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MAGHREB POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 1, 9 Jan 82, pp 20-21, 23

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text] FOR THE Maghreb, on the Arab world's western fringe, 1981 was more a year of continuity than radical change. Political events in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania had a distinctly regional character — a far cry from the international implications of events in the Middle East.

Tunisia pursued its cautious path towards the liberalisation of its political life, while patching up relations with its neighbours in North Africa. In Algeria, President Chadli Benjedid reinforced his own position, and charted the course for fundamental economic reform.

Morocco, increasingly bogged down in the bitter six-year conflict in the Western Sahara against the Algerian-backed Polisario, suffered the worst drought of the century — as well as a serious deterioration in its domestic political climate. Mauritania, having opted out of the Saharan war in 1979, sought to affirm its neutrality and keep its parlous economy afloat.

Having unexpectedly come to power in 1980, Tunisia's prime minister, Mohammed Mzali, staked his reputation in 1981 on overcoming the country's latent political crisis — which had engendered an uprising by workers in 1978, and an armed attack by dissidents against the southern mining town of Gafsa two years.

The key to Mzali's strategy was to re-establish a democratically elected leadership in the powerful trade union organisation, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), and open the door for the first time in the country's 25 years of post-colonial history to multi-party elections.

The UGTT congress in the spring of 1981 capped the political rehabilitation process, with a 37-year-old university lecturer, Taieb Baccouche, being elected as secretary-general. There are many different currents still inside the union, including one favourable to the former union leader Habib Achour. In any case, the UGTT congress affirmed its will to adopt an independent line vis-a-vis the ruling Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD).

During the summer, the political process moved into high gear when the aging presi-

dent, Habib Bourguiba, gave the go ahead for the re-emergence of the banned Communist Party. Along with two other more moderate formations, Ahmed Mestiri's Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS) and the wing of the Mouvement d'Unité Populaire (MUP) opposed to exiled Ahmed Ben Salah also decided to participate in the October elections.

The more radical leftwing organisations, as well as the Muslim fundamentalists, called for a boycott of the ballot, to little real effect. The government, fearing the growing impact of the fundamentalists, gave its two principal leaders long prison sentences during the summer and clamped down on its press.

To general surprise, the PSD carried all 136 seats in parliament, with none of the other parties winning the five per cent of the vote needed to legally exist in the post-electoral period. The Opposition forces claimed that the ballot was rigged, and that the country had lost a golden opportunity to prove its democratic credentials to the world. After UGTT candidates, on the PSD

list, won 27 seats, it decided to set up its own parliamentary group.

The year ended with a major, and unexpected, volte face: President Bourguiba rehabilitated his arch-rival, Habib Achour, who was given the post (specially created for him) as UGTT president. In fact, with Baccouche moving gently to the background, Achour once again took over effective leadership of the UGTT.

On the economic front, recent oil discoveries by British and American companies indicate that Tunisia should maintain oil exports (its largest hard currency earner), at least until 1990. The continuing exploration drive could well uncover new reserves. Highly dependent on a limited resource base, Tunisia badly needs new oil to ensure its future growth.

However, the development of the promising Gulf of Gabes continental plateau is still blocked by the dispute with Libya. The case is currently before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and an advisory decision is expected imminently. Meanwhile, the Libyans have sought to prevent Tunisia from joining the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (Oapcec) until a solution is found.

In spite of this imbroglio, relations with Tripoli markedly improved in 1981, with Tunisia finding a large export market in its eastern neighbour. Economic cooperation with Algeria was also stepped up, and a joint bank established.

In Algeria, President Chadli Benjedid has continued to show himself a shrewd political tactician — as he has done since coming to power in 1979 as a compromise candidate imposed by the armed forces. Last year he beat off his chief rivals within the ruling Front de Libération National (FLN), with the ex-party coordinator, Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, and the former foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, both removed from the party's political bureau.

Chadli has pushed for a pragmatic middleway between the Yahiaoui faction, which is supported by radical pan-Arab and leftwing forces, and the western-leaning supporters of Bouteflika. As a result, Algeria — while remaining in the Steadfastness Front — has played a more moderate and less vociferous role in Arab diplomacy. At the same time, Chadli has stressed Algeria's African dimension by visiting more than a dozen sub-Saharan states during the year.

The country's attitude towards the Western Saharan conflict remains basically unchanged: it calls for direct negotiations between the Polisario and Morocco, and refuses to be considered as a belligerent. Another positive foreign affairs development was the rapprochement with France, highlighted by President Mitterrand's state visit last month.

It is domestic affairs, however, which seem to monopolise the president's time. After the last 20 years of enforced austerity, Algeria's people (more than half of whom are under 18) are looking to better living

conditions. Chadli has promised to bring an end to the abuses and inefficiency of an extensive bureaucracy and parastatal sector; there have already been efforts to produce more consumer goods, provide badly needed social services and boost the agricultural sector.

The year's main public debate in Algeria has involved what role to accord the private sector in the 1980s. The reform measures envisaged will give 'non-exploitative private enterprise' access to public credit and raw materials, in the hope that it might provide basic commodities which are in short supply — and provide employment for the growing work force. The parastatal sector is to be decentralised in the interests of greater efficiency.

The accent has been on consolidating the economic growth of the past, and no major new projects were launched in 1981. Moreover, Algeria did not relent in its drive to link LNG prices with oil's: negotiations with France and the US are continuing, and an agreement with France is in the pipeline for early 1982.

Along with the other African producers of sweet crude, Algeria resisted the year's downward pressure on prices, but to little avail. The state hydrocarbon concern, Sonatrach, fell far short of its annual production targets: 45m tonnes of crude oil, 8m tonnes of condensates, 16.7bn cubic metres of LNG, 1.4m tonnes of LPG, and 15.5m tonnes of refined products.

Apart from that for condensates, none of these goals were attained. Oil output, for example, will probably not exceed 35m tonnes, of which 11m tonnes went through the country's refineries. LNG production will probably not reach half the projected level. And 1981 hydrocarbon export revenues have been estimated by officials at around \$12.5bn, some 8.2 per cent lower than forecast — and just under 15 per cent up on 1980.

One crucial problem that did not flare up in 1981 was the Berber 'cultural question', as it is officially termed. But, with its political overtones, it remains a hornets' nest for the government. The Berbers made little progress in their bid to have their linguistic rights respected in the 'Arabisation' of daily life.

The most dramatic political events in the Maghreb in 1981 were in Morocco — where, during massive protests in June against government economic policy, the armed forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing several hundred. Sweeping arrests were also made, including the leadership of the opposition Union Socialiste des Forces Progressistes (USFP). This marked the first serious crack in the 'union sacrée' built up around King Hassan for the 'recuperation' of the kingdom's 'lost' Saharan provinces.

The three-party government coalition also fell apart. The split in the largest political party, Le Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI), caused the faction led by ex-premier (and Hassan's brother-in-law) Ahmed Osman to leave ruling circles. In addition to independent political personalities, the government formed in November included members of the Istiqlal Party, the breakaway RNI group known as the Indépendants Démocrates and the rural-based Mouvement Populaire.

The political crisis has been exacerbated by a second year of severe drought, which has devastated Moroccan agriculture and accelerated the rural exodus. It is estimated that cereal production fell by something like half, with perhaps 40 per cent of the country's livestock perishing. Exports of citrus fruits and winter vegetables to the European market have also collapsed, with the loss of hard currency earnings. Equally, the need to import cereals has widened the trade deficit, which is expected to rise to \$2.1bn in 1981, up from \$1.8bn the previous year.

The Western Saharan war, costing an estimated \$3m per day, is a severe extra burden for the economy. In 1981, the royal armed forces completed the first phase of its new defensive tactics with the strategic triangle fortification protecting the capital, El Aioun, Smara and the Bu Craa phosphate mines. The intensity of combat slackened for most of the year — until Polisario launched, in October, its lightning attack against the 2,000-strong garrison at Guelta Zemmour.

The success of Polisario's offensive — five Moroccan aircraft were shot down, and several hundred prisoners taken, at Guelta Zemmour — forced the Moroccan high command to abandon its last two outposts outside the strategic triangle. This means that Hassan's forces now effectively control only some ten per cent of Saharan territory.

After Hassan accused Polisario of using heavy battle tanks and sophisticated Sam-6 and Sam-8 anti-aircraft missiles, he requested an upgrading of US military assistance. The new US ambassador in Rabat, Joseph Werner Reed, is an active partisan of the king's cause, and the Reagan administration is likely to prove sympathetic to Moroccan demands for new arms systems — especially after the November visit to Rabat of a high-level Pentagon and State Department mission.

Hitherto, the Western Saharan conflict has not seen direct superpower involvement. With the probability of increased US aid to Morocco, however, Polisario, through its allies in Algeria and Libya, may well seek new Soviet-made arms to match Hassan's upgraded armoury.

Yet as recently as June, after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Nairobi, it seemed that a dynamic for peace was finally emerging. King Hassan offered to organise a self-determination referendum in the contested former Spanish colony, and this proposal was accepted by the OAU. However, the special OAU application committee has run up against serious problems: in particular, the definition of the referendum's exact character, and who will be able to vote in it.

Little progress on a negotiated solution of the Saharan question came during the second half of 1981. To complicate things even further, Hassan has recently announced that he no longer feels bound by his pledges at Nairobi because of Polisario's new wave of attacks.

The Saharan affair also dominated political events in the southernmost of the Maghreb nations, Mauritania. Since its August 1979 peace treaty with the guerrilla forces, Mauritania has sought to maintain a precarious neutrality in the conflict. Rabat, however, has persistently accused it of allowing Polisario forces to use the northern part of its immense land mass — a claim strongly denied by officials in Nouakchott. New accusations after the Guelta Zemmour attack only further strained the already tense relations between the two countries.

The Mauritians are extremely wary of Moroccan intentions, and accuse Hassan of seeking to destabilise the ruling Military Committee of National Salvation (CMSN). President Mohammed Khouna Ould Haydalla's regime survived a coup attempt in March by Moroccan-backed Mauritanian dissidents belonging to the Rabat-based Alliance pour une Mauritanie Democratique (AMD).

Under Saudi auspices at Taif last summer, President Haydalla and King Hassan pledged to paper over the cracks in bilateral relations, but it was a promise that never bore fruit. On the other hand, ties with Algeria markedly improved in 1981. Algiers now supplies both budgetary assistance and technical aid.

With the combined effects of the prolonged Sahel drought and the war's dislocation, Mauritania is highly dependent on economic aid, particularly from the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Algeria are the prime aid donors, but it seems that in 1981 the flow of Arab petrodollars significantly slowed down.

CSO: 4500/91

BRIEFS

JAPANESE CONTRACTS--A Japanese company, Japan Gasoline Corporation (JGC) has won orders in the Gulf worth more than \$1 billion. The largest is a contract worth some \$1 billion to build an oil refinery for the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) at Mina al-Ahmadi on the Gulf by 1985. The contract, on a cost-plus-fee basis, includes a feasibility study to decide the capacity of the new refinery and modify the existing refinery there, according to a REUTERS report from Tokyo. Last year JGC won an order to enlarge the existing refinery to handle 270,000 b/d of crude oil by 1984 on a cost-plus-fee contract worth an estimated \$6 million, but KNPC now plans also to modify the refinery. The new refinery will specialise in the production of gasoline, paraffin oil and low sulphur heavy oil. JGC recently signed a contract with another Kuwaiti company, Kuwait Gas, for the construction of a 45-kilometre long gasline and a gas compression station serving the Wafrah oil field in the south of the country. Completion is scheduled for July 1983. Finally, the Saudi Arabian state-owned enterprise Petromin has awarded JGC an \$11.4 million order to build tanks and refuelling facilities at the airports of al-Jawf and Turayf between now and February 1983. The Japanese company has carried out similar work at the airports of Tokyo-Narita and Singapore. [Text]
[Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 52, 28 Dec 81 pp 8, 9]

CSO: 4400/114

FATE OF SOVIET HOSTAGES, GEOLOGIST DISCUSSED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Dec 81 p 3

/Report from Correspondent Olaf Ihlau/

/Text/ "You alone can save me now," the writer of the letter desperately appealed to Moscow's party chief Leonid Brezhnev. He reminded Brezhnev that he had devoted his entire life to the Soviet Union "in all sincerity." Yet it looks as if the USSR will ask its loyal citizen to render it the ultimate service--to sacrifice his life. So far the Kremlin has not responded to the imploring calls for help by Soviet geologist E.R. Okhrimuk, kidnaped in broad daylight by Afghan resistance fighters in Kabul last September, asking that he should be exchanged for 50 political prisoners. Any prolongation of this silence will sooner or later spell the end for the 68-year old scientist as well as for various Russian soldiers and officers who were captured by the Muslim religious warriors on the Hindukush since last summer.

The most prominent hostage of the Afghan guerrillas is alleged to be held in a camp in the southern province of Nangarhar. That province is the location of the main operational bases of the underground movement headed by Yunis Chalis. It is a group splintered off from the orthodox Hezbi Islami (Party of Islam). The former teacher (61) is the only partisan chief still actively participating in the battles against the Babrak Karmal Government and the Soviet occupation forces. All other chiefs are with the groups in exile in Pakistan's northwestern border province. His commandos place bombs in the capital and send out small groups which liquidate high functionaries. They can boast of some successes. "If one of us is threatened with capture, he prefers to use the last bullet on himself," says the chief of the Kabul Chalis group.

This slightly built fur trader, let us call him Abdul, had organized the kidnap of the Russian geologist who seems to be of Central Asian origin. It was a subversive masterpiece, both with regard to planning and execution. Akhrimuk's Afghan driver was a fellow conspirator of the two kidnapers who, after a simulated accident on the drive to the Ministry for Industry, quickly overpowered the scientist and then calmly drove the car with the government license plates past all checkpoints out of Kabul. They thought to have captured more than just a scientist involved in geology. Okhrimuk, an expert on fossile fuels, had come to this heartland of Asia 5 years ago as an adviser to the then government. This was just the time when the ruling despot Daud's passion for the Soviet neighbor to the north was rapidly cooling, and he got more and more friendly with that liberal spender, the Shah of Iran, and with charismatic Pakistani President Bhutto. Reason enough for Moscow, together

with the Kabul comrades, to spin the web of that conspiracy which, in April 1978, ended in the murder of Daud and revolution. Was Okhrimyuk possibly involved in the preparations for the coup?

A Serious Accusation

Possibly. At any rate the Mujaheddin consider that their hostage is worth the freedom of 50 imprisoned comrades-at-arms. Talking recently with Western diplomats, Soviet Ambassador Vasili Zafronchuk, Moscow's "chief adviser" in Kabul, claimed that this demand was impossible of fulfillment "from the sheer physical aspect." He asserted that the majority of the warriors of Allah had perished long ago "without a trace" in Daud's torture chambers. Zafronchuk also believes that the geologist has by now been taken out of the country, to a guerrilla camp in north Pakistan. This is also intimated by Chalis follower Abdul, although he claims that most of the resistance fighters listed for an exchange were shot in Pul-i-Charkhi Prison only now, following publication of their names. However, Abdul is unable to supply evidence to sustain this serious accusation.

No Hope of Mercy

E.R. Okhrimyuk has now been a captive of the insurgents for nearly 3 months and seems to be in poor health. In one of his letters to the Kremlin leadership this Soviet citizen reported that he had not seen any American or Chinese instructors during his Odyssey through Afghan villages, only armed Afghans "who fight for their right as a free people and against 'B.K.'." The initials B.K. stand for Babrak Karmal, Kabul's revolutionary ruler. It is said that he strongly opposes any negotiations because this would be the first step toward Soviet recognition of his political foes. Up to the present the Moslem insurgents were merely termed "counter-revolutionary bandits, criminals, looters and hooligans" by both Kabul and Moscow.

Allegedly the Soviets reacted coldly to feelers put out by the International Red Cross regarding possible negotiations. If his rulers are prepared to sacrifice him, Okhrimyuk cannot expect mercy from the religious warriors involved in a "holy war." In the course of a conversation Babrak Karmal's brother Mahmoud Baryalai did not hide his opinion that he considered minimal the chances for a favorable end to the case. "We will never bow to terrorism," proclaimed the Central Committee secretary of the Democratic People's Party. Moreover, he added two sentences which, with brutal banality, go far to seal the geologist's fate: "Revolutions demand sacrifices. I have great respect for this Soviet expert and all those who sacrificed themselves for the world revolution."

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CSO: 4620/16

INDEPENDENT OPPOSITION FIGURE DISCUSSES VIEWS WITH PRO-GOVERNMENT ORGAN

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2978, 6 Nov 81 pp 24-26

[Interview with Muntaz Nassar by AL-MUSAWWAR: "Mubarak Will Do a Great Deal for Egypt Because He Is Truthful, Simple and Serious"; date and place not specified]

Text Once the language of dialogue between the ruling majority and the opposition minority had been severed, who was it that cut the lines of communication between the majority and the independents, so that they ultimately became one of the parties to this opposition?

The goal of this meeting is not to get each of us to look backward in anger but to put our hands on the future. For this reason Muntaz Nassar came to visit us. He is the most famous independent in the current People's Assembly. He is a native of al-Bidari, a town which has recorded the highest incidence of violence after Chicago. He is a lawyer and became famous recently because his office is where the independents hold all their press conferences.

We held this dialogue, whose text we publish in full.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Now that President Mubarak has asserted his intense enthusiasm for the need for an objective dialogue between the opposition and the majority, what is your notion of the possibility of building new bridges of mutual understanding and solidarity between the majority and the opposition?

Muntaz Nassar: Any dialogue in order to build bridges between the majority and the opposition is vital to the interests of the regime and to the interests of democracy, which call for a majority and an opposition making statements that it believes to be correct in order to bring about welfare for the nation and implant the examples we believe in.

AL-MUSAWWAR: That is true; we understand that you as independents have refused to join parties because you wanted to be the connecting link between them. Have the independents managed to play their part? If they have not, is that due to negative points on their part or existing conditions?

Answer In actuality, there are people who consider that independents have no role in a multi-party system. That statement has actually been made by some officials; it is theoretical and does not correspond to reality. The fact is that independents exist in all political systems, in multi-party or single-party systems; they express

the opinions that bring the majority and the opposition together, because if an issue is confined to a single opinion, we will never arrive at the truth. The truth is the flower of dialogue, and differences in opinions are what give birth to correct opinions.

Independents have a role; they could have made a party but there were restrictions in the Law on Parties. We tried to establish the National Front Party but that was obstructed. We filed a case with the judiciary and stated that the Law on Parties was unconstitutional. The court said that the case on unconstitutionality was vital and that it had to be brought before the Supreme Constitutional Court. The hearing was set for next 7 December. We have not joined any parties out of our belief that there is nothing in the parties' programs in spite of our devotion to it, needed some changes if it was to create a kind of balance among the authorities. This view does not exist in the programs of the existing parties, which approve of the existing constitution. Therefore I believe that the National Front Party is distinct from the others.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Your status as independents made it mandatory that you be the connecting link among parties. Do you believe that you have performed your role in this area?

[Answer] Let me speak frankly. After the protest against the establishment of the National Front Party was made, we actually did form our position as independents and it happened that a number of laws were passed whose provisions we considered restrictive, and we tried to amend them. However, our opinion found no response with the majority. We settled for going into opposition, as far as we could, and for getting our views across to officials and people who were not officials in the country through press conferences. I believe that this technique has not been sufficient for carrying out our mission and I therefore believe that we, as independents, have not achieved everything we had aimed at.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Hasn't the independents' total alignment with the opposition been a weak point in the independents' basic positions?

[Answer] There has been no total alignment. Rather, in the press conferences which I prepared, I collected all the opposition views and parties and at the same time rebuked the nationwide media for failing to allocate space to us. Even the opposition press did not give the independents enough space to publish the views they considered appropriate. They were more concerned with their own positions. Similarly, we were indeed subject to a media boycott.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Has this media boycott had an effect on the political conduct of the opposition -- I mean, from the standpoint of psychological influence, making it harsher and more extreme?

[Answer] The media boycott undoubtedly has had an effect in getting us to orient ourselves toward holding press conferences, although in fact I would have preferred it if the nationwide press had allotted space to us to publish the opinions we hold. When they did not do so, our only recourse was to hold press conferences for the sake of expressing our views before the public in Egypt and abroad.

AL-MUSAWWAR: If the nationwide press had allotted you this space, would the situation have been different? Would that have affected the severity of the confrontation between the majority and the opposition?

[Answer] I believe that had the nationwide press taken that approach cooperation among various bodies would have resulted. It is in the national interest that the nationwide press not align itself with the majority view -- rather, in the national spirit it must, and in the interests of democracy, give attention, if only to a limited extent, to other views.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Do you believe that that alignment has influenced the psychology and behavior of the opposition?

[Answer] I believe that it was because people in the opposition felt that they were being boycotted; that influenced them psychologically and influenced their behavior and conduct.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Consequently, it has also affected their concern with issues that they should not have taken up so violently.

[Answer] Boycotts do not serve any purpose. What does serve and develop democracy is the expression of opinions and contrary opinions.

AL-MUSAWWAR: We believe that such a boycott (if there was one) occurred at an early period but that the opposition subsequently came into possession of papers of its own.

[Answer] Opposition papers came very belatedly. We, as I said, were not able to express our opinions as independents in these papers because the newspapers were preoccupied with their own party activity and with promoting material written by party members.

AL-MUSAWWAR: To be balanced and fair, we would like you to identify for us the negative aspects of the conduct on both sides, the majority and the minority, in the period that has ended. How might we identify these negative aspects?

[Answer] The fact is that the majority's mistakes were many times greater than those of the minority. The majority did not have the generosity to listen much to other opinions, and when it did listen to opposition views it greeted them by boycotting them. As far as I am concerned, the opposition listened to me and listened to me in many instances, whereas I for my part was concerned to present opposition views in a manner which would not provoke anyone. On many other instances, though, they boycotted me and I would ask them to listen and then exercise the right to reject what I said. The dialogue within the assembly was full of negative features on the majority's part.

AL-MUSAWWAR: As people observing what has happened, [we can say] your statements in the People's Assembly were rarely broken off. Don't you believe that ways of acting and pursuing a specific method of speaking have had their effect?

[Answer] In reality I did not experience many clashes inside the assembly but as regards the press conferences to which I took recourse according to parliamentary

tradition, opposition deputies who do not have a newspaper have the right to seek recourse to these conferences and call them in opposition chambers in the assembly, but that did not happen.

AL-MUSAWWAR: This is one point against the majority. What have its other negative features been?

Answer The matter of committees' chairmanships. The majority has monopolized committee chairs.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Aren't such positions referred to the rule of the vote?

Answer In every parliament in the world the rule is that the minority is given some committee activities.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Would it have been possible for the majority party to give you chairmanship of the Legislative Committee, which you wanted, though agreement had not been reached over the broad lines of the definition of the higher national spirit?

Answer I was not talking about a specific committee chair; I was talking about the majority extending its hand to the opposition so that agreement could be reached on major national issues, and the opposition could be represented in agencies and institutions one way or another.

AL-MUSAWWAR: What else about the negative features of the majority?

Answer I believe that this will suffice.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Let us move over then to the negative features of the opposition.

Answer The opposition must be in direct contact with the majority, and this is something the opposition has not yet been able to grasp and carry out thoroughly in order to bring about the public interest.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Why? Is that because of the opposition's failure to understand its role?

Answer These are psychological points. If they are eliminated, there is great hope that a rapprochement can be achieved. We as independents have gone down every road in order to bring about such mutual understanding.

AL-MUSAWWAR: How was it possible 1 month after the launching of the democratic experiment that the National Unionist Grouping Party [NPUG] could exploit the events of 18-19 January? Wouldn't it have been better for this party to face the situation in a different manner, in order to implant the democratic spirit?

[Answer] I do not have the right to criticize the negative points of other parties.

AL-MUSAWWAR: But we are speaking about Egypt!

[Answer] Any party that pursues conduct against Egypt does not deserve to have anyone defend it if the judiciary rules it guilty.

AL-MUSAWWAR: When the setback occurred, all the progressive parties took a stand and the Egyptian left raised the slogan of unity in order to cope with the setback and protect the regime. Why was there no such slogan for the sake of implanting democracy? Why didn't they stand alongside the majority and say that this was a threat to democracy?

[Answer] They should have taken this approach. We, as independents, played our part. I go back to the request for information on the Pyramid Heights: we succeeded in stopping that project.

AL-MUSAWWAR: The majority gets credit for that before the opposition does. The opposition screamed while the majority answered, executed, abrogated and acted.

[Answer] Yes, the majority also gets credit. There was a request for information on duties that had been stipulated on the courts' behalf. The government responded and it was determined that the money that had been collected would be repaid in installments. However, that was not done.

AL-MUSAWWAR: The government responded from the standpoint of principle and agreed to that. If the execution had been slow it would have been possible to file a case against the ministers of justice and finance in order to get the verdict executed. Who was it that did not allow this fruitful approach to continue?

[Answer] I do not want to dig up the past, I want to learn about the future.

AL-MUSAWWAR: If, for the sake of argument, we consider that the majority has not been generous with the opposition in the period that has ended and that the opposition felt bitterness over its isolation and media boycott, what is reawakening the hope today that a new leaf can be turned?

[Answer] The leaf that President Husni Mubarak turned in his latest speech and the contents of his declaration are appropriate. We do not have to live in the past. We must translate the principles of the speech into deeds and bridges for cooperation between the majority and the opposition. Through such cooperation, we will be able to carry out and apply everything President Husni Mubarak requested in his speech.

AL-MUSAWWAR: What things did that program contain which encouraged the opposition to become receptive to a dialogue?

[Answer] Combatting corruption, favoritism and laxity and domestic reform. The president declared the majority's determination to enlighten itself on the opposition's views on national issues before presenting these issues to the constitutional institutions.

AL-MUSAWWAR: The statement sketched out the man's aspirations with respect to reform, but how will the majority and the opposition cooperate in carrying this program out?

[Answer] If we proceed under the guidance of the contents of the speech, that will lead us to establish confidence between the majority and the opposition and therefore the rest will follow. The basic issue in making the dialogue a success and in making cooperation a success is to restore confidence. If confidence is restored, the rest will be easy.

AL-MUSAWWAR: What specific tasks are the independents now expecting from President Husni Mubarak?

[Answer] Just to carry out what he promised in his program. He has our full support on the need to give full priority to the affirmation of security and stability in our country. We agree with his excellency the president on the emergency law -- on condition that that be for a temporary period and that it end when the need for it ends, as he has said it will.

AL-MUSAWWAR: In the light of these circumstances, is it possible to spell out a specific period for the emergency law, especially since he has promised that he will lift it as soon as these circumstances end?

[Answer] Absolutely. I told him so. We are also demanding that elections by list be amended, because that is in violation of the constitution. I told the president so and he told me that that matter would be given study and attention.

AL-MUSAWWAR: If these are your demands of the president, what is your method for carrying them out?

[Answer] Our new approach is to support every view regarding any decree issued by the government which will bring about the realization of these principles. We will reject any decree the government presents which entails the infringement of any of these principles. We will support the new president through statements; through our talk in the assembly we will make him feel that we are standing alongside him in every way.

AL-MUSAWWAR: What is your opinion about the black terror that exists in Egypt today?

[Answer] We as independents totally and absolutely reject all forms of terror. These are phenomena which no one who thinks of his country's interest can accept and we therefore call upon the government to resolve this question as soon as possible.

AL-MUSAWWAR: If that is your position, don't you believe that if we had applied the Law on National Unity to 10 or 20 people from the beginning the terrorist groups would not have become so widespread? Don't you believe that the severe wave of opposition to the list of detentions issued on 5 September was not /sic/ out of place?

[Answer] In the case of the terrorists, yes; in the case of the politicians, no.

AL-MUSAWWAR: We believe that if this list of detentions had not been issued we would now be facing a more difficult problem. The September decrees thwarted the power of these groups to a large degree.

[Answer] If the process had been confined to the real terrorist groups whose gravity, and whose pursuit of a dangerous role, has now been revealed by investigations, that idea would have been proper. I do indeed agree that as far as they dealt with the members of terrorist groups these decrees naturally reduced the volume of the loss.

AL-MUSAWWAR: If the opposition had had an accurate picture and had been informed of the scope of the conspiracy, would you have understood the reasons for these lists?

[Answer] The government's duty is to present that to the opposition as a question of duty which it is necessary to take an opinion on lest we talk about and oppose issues whose dimensions we are not aware of. I personally have been burned by the fire of terrorism. A nephew of mine in Asyut, a young recently-married agricultural engineer, was shot by a terrorist as he was looking out a window in his home.

AL-MUSANWAR: How do you view the most suitable means for establishing a dialogue between the opposition and the majority?

[Answer] Ways of getting together must be planned and carefully studied. I do not have specific ways in mind. The approach could take the form of periodic meetings inside and outside parliament and among all parties so that they can exchange opinions and information and reach agreement on several outlines.

AL-MUSANWAR: Shall we now ask President Husni Mubarak to abrogate the Camp David agreement and the peace treaty, of which you have been an opponent?

[Answer] I cannot do so now, for many reasons, most important of which is that Egypt has committed itself internationally to this treaty. Rather, I am asking him to carry out our commitments in it.

AL-MUSANWAR: Why?

[Answer] Our respect for our international commitments and the fact that we will regain the rest of the occupied territory in Sinai next April. As regards our reservations about the treaty, we have expressed them in the past; at the present time, however, we have committed ourselves internationally to this treaty and we stand behind the president in bringing about an evacuation from Egypt, because what concerns us is Egypt. However, I can say that achieving Arab solidarity for the sake of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is necessary.

AL-MUSANWAR: Is it possible to achieve Arab solidarity through Egypt's disavowal of the Camp David agreements, as some people believe?

[Answer] This approach is impractical and it is out of the question.

AL-MUSANWAR: How then can such solidarity be achieved?

[Answer] By convincing people, by contacting them, by holding initiatives with them, on bringing them around to Egypt's position, especially since Egypt is anxious to bring about all the hopes of the Arab nation.

AL-MUSANWAR: Let us now turn to what was discussed between you and President Husni Mubarak.

[Answer] One has to be thankful for President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's initiative. He talked with us about all the issues. The most prominent thread of discussion dealt with his concern for Arab solidarity, his insistence on fighting corruption and favoritism, his readiness to follow through with the course of democracy and his assertion that it was necessary to stabilize security and preserve the sovereignty of the law. We spoke about election by lists; he said that that issue was something that could be discussed and he stressed that one of his important initiatives was to fight corruption everywhere.

At the end of the meeting he told me "The idea people had given me about you is now completely different. I myself sense truthfulness, simplicity and clarity." As for my impression of President Husni Mubarak's personality, I felt greatly reassured after meeting him. I am certain that this man will do a great deal because he is simple, truthful and serious.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Where did you get this feeling?

[Answer] He put emphasis on what the masses felt and what the Egyptian man in the street wants, and he is firm in his insistence on fighting sloppiness and deviation. If we close these loopholes we will at the same time be putting a stop to the conduct through which terror seeps into the minds of young people.

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MAGAZINE CONDUCTS DISCUSSIONS WITH SECULAR OPPOSITION FIGURES

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2978, 6 Nov 81 pp 20-24

[Article: "AL-MUSAWWAR Builds Bridges of Dialogue to the Opposition"]

[Excerpt] Now that President Mubarak has expressed extreme enthusiasm to have an objective dialogue between the opposition and the majority, AL-MUSAWWAR, on its initiative, out of its full appreciation of the need for solidarity among nationalist forces in coping with the danger of destructive terrorism, whose target has been the ruling regime and the opposition both, as it considers them to be partners in the general form of government which terrorism renounces and rejects in form and substance -- out of full appreciation for all this on the part of all parties, AL-MUSAWWAR opened a dialogue this week with two detachments of the opposition, the independents and the Labor Party. It held a discussion with Mumtaz Nasser, the independent opposition deputy, and then another one with the Labor Party, represented by its chairman Eng Ibrahim Shukri, Dr Layla Takla, Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, Rif'at al-Shahawi, Sayyid Jalal, Sayyid Rustum and 'Abd-al-'Aziz Salim. This is the result of the dialogue in full.

AL-MUSAWWAR: When we asked President Mubarak, in the interview we published last week, about his views on the need for a dialogue between the majority and the opposition, he said without hesitation that he would not oppose the pursuit of such a dialogue, especially since the Labor Party had risen to the level of national responsibility and its behavior, following the assassination, had been a model of serious political action; when the country is in crisis, everyone must put their shoulders together to ward off danger. Proceeding from this position, we see no obstacle at all that would inhibit such a dialogue. We, for our part, had no doubts that the Labor Party would respond to this invitation, although we consider that the sound approach to any dialogue on the future of democratic action in Egypt lies in understanding the lessons that have been drawn from previous experience so that we may ascertain the different aspects of its shortcomings. Here the point is that we can really determine our future course.

Rif'at al-Shahawi, member of the Labor Party, responded by saying:

"First, we thank AL-MUSAWWAR for being receptive to this dialogue, and we also thank it for having raised the issue in its comprehensive conversation with President Mubarak. The fact is that Eng Ibrahim Shukri began the dialogue in a natural way, since the Labor Party began the dialogue from a premise of a real expression of its role and the reason for its presence on the political stage. The Labor Party

exists in order to start to carry out and instill specific notions, foremost of which is democracy. Therefore when matters in the recent stage became critical following the assassination of the late President al-Sadat, we in the Labor Party started to sense the gravity of this stage for the nation. It was on the basis of this premise that the party acted and its behavior was indeed up to its national responsibility.

"When Eng Ibrahim Shukri called on party members to support the nomination of Mr Husni Mubarak as president and summoned the party leaders to discuss this decision, no one opposed Eng Ibrahim Shukri's demand. Therefore the party statement of absolute support was issued with total unanimity.

"What happened was based on the premise that we had felt that we were all in a serious stage and that we were all in the same boat. The terrorist movement that assassinated al-Sadat had among its objectives the assassination of all the leaders in the regime and all the leaders in the opposition; it was essentially aimed at overthrowing the regime and was opposed to all the constitutional forms al-Sadat had established. We also felt that we were embarking on a new stage and that we had to prepare new ground in order to be able to nurture good, high quality plants."

A Better Climate for Cooperation between Government and Opposition

AL-MUSAWWAR: So the Labor Party agreed to support the situation on grounds that it sensed a danger, being a partner in the current situation in Egypt. What is there to prevent the Labor Party from completing the step it started with the meeting between its leaders and President Husni Mubarak and further extending its hand to a democratic dialogue aimed at creating a better climate for cooperation between the government and the opposition?

Rif'at al-Shahawi: It will not harm the Labor Party to hold theoretical discussions with various parties, since it wishes to express its principles and ideas intellectually and morally. We in the Labor Party want real democracy in the sense that we want to give good actions proper acknowledgment. We also have the moral courage to state our opinions on everything we consider to be harmful, and we do not in any way consider that our role is one of opposition for the sake of opposition in itself. This is not our mission. Rather, we are trying to perform our duty toward our country and people and extend our hand to everyone who extends his hand to us for the sake of this role.

AL-MUSAWWAR: In the view of the Labor Party, what are the lessons which have been drawn from the previous stage? What errors are common to the opposition and the majority? We would like, as we raise this question, to emphasize that we do not want to put the past on trial. Our goal is to describe the actual situation, which is the best basis for drawing a picture of the future. The course of democracy suffered a relapse, not just because of the mistakes of the majority; rather, a large part of this relapse is related to the conduct of the opposition parties, especially in the period that ended recently.

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi: "I personally am totally in agreement with AL-MUSAWWAR on the point that the future is the product of yesterday and today. I totally agree with you that we must not let the past condemn us. It can only teach us but it cannot condemn us. Proceeding from this premise, we must, in this objective dialogue, try

to divide things up in terms of parties, climates, and psychological, social, economic and political circumstances, without turning the past into a barrier that stands between us and a calm dialogue which can open the road toward the future we desire.

If we start with the parties themselves, I believe that I should not say anything about intentions; only God knows those and everyone is held accountable for them. However, the outward appearance of things is that the democratic picture which was sought did not in our view represent a true democracy. Therefore a severe gap arose between what we wanted to say and what democracy allowed. That subjected us to psychological factors, and, following the revolution, we lived under a single party, that is, an authoritarian system, which is a regime that dictates its will while we only listen. It was difficult for us to prevail in the stage of transition from an authoritarian regime to the form of democracy the late president wanted. That was a psychological situation which everyone is familiar with, especially since people's spirits were not prepared to accept criticism at that time. We all lived through this authoritarian period in history and carried out orders from above in the Socialist Union and other organizations. It was natural, in the course of the dialogue, that we should begin by being in fear of the structural circumstances in which we grew up. Therefore there was no clarity in any form. The real reason was a lack of familiarity with the situation for many long years.

As for the general atmosphere, opposition parties emerged after the emergence of the ruling party, the Egypt Party and then the National Party. It was natural that these parties should have a majority; this climate perforce led the people in the majority to claim a natural right to all the media and means of expression, which is what happened. Some people had the idea that everything given to others was a gift. This created a sort of touchiness and here I would like to point out that I very much liked what President Mubarak said when we met with him and he stated "We are partners. When the extremists killed al-Sadat, they hoped to kill the National Party, the opposition and the government, because we are partners." This is the truth. I had hoped that in the previous period we could have proceeded on a basis of participation, not on the basis that there are people who have and people who are not entitled /to have/. We are all Egyptians and we will all drown if the boat sinks while we will be saved if the boat stays afloat.

I can specify that things proceeded quietly for a number of months after the formation of the Labor Party and the National Party. There was hope for a mutual understanding concerning an atmosphere which could give the partners a chance to work together. However, what happened is that people who have generally cannot do without what they have; this was a small blunder in our democratic evolution and had an effect psychologically and politically on the general atmosphere.

By this I mean that whoever has four nationwide papers and 20 nationwide magazines will not abandon one page of them to his opposition. After that, the regime started to give the majority the opportunity to act on the basis that it had something and would not let the minority share anything with it.

The Transition Stage and the Requisite Guarantees

AL-MUSAWWAR: When you say that what was sought was the form of democracy, and not democracy itself, don't you see that you have forgotten an important element, which

is that the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime cannot take place all at once and that the period of transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system required greater time? Don't you believe that the transition stage required some guarantees which the regime itself might require, and the country might require, because of circumstances related to the transition from one system to another?

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi: I am not laying blame on anyone. Rather, it is my hope to deduce the lessons from which benefit is to be drawn, if we want to benefit. Who specifies what the bottleneck is or what the stage of transition and transformation, and its requirements, are to be? How far does this bottleneck extend? Must everything that is allowed to pass through the bottleneck lack organization, or is it to be subject to circumstances and requirements?

Answering these questions requires that there be good will concerning the course of democracy.

AL-MUSAWWAR: In this regard, let us ask you a specific question: Is it reasonable for the National Unionist Grouping Party [NPUG] to take a position on the events of 18-19 January similar to the one it took, after 1 month of the democratic experiment, which was all we had at that time? In my opinion the NPUG blocked the bottleneck with its unobjective stance, for the sake of a phenomenon which it did not interpret very well in the streets. We cannot forget the psychological effect of the 18-19 January events. To what extent is the opposition responsible for this?

Dr al-Hadidi: I can say that every action has equal opposite reaction. If I talk to you in words and you reply in words, that is democracy. However, if I talk to you in words and you reply with stiff decrees, that is not democracy.

As for what happened on 18-19 January, that is serious. One must look at it objectively and intelligently. A departure from the ordinary is not an ordinary matter, but why was it criticized as behavior on the part of the opposition? Why wasn't it criticized as a reaction to the high prices of that period, for example?

AL-MUSAWWAR: The NPUG used the agencies of the central committee to make contacts; that is well known and has been proved. Perhaps you remember after the 1967 setback the Egyptian left stood up and said that the regime would prevail, and that was the goal. But when the events of 18-19 January threatened democracy, the Grouping Party did not say that. Rather it asserted that that was a revolution. It chose to withdraw from the democratic partnership. Don't you agree that problems occurred in the period of the bottleneck?

Dr al-Hadidi: Most detachments of the opposition were amorphous then. There were only the NPUG and the Egypt Party. Later other parties appeared on the political street and history shows that we have transcended the 18-19 January stage. We must not wear it on our sleeves; it has ended.

18-19 January and a Review of the Experience

AL-MUSAWWAR: Doesn't the Labor Party believe that 18-19 January left some after-effects with the leaders of the ruling party, as it conducted a review of its own conduct a month after the experiment started?

Rif'at al-Shahawi: That is not a defense of the NPUG. I hope it will be clear that the NPUG's behavior ought to have been considered an obstacle, producing all these stances against the democratic experiment; in my opinion, the NPUG, on the other hand, went beyond its limits, but that could have been exposed before the people; let the people be the judge concerning that period.

Sayyid Jalal: The Labor Party's only mistake was to have let a single person from the NPUG enter its ranks and to hear a single word from that party. I give warning that any complicity with the NPUG will lead to another 18-19 January. The potential for that exists but we are a party that has no connection with the NPUG, and I always say, watch out, watch out, watch out for the NPUG!

AL-MUSAWWAR: The grouping gave the enemies of dialogue a very broad opportunity with its position on 18-19 January.

Ibrahim Shukri: We do not want to take a position against 18-19 January except to draw useful lessons.

Dr al-Hadidi: There is no doubt over the NPUG's mistakes.

Rif'at al-Shahawi: Do not put us in the position of defending mistakes that occurred before the establishment of our party. We should just be held to account from the time we started.

Dr al-Hadidi: The Egypt Party benefited from that by turning itself into the National Party and changing leaders and methods, and new opposition parties arose. The Egyptian left is a fact. It is of long standing in Egypt, dating back before the revolution. The list of good and bad elements in the democratic experiment must not /sic/ include moderate nationalists who want to see the boat making calm progress. Our party includes personnel whose nationalist past is a credit to them and will protect them from mistakes, even in the future.

AL-MUSAWWAR: In the initial stages, Mr Ibrahim Shukri said what he wanted from opposition movements, and the assembly listened to him. Votes are taken, for him or against him, and here we would like to learn about the mistakes of the majority and the minority both.

The Mistakes of the Majority and the Mistakes of the Opposition

AL-MUSAWWAR: The question that is raised now is what specifically have been the mistakes of the majority and the mistakes of the opposition?

Dr al-Hadidi: The mistakes of the majority may be summarized as:

1. For a while, it felt that it owned everything and it did not believe in sharing.
2. It failed to realize that we are nationalists with rights under the constitution and that nobody's livelihood should be harmed because of his opinions, beliefs, color or sex. Therefore let us apply this to everyone, and not /say/ that everyone who is against me is my enemy.

3. The majority did not try to build any bridges of communications with the minority parties, at least to keep them informed and reach agreement over broad areas of national interest.

We asked Dr Mustafa Khalil 2 years ago to form a joint committee to which the parties would be invited to discuss important issues, so that the dimensions could be known and we could agree on a minimum number of things we could all agree on.

4. Ultimately what is important is whether the majority party believes that the solution lies in having a democracy that listens and responds. This is the issue. The destiny of democracy is governed by practice.

5. The opposition has not acquired even a minimum of information. You cannot ask me to have confidence in you unless information is available.

AL-MUSAWWAR: What, then have been the opposition's mistakes?

Dr al-Hadid: The opposition's mistakes have been:

1. Its reactions were excessive because the other party refused to let it be its partner.

2. When the opposition faced great pressure it closed ranks in spite of its ideological differences.

Rif'at al-Shahawi: One of the majority's mistakes was that when its party was established it continued to follow the authoritarian system. The National Party itself was the cause of the clear threat to democracy. All the people who were in the Egypt Party at the beginning of the experiment were leftovers from other organizations such as the Socialist Union and the Liberation Rally.

Then came the National Party and the same personnel joined that.

Therefore it was difficult for them to rid themselves of a philosophy they had lived with for roughly 20 years.

AL-MUSAWWAR: We are putting the democratic experiment on trial in its stage of transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic one based on firm democratic criteria. That is wrong. We must not forget that the events of 18-19 January constituted part of the particular psychology of the regime. We do not want to judge the past. We want to conduct a dialogue and a dialogue on our horizons for the future, not the past. Let us make new friends for dialogue and confront the enemies of dialogue. We absolutely must not rule out the opposition parties, especially in the latest period of responsibility.

Sayyid Rustum: I am talking about the situation we are living in. The issue is the young people who are alienated from the course of events, out of a sense that there is a gap between reality and theoretical principles. The distribution of employment forms was the prerogative of the National Party to the exclusion of the Labor Party; they concerned only the young people in the National Party.

This raises a natural question: Where is the democracy? The Consultative Assembly elections, which took place on the basis of a system of lists with an absolute majority, is a tradition of the authoritarian system. It gives other parties no chances. Consequently of course all its members are from the National Party. Had there been consultation, it would have been better for that to have been with the other parties, not with oneself. Even the Liberal Party members who came to the Consultative Assembly did so not by election but by "appointment." We were gladdened by the Media Law which gives parties an equal opportunity to reach the masses, but we have not heard the voice of a single person in the opposition. They said they would apportion the Socialist Union's property to all parties, but that has not been carried out. The National Party has taken over all the property of the Socialist Union. I would like to say that I have a number of specific recommendations:

1. The president should be an arbiter among the powers, separate from the parties.
2. There should be a review of the economic system and government workers' wages as well.
3. Part of the nationwide press should be allotted to the opposition. This is what we have felt recently. My request to President Husni Mubarak is to abrogate the elections by absolute lists, which means sanctifying a single party.

Preparing for Democracy Is an Inevitable Necessity

'Abd-al-'Aziz Salim: It was natural for the Labor Party to defend itself and join up with all the wings of the opposition to form a front. Some people imagined that that was an alliance, but now the situation has changed. Therefore we are on the verge of another new phase. In the new phase I say that we are not in the same circumstances as those experienced by Israel, which claims to be an oasis of democracy in the Middle East -- which is true, although it is suffering from the same pressures and circumstances we are.

Democracy is our option, but we must agree whether it is to be realized in stages or in a single thrust. What is to be forbidden and what is to be allowed? Therefore there is a dialogue and there must be channels of communication and the exchange of a given amount of information among everyone, so that information will not be restricted to one body at the expense of another. This is the proper entree to the new stage if one is to implant the foundations and agree on the definitions of democracy and its dimensions and limits. We must agree that everyone is Egyptian and everyone is a patriot, and the integration will take place on that basis.

Sayyid Rustum: The Egyptian people demand "exemplars" and behavior which will do away with everything and do away with hypocrites. President Mubarak's meeting with the detachments of the opposition created a profound impression with the man in the political street. Then discipline and its abuses: is it reasonable for us to set out times when shops can be open?

Should a "tradesman," for example, open up at 1000 hours in the morning?

One young person buys an apartment for 100,000 pounds and another one cannot find a place to live! This is the basic problem.

The government is supposed to set up accounts for the majority of the young people, not a minority. In the period to come it will be necessary to concentrate on solving the housing problem because that is social and political and works to divide young people. We also demand that we review disciplinary laws in the stage to come lest the national economy be damaged by production stoppage.

No Blame for the Late President

AL-MUSAWWAR: We would like to hear Eng Ibrahim Shukri's opinion.

Ibrahim Shukri: There is no doubt that the events of 18-19 January constituted a point for reviewing the situation, as far as the late president was concerned. He disclosed his new conception only in July 1978. He wanted there to be parties and democracy and felt that he had the responsibility not to expose the country to what he imagined were dangers that could damage stability in the country. After that he went down to the man on the political street. It is not odd that the president should be the head of a party, but parties always emerge first and then the head of the party promotes specific ideas and embarks on campaigns until he takes the reins of power and the head of the party becomes president. But to establish a party while he is actually in power and the reins of affairs are in his hands -- there were risks in that that al-Sadat himself used to talk about. I can state that after I revealed my intention to form the Labor Party, he said, smiling, "Your task will be easier than mine." And I smiled.

He told me, "No one will come to you unless he really wants to join you and believes in you and the principles you are promoting."

However, my own attitude is different.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Was there any other way he could have proceeded?

Ibrahim Shukri: When the experiment started it faced the risk of failure because many people did not grasp the fact that there was a strong party that assumed responsibility and played its role as a party.

The picture I found was that the approach had become the formula for an entire system of conduct in the context of a single party, in light of which there could be another party, but not numerous parties of different weight, each of which had its own opinions.

We talk a great deal about mistakes to which the major party and the opposition parties succumbed. In my opinion, the major party and the leader of the forward march, have the greatest responsibility in making the democratic experiment a success and also in remedying errors in a way which can produce results, not in a way which they consider to be the only one possible. This can come about only if they listen to other opinions through dialogue.

Therefore we stood in confusion when faced with a specific position. That is that after the elections which took place in June 1979, more than 2 years passed and the heads of other parties, no matter how many seats their parties had, had no opportunity to meet with the head of the main party, not to speak of the president, to discuss matters, even within the limits in which we could say that there was co-existence, if we use this word which is used only when we feel that a boycott is in force.

When the basic situation was one of dialogue, especially when there was nothing to prevent one, a meeting actually took place with the late president, a short time before the elections -- that was in May 1979 -- and the results appeared in June 1979.

A short while later I requested a meeting. When I found that there was no chance for a meeting, I should then have gone to meet the president when he opened the assembly in 1979, as the head of the main party. After the majority party, I would not say that I was "leader of the opposition," but such a designation existed, and predated my accession to the People's Assembly; it was in this capacity that I observed that I was granted no opportunity to meet the late president. I told the senior secretary at that time, Hasan Kamil, that I had requested a meeting with Mansur Hasan, who was a minister at that time, and he said "You did not request it from the body that is supposed to arrange that. In all probability your request will be presented to the president in the course of this week."

Weeks went by after he made that statement. I asked him about it and he told me "I have not had a chance to set a date."

Hasan Kamil departed and went through many changes in position and responsibility.

This leads me to state that much of what was subsequently attributed to the Labor Party was a sort of violation of what we could view as an evaluation of positions and whatnot.

For example, regarding our reservations on the peace agreement, our perceptions that Israel had abandoned many of its commitments were correct; that made us say, "We cannot recommend proceeding with these agreements, either." This statement of ours is labelled a great mistake. It was said "Ibrahim Shukri attended a Council of Ministers' meeting in which the basic points of the agreement were presented." This presentation, by the nature of the case, was not open to discussion; rather, it was a presentation of basic points. I was not asked to agree or not agree but I had asked the prime minister if I could be informed about the main outlines on which the agreement was to be based and he said "Instead of a special meeting between the two of us, I thought it would be fitting for you to attend a meeting of the Council of Ministers at which the basic points would be presented." There were no discussions of any attempt to make any amendments in the basic points, especially since the agreements that had been made were not open to change.

Therefore it was my duty to present the subject to the party. We reviewed it and long discussions took place among the party members. No total rejection of the agreements occurred although there was a faction that rejected it totally, and another faction that considered that it had some reservations.

In the spirit of democracy, I considered that it was my duty to take a vote at the end of the discussions; the people who were in agreement but had reservations outnumbered those who saw fit to reject it. Thus I declared the party's opinion on that, especially since I felt that this position perhaps fit in with many situations, feeling that the opposition to the agreements abroad had assumed a form different from the objective one that ought to have been taken. I was satisfied when the party did not take the position that the people in opposition abroad had taken on us -- based on the opinion that agreement to it was inadmissible although I expressed

reservations and ultimately made the statement that my purpose was that there should be recognition of the rights of the Palestinians and that they should have their embassy in Cairo just as Israel was to have an embassy in Cairo. It was very clear that we took our position with reservations. I took this position in order to reconcile many conditions. That could not have been decided at all if it had been considered something rigid which could not have been discussed or modified once we had given our agreement, especially with the conduct of Israel, which we truly considered had abandoned many of the basic points on which the agreements were founded.

Indeed, Israel has wrecked all of these basic points and up to now violent statements still are being made, such as Sharon's statements regarding a nation for the Palestinians in Jordan and the settlements, which he is going to consolidate and intensify. When Egyptian officials speak of all this in their official language, in language which considers merely that this obstructs the negotiations and might not be compatible with the spirit of the agreements -- all this is something which, when the opposition party speaks about it, it does so in more forceful terms and clearer, more critical terms than that. This critical tone enables you to join the Egyptian negotiators when they meet with the Israelis. Our goal was not to obstruct, because every achievement that can be won for Egypt or the Arabs will be an achievement for us all. The difference is just how to cooperate.

Here is an obvious point and it needs explanation, because there is nothing that does not have an explanation. This point is a sort of lack of trust. Perhaps this has come about as a result of aspects that have become aggravated in ways we do not understand. We have tried a great deal and have made efforts to make contact, but to no avail.

Many people consider that I have endured a great deal recently. I even was in the general committee, telling the people there that I had the right, after the president's speech on 14 May 1981, to state my opinion on what the late president had said with respect to me and the Labor Party. I did not interrupt and protest during the late president's speech, out of the desire to protect Egypt's shining face, because Egypt knows the proper parliamentary traditions and listens to what the chief of state says. Although we had things to complain about after that, we have a proper way to do so, which is not to blame his conduct. At the same time, the assembly chairman replied by saying "That is your right."

However, we do not have power over the Consultative Assembly and you can seek different views on giving reports on that.

Therefore the Labor Party actually presented proof and dispelled text ends at this point

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CSO: 4504/87

RELIGIOUS ACTIVIST DETAINEES CONDEMN VIOLENCE

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 263, 8 Nov 81 pp 65-67

[Article by Ahmad Mustafa: "Visiting the Detainees in Prison: They Condemn Murder and Violence"]

[Text] What is the opinion of people who have been put in detention in connection with the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat?

What is their opinion on claims by some arrested terrorists involved in the murders that if they are sentenced to death they will become martyrs?

Then what is their opinion on differences in opinion? Are these to be settled by violence and murder? Does that have any basis in religion?

Before the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat, did the detainees have any knowledge of this vile conspiracy? What position do they take on it?

Did the terrorists who have been indicted in the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat broach the execution of their schemes to the detainees before carrying out their criminal operation?

What is the detainees' opinion of the repentance societies? I had assembled these questions and brought them to the places where the detainees were being held in order to learn some detainees' opinions on them.

I spent a full day with these men, meeting and stayed with them from 1000 hours in the morning to 2000 hours in the evening.

The first person I met, in Turah prison, was Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani, secretary general of the Society of Moslem Brothers and editor in chief of AL-DA'WAH magazine, which was the brothers' organ.

The man came out of his cell in the prison and met me with a mirthful expression. When I introduced myself to him he said "Greetings! It is good luck that I am meeting you today specifically."

When I asked him why, he said "Today is my birthday."

When the prison warden and officers heard this, they invited him into the warden's office and offered him refreshments.

I asked Shaykh 'Umar al-Talmasani, "What do you think about the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat?"

He stated, "By God, it made me terribly sad, because this kind of conduct can lead to very grievous consequences. In addition, the Islamic religion, which is what I worship, totally condemns assassination."

I asked, "What is your opinion on the claim some terrorists make to the effect that if they are executed they will become martyrs?" He said, "That is absolutely false. Perhaps you are familiar with the holy verse which says 'Anyone who kills a devout person will suffer the punishment of eternal hell for it,' and another verse, 'Anyone who kills a human spirit except in repayment for a similar crime, or for corruption on earth, will be treated as if he has killed all mankind.'"

I asked him, "Should differences in opinion be settled by violence and murder? Is there legal support for that?"

He replied, "Violence has not been used in Islam, throughout its long history, except by some factions which were not deeply versed in religious jurisprudence, such as the Kharijites, the Batinites, the Azraqites, the Qarmatians and the like, who even dared to take the black stone from the holy Ka'bah, which is not permissible in Islamic thinking."

I asked him his opinion on whether he knew of the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat before it occurred.

He answered, "If I could have prevented them by myself I would have done so and had that not been in my power I would have gone immediately to inform the officials."

I then asked him his opinion on whether the terrorists had made him an offer to participate with them in any stage of the execution of their scheme.

He replied, "I have always been one of those who call for calm, stability, security, and a refusal to march and carry out destructive activity. That is recorded on the tapes on which I have recorded my platform and my talks." Shaykh 'Umar al-Talmasani continued, "I remember that in March 1972 I wrote a statement in AL-AHRAM newspaper titled 'The Truth Must Be Told' in which I thanked the late president Anwar al-Sadat for releasing the prisoners. In my article I mentioned some of the things he had done that are to be considered good deeds."

I asked Shaykh al-Talmasani his opinion about the repentance groups. He laughed and said "What do you think about their considering me an infidel, like the rest of society?"

Shaykh Kishk

I left one prison, after ending the conversation with Shaykh 'Umar al-Talmasani, and went to a prison where the rest of the detainees were. The first person I met was Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk, whom I accompanied from his cell in the prison to the warden's office in order to find out his views on the questions I had presented to Shaykh al-Talmasani.

Before I spoke with him I remembered one of the sermons in which he had attacked me on account of a journalistic report I had published in the very first issue of UKTUBAR concerning the institution of marriage in America, where I lived about 7 years.

Shaykh Kishk laughed at length and started making fun of me. After that I asked him his opinions on the questions I had presented to him.

He said, "Killing a human spirit in God's view is one of the grossest of acts. Islam is a religion which despises the sight of innocent blood, because that is the key to the door to strife, which crashes like the waves of the sea. Therefore the harshest verse in the holy Koran is the one on murder, which God promises to punish by eternal hell, curses and great torment. Murder is one of the grossest of acts. Islam has never resorted to the use of violence in solving any problem, because violence is destructive. Did the Moslems fall prey to the strife they have seen except when blood was shed and the Islamic arena turned crimson, especially after the killing of our lord 'Uthman ibn 'Affan? Strife broke out as a result of that and it killed everything on barren and fertile land both. The Moslems are still suffering as a result of the shedding of innocent blood."

On the question whether differences in opinion could be solved by violence and murder and whether there was support for that in religion:

Shaykh Kishk replied, "It is Islam's greatness that it possesses the intrinsic characteristics to propagate itself by itself, without need for the use of violence. Islam is the religion of intelligence and logic. It propagates its call by proper, open means, that is, not secretly or through violence. How can a Moslem resort to secrecy while Islam is as clear as the sun in the middle of the sky? How can Islam resort to violence, while it is the religion of intelligence and logic? We have never heard it said that ideas are advanced through violence or that the sword plays a part in winning people over." Shaykh Kishk went on to say, "A bedouin was once asked, 'Why do you believe in Muhammad?'

"He said, 'Because he did not order anything. There is a universal saying by the prophet on whom be God's prayers and peace, in which he said 'My capital is knowledge. Intelligence is the asset of my religion. Love is my foundation, ardor is my vessel, mention of God's name is my close companion, trust is my treasure, obedience is my nobility, patience is my shield, and my heart's love is in prayer.' Indeed, there is one incident where murder, and the shedding of blood was condemned, and that is where the prophet of God -- on whom be God's prayers and peace -- became extremely angry when he learned that Usamah, one of his companions, had killed a man who had said 'There is no god but Allah.'

The prophet, on whom be God's blessings and peace, said 'Usamah, didn't you kill a man who had said "There is no god but Allah?"'

"Usamah told him, 'Prophet of God, he said that in dissimulation, that is, as a ruse.'

"The prophet told him sternly, 'Didn't you take pity on his heart?' Then whenever the prophet saw Usamah he reminded him of that by saying 'Did you kill him after he had said "There is no god but Allah?"' Finally Usamah said 'I wish I had not been a Moslem on the day I killed him.'"

The Events in Asyut

I asked Shaykh Kishk, "What is your opinion about the events that occurred in the city of Asyut, in which seven young officers and about 70 soldiers, all policemen lost their lives?"

He answered, "I do not know who it is who benefits from the sight of blood. Blessed almighty God says 'Do good deeds and do not follow the path of the corrupt.' Then, Islam calls for security and safekeeping. The blood that has been shed is against security and safekeeping. Terrorizing the devout by aggression is alien to Islam and the spirit of Islam. Indeed it is a great affront. I ask glorious God to make us see the road to the truth, so that we can live like brothers in this country, with good will and compassion toward one another. There is no difference between soldiers and civilians. Indeed, all are the children of the same womb and the same nation. The soldier does not sleep, and his eyes are watching over me; for him I harbor a spirit of brotherhood and loyalty. Let those who act act in this manner."

Dealing with the Problems of Young People

I asked Shaykh Kishk for his opinion on dealing with the problems of young people.

He replied, "Scholars must perform their duty as thoroughly as they can in order to fill the void and convince and guide young people along the correct path, as our prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, did when he said 'Recommend what is good for young people, for they are the most delicate of spirit. God sent me the magnanimous true religion and young people supported me while old men opposed me.'"

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus

I left Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk and went to the cell in which the young journalist Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus, son of the well known writer Mr Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus, was being held.

When I saw Muhammad at the outset I did not recognize him. The reason was that he had let his beard grow large and thick.

Muhammad arose from where he had been sitting and I asked him how he was. He said, "With thanks to God, absolutely nothing is disturbing me here except the mosquitoes. They are of the large type and there is no use fighting or killing them, the use of insecticides notwithstanding."

I asked him for his opinion on the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat.

He replied. "There is no doubt that I am absolutely opposed to the principle of assassination. Assassination in general is a weapon that only the enemies of Islam use. That was clear in the era of the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and the era of the upright Caliphs. In the era of the prophet, the Jews tried to kill him with a stone but God almighty warned him of this plot. One of the Magi killed 'Umar ibn al-Khattab and some rebels killed 'Uthman ibn al-'Affan as he was reading the holy Koran. A Kharijite killed our lord 'Ali, may God be content with him. The final reason for my opposition to or condemnation of the assassination is

that the late President Anwar al-Sadat was devout. The murderers are not to be considered martyrs, they are to be considered murderers. There is a number of items of proof of the late president's devout faith, among them the fact that he prayed regularly. There is a saying where the prophet on whom be God's prayers and peace stated, 'If you have seen a man frequenting mosques, then bear testimony to his faith.'

Muhammad Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus went on to say, "Another thing which confirms the devoutness of the late President Anwar al-Sadat is that he is the first Egyptian president who has asserted in the constitution, which was set forth in 1971, that Islam is the religion of the state and that Islamic law is the main source of legislation. That is something which could not previously be found in previous constitutions. Another reason why I oppose his assassination is that the call to God comes through wisdom and proper exhortation, even if the people making the call are despised. There is another reason, a personal one, which causes me to condemn the assassination, and that is that the late President Anwar al-Sadat was a personal friend of my family's and he visited us at home more than once. He knew my father well since 1948."

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus went on, "Had I known of the vile plot to assassinate the late President al-Sadat before it occurred, I would not have hesitated for a moment to inform the responsible bodies because no true, intelligent Moslem can think of such an act. The people who committed this criminal act are not Moslems, they must be considered murderers."

I asked him his opinion on the renunciation groups.

He replied, "I met with some prominent members of the Renunciation and Repudiation Society toward the end of 1976, at the home of Shawkat al-Tuni the lawyer, may God have mercy on him. Among the people I met, two were sentenced to death in 1977 and the third was sentenced to hard labor for life. My conversation with them was published in the newspaper AKHBAR AL-YAWM and I discovered from my sessions with them that their ideas did not coincide with proper Islamic thinking."

Martyrs Have Characteristics

I then went to the adjacent room, where I met Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr, the man who gives sermons at the Salah-al-Din Mosque in the al-Manyal section of Cairo. He was wearing a white robe and had let his white beard grow freely. That was the first time I had seen him. After I introduced myself to him, I presented him the questions I had asked of some of his colleagues. He stated,

"Islam does not approve of bloodshed. Rather, it protects blood and considers it inviolable; almighty blessed God says, 'To that end, we have prescribed for the people of Israel that anyone who kills a human spirit except in repayment for a similar crime or for corruption on earth will be treated as if he had killed all mankind, and whoever revives a human spirit will be treated as if he had revived all mankind.'" On the allegation by some of the accused terrorists that if they are sentenced to death they will die as martyrs, he said, "Martyrs have characteristics and rules which no two people will disagree over. Glorious almighty God stated, in his description of the degree or status of martyrs, 'Do not consider the people who have killed for God's sake to be dead people; indeed they are alive in the sight of their lord and are thriving.' Because of that, no one who kills a devout person or a Moslem can under any condition be a martyr."

On the resolution of dispute by violence or murder, he said, "Intellectual issues cannot be resolved by violence. Rather, these intellectual issues must be purified of their blemishes and their parasitic features so that they can then come to seem purer than the blue vault of the sky. Guiding people's steps is the most exemplary means for pushing the wheel of constructive thought forward. The pursuit of violence or murder to settle any intellectual or religious dispute, is a totally rejected method which religion does not endorse."

On his view as to whether any of the accused terrorists had made an offer to him to participate with them at any stage in the execution of their schemes, he said, "Almighty glorious God condemns murder, and I propagate this ruling among people; how could I participate in any act of murder?"

I asked Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr for his opinion on the repentance groups, and he said "My opinion on this society is that the people in it do not possess a shred of the proper Islamic culture that would qualify any of them to be proselytizers supervising Islam. The Islamic call takes hold in people's hearts only when the proselytizers support it with proof and evidence. Islam is the religion of pure, proper thought."

This Is My Opinion

At the end, I concluded my visit to the prison by meeting Dr 'Abdallah Rashwan, a lawyer who summarized his opinion for me in a few lines, saying, "I do not endorse murder in general. As to the talk about people who will die as martyrs, there are rules for martyrdom in Islam. The most prominent martyrs are the men who fight in the arena of holy war so that God's word may prevail.

"With respect to differences in opinion, these can never be settled through violence or murder. If I knew at any time of any of the arrangements these accused persons had been making I would have taken the most extreme measures I could to prevent them."

Dr 'Abdallah Rashwan concluded his statement by saying, "I would never agree to take part in or in planning for any murder for one reason, which is that I am a Moslem."

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CSO: 4504/87

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CONSIDERED U.S.-BACKED PLOT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Musavian]

[Text]

AS THE Associated Press reported, the Bahraini Premier has supported the Iraqi proposals suggesting the severing of political relations between Arab states and Iran and demands for "urgent measures" to be taken against the penetration of Arab armed elements trained in Iran.

Following such a demand, the Secretary General of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, Sheik Abdillah Bishara declared that an agreement in regard to such measures will be signed among 6 Persian Gulf countries within the next few weeks.

Some time ago, the puppet regime of Bahrain accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of dispatching terrorists to regional countries with the intention of creating chaos and disturbing the peace in Persian Gulf states and overthrowing their governments. It was not long before the pre-planned support of the American-backed reactionary countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq resulted in the formation of the so-called "Security Plan" for preservation of peace and for firm confrontation against so-called "disruption."

At the conclusion of the upshot on the issue, the decisive support of the White House served later to reveal that the main figure behind the plot was the U.S. and the propaganda as on other occasions originated in Washington.

In addition to sympathizing and participating in the above-mentioned security plan, the already collapsing regime of Saddam which truly needs a new propaganda tool against the Islamic Revolution of Iran due to the declension of its invading animalistic image and its incessant defeats, demanded of all Arab countries to cut their diplomatic relations with Iran. Meanwhile, the Bahraini prime minister

has also supported the suggestion.

In our view it is not improbable that in near future, the proposal may have the support of other Arab states whose very identity is known to all and that the plan may well be executed through the support of their masters in the White House.

A glance at the record of the Iraqi embassies and diplomats in foreign countries will not only serve to reveal the quality of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime as the main advocate of the proposal, but it also discloses the nature of the other regimes which have supported it.

In this regard the mentioning of only a few of plots carried out against the Islamic Republic as well as other Moslem and non-Moslem countries will suffice:

1) On August 79, the leader of the Palestinian Organization 'Al-Saiqa' was murdered by Iraqi 'diplomats' in Cannes, France.

2) On May 80, the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in London was occupied by a few Iraqi lackeys and all of its employees were taken hostage. The operation which resulted in the martyrdom of two of the employees of the Islamic Republic's Embassy was directly carried out under supervision of the Embassy in London through the full cooperation and support of the Fascist British police.

3) On August 80, the unsuccessful attack of the Iraqi diplomats on the Iranian Embassy in Vienna resulted in the expulsion of some of the 'Iraqi diplomats' from Austria.

4) On August 80 two Iraqi diplomats were expelled from Democratic Republic of Germany for

launching plots and for placing bombs in the Congress of the Iraqi Kurdish Students opposing Saddam's regime.

5) On July 81, an Iraqi Moslem militant was martyred by a so-called diplomat of the mercenary regime of Ba'athists in Dubai Emirate.

6) On October 81, 5 armed Iraqi diplomats attacked the ranks of the Moslem students who were participating in a legal and peaceful demonstration and injured 16 students. Following the incident, the Iraqi diplomats were acknowledged to have behaved inconsistently and were expelled from India.

7) On December 81, two Iraqi disreputable elements were expelled from Venezuela in Latin America. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry later announced that the two Iraqi diplomats had been dismissed on charges of embarking on activities inconsistent with their diplomatic position.

8) On February 80, a 35-member Iraqi delegation travelling to Karachi were inspected at the Islamabad Airport and various types of weapons some of which were hidden in cameras were discovered in their luggage.

Besides the Pakistani people have not yet forgotten that in the Winter of 1969 the diplomatic pouches of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry contained over 300 machine guns and a huge amount of bullets. And it was only recently that the Iraqi regime fired all its local employees at its embassy and Consulate in Islamabad and Karachi as a security measure designed to guard their secrets from Pakistan.

The above which all have been confirmed by

the world's news agencies are enough to prove the baselessness of such claims against Iran. But if we consider such proposal as are raised against Iran by Iraq as a consequence of the latter's hostility toward Islam and Iran's Islamic Revolution, the question is why have the other regimes in the region such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia submitted so disgracefully to support for a regime like that of the Iraqi Ba'athists? And what reply do they have for the Moslem people to justify this?

We would like to ask the regimes in the region how come that they never proceeded on any security measures against the Iraqi regime taking into view all these terrorist and non-diplomatic acts by the diplomats and members of the Iraqi embassies across the world? They must tell us why they embark on security measures against Iran despite the fact that they have only arrested a few people all of whom are in fact Arabs and mostly from Saudi Arabia?

We wish to ask them 'Do you think that this new political show of yours which is planned and executed by the White House is not clear to us and other Moslems?

Anyhow, it is never to your benefit to indulge yourselves in servitude to the U.S. and to think that the Moslems can be deceived by you.

You must be certain that by signing such pacts and agreements, you can never hinder this Godly-backed Islamic Revolution of Iran. It will be the end of you and at that time there will be no way open to you and no repentance will bear you fruit.

NO NEED FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS TO EXIST IF UN-ISLAMIC, SAYS KHOMEINI

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] Tehran, Jan. 18 (IRNA)--The Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini today received Foreign Minister Velyati along with a group of 25 Iranian Charge d'Affaires assigned to Iranian embassies abroad.

During the meeting the Foreign Minister presented the Imam with a report on the assignments of the new Charge d'Affaires. The Imam also addressed the group in a short speech a translation of which appears hereunder:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

"Ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I have on various occasions reiterated to each and every foreign minister of any new cabinet that the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad should conform with Islamic principles. If the staff of embassies abroad, or the situation in those places, or their managerial practices and their manners of their staffers should be found to be inconsistent with the Islamic Republic then we might as well not have those embassies.

"If any of our embassies abroad were like their predecessors during the time of Mohammad Reza, then how could we expect the peoples' tongues and their pens to remain quiet? There are people who invent stories (for harming the reputation of the Islamic Republic), what will they do, if God forbid, there is something capable of creating scandal).

Therefore it is our responsibility to safeguard our Islamic reputation and our country. You people who are going abroad should make an effort for selecting people who will not deviate from the right path. If you cannot rectify things quickly then concentrate on a (strategy for) gradual improvement.

You all know that the Foreign Ministry is bearing a heavy responsibility because of its involvement with foreign countries, and therefore you should try to lead your embassies abroad along the path of Islamic maturity, and Islamic growth and sublimity, and also try to have publications in which you may reflect that which you have to say, and thereby answer the fictitious reports of the radios and televisions insofar as you can.

"May this (Islamic) Republic soon grow to correspond with the will of the Blessed and Supreme Lord. May God make you all successful."

IRAN CAPABLE OF PROTECTING THE REVOLUTION

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN Jan. 19 (IRNA) — A seminar of the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guardsman Corps opened in Tehran this morning with an inauguration message from President Khamene'i read after the opening qur'anic reading.

In his message the President said that although only three years had elapsed since the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Muslim nation of Iran has proved that just as it had the competency to launch the revolution it was well able to protect it.

Another part of the message said the Corps now had necessary experience, efficiency, high moral and proper training and these characteristics by themselves would disappoint the enemy.

In another part of the message the President gave guidance in

connection with creation of further order in the Corps and its coordination with the army as well as guidelines in the area of training the members of the Corps and its relations with other revolutionary foundations. The President's message stressed the importance of Velayat Faqih as the guiding principle of leadership.

The Commander of the Corps, Mohsen Reza'i then addressed the audience. Referring to the recent speech of the Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini, Reza'i, while referring to the role of the Corps in protecting the achievements of the revolution, stressed the importance of the continuous presence of religious scholars to monitor the ideological line of the Corps. He said the line of the Corps must be in line with Velayat Faghih.

CSO: 4600/206

U.S., RUSSIA MANEUVERING INSIDE IRAQ, MINISTER SAYS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 19 (IRNA) —

The Interior Minister Nateq Nuri, along with other delegation members returned to Tehran from Orumiyeh (West Azarbaijan) this morning, after attending the morning ceremonies of the joint forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran held in the Orumiyeh 64th Division Garrison.

The Interior Minister had travelled to this province along with Mr. Zarea, the Plan and Program Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry, the Commander of the Gendarmerie and the Police Chief of the Islamic Republic, to inspect Orumiyeh Province and review the problems of the region.

Referring to U.S. plots and its flunkey agents inside and outside the country, Nateq Nuri stated that today, all

super-criminals were confessing their defeat vis-a-vis the blessed revolution of Iran.

He added that upon expiry of about 2 years of the Iraqi imposed war upon Iran, the Washington Post paper in its recent issue, had confirmed the nobility of the army personnel of Iran as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and finally the defeat of the mercenary Saddam.

The Interior Minister, while pointing out the unstable situation of Iraq, said that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., after obtaining some information about the Iraqi situation, have been assured of the certain defeat of Saddam. Therefore, they have poured into Iraq opposing political forces to change the situation to their own benefit, upon the overthrow of Saddam.

CSO: 4600/206

UNITY WEEK COMES TO AN ILLUSTRIOUS END

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Jan 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] TEHRAN, Jan. 15 (IRNA) — On Thursday Unity Week ceremonies were observed at Tehran's Unity Hall attended by a group of Friday prayers leaders of Iran, foreign guests, several persons crippled in the course of the revolution and war, the Minister of Islamic Guidance, and other people from all walks of life.

Hojjatolislam Hakim, the Secretary General of the Iraqi Combatant Ulema said the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran was that of unity while that of Saddam of Iraq was aimed at dividing the Islamic ulema.

Mr. Ahmad Zayn, a Lebanese Islamic scholar, then spoke and attributed the stagnation of the Muslims to the conspiracies of the superpowers to divide the Muslims into sects and various nationalities.

He then said that Masjid Al-Aqsa in Palestine would never have been desecrated had the Muslims been united. Regarding Palestine, the Lebanese scholar said as Imam Khomeini has time and again said the Muslims will never consent to the usurpation of Palestine. He added that as a Sunni Muslim he supported all the various schools of thought of Islam, for they were sound politi-

cal and religious systems of jurisprudence and were all striving for the victory of Islam.

In the end, Mr. Zayn called on all the Sunni ulema to unite behind the dicta of La Ilaha Illa Allah (There is no god but God) and Mohammad Rasul Allah (Mohammad is the Messenger of God) under the leadership of Imam Khomeini to eradicate the arrogant powers in the world.

Then, Abdol Taher, a Pakistani professor, spoke saying that in the very beginning of Islam, the spirit of brotherhood and unity which had been created among the Muslims, was real, for had it been otherwise, the hypocrites and unbelievers would never have opposed it so fiercely.

In the end, he called on all Muslims to forget their differences, to rally for the cause of Islam and to oppose only enemies of Islam.

Ayatollah Hussein Nuri, the Friday prayers leader of Hamedan (Western Iran) then said the Prophet Mohammad (SAW) formed a dynamic community made up of many varied elements, races, and social classes, by first uniting them under the tenets of Islam. He said the unity and solidarity of the Muslims made them

able to defeat the great powers of that time.

Speaking on colonialist attempts to undermine Islam, Ayatollah Nuri said once the colonialists realized the Muslims could do anything given their unity, they started a campaign to undermine unity by stressing nationalism and sectarianism among the Muslims. He said the Muslims must never forget what the U.S. did in Vietnam and Iran, what Belgium did in the Congo, what Italy did in Libya, and what France did in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

He continued by saying that Muslims must not be indifferent to the plight of their brothers-in-faith in the Philippines, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Ayatollah Nuri then added that the Muslims who formed the majority of people in 40 countries of the world, must stop giving their natural resources to the imperialist world.

In the end, he praised Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Montazeri for their efforts to bring the Muslims of the world together in order to confront the oppressors. The ceremonies ended with the chanting of the unity prayer by the audience.

RECENT EVENTS IN BAHRAIN ASCRIBED TO 'PLOTS OF BIG SATAN'

Tehran ETTEL'AT in Persian 19 Dec 81 pp 16, 15

[Text] Yesterday Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second sermon of the Friday prayer, referred to some of the plots against the Islamic revolution of Iran, among them the arrest of some people in Bahrain ascribed to Iran. The officials of Bahrain said these people had been trained in Iran and dispatched to Bahrain for sabotage purposes. Of course, these kinds of plots against the Islamic Revolution of Iran are endless and it is natural that the world oppressors under the leadership of 'Big Satan' are exerting all their potential and actual power to defeat a revolution which has annihilated all the oppressor's harvest. The oppressor is struggling vainly like a slaughtered animal and everyday causes some disturbance and ascribes it to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The reactionary states of the region who feel that their mock governments are endangered by the Islamic movement, in order to save thrones, do not mind identifying with the plots of world imperialism. The Jerusalem occupier regime each day annexes another portion of Islamic and Arab territory and paints a fearful monster picture of Iran for its nation and chatters about the danger of the expansionist Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile Israel, with peace of mind, insults the sacredness of Islam and Arab and with assurance from the U.S. strategic agreement continues its bullying in the Middle East and the Arab rulers do not reject its acts as if nothing has happened and as if the Zionist enemy has not participated in another evident piracy.

To find the roots of these plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran, one must refer to the depth and nature of this revolution. A revolution with aims neither eastern nor western is fighting for 15 months against the Bath regime of Saddam and each day with fresh spirit attacks the enemy and wins a bigger victory for the Islamic army. The revolution that has resisted the economic sanctions of the superpowers in a way that has surprised the world. The U.S. is scared that the spirit of the Iranian nation will spread throughout the area and dissolve the interests of the 'Big Satan' not only in this area but throughout the world. For this reason, following each enormous victory of the Islamic army, a big conspiracy occurs. After the great victory of "Samen al-Ameh" and the breaking of the siege of Abadan and the liberation of a great portion of east Karun in October of the current year, in Tehran the hypocritical masses staged extensive street riots and a few days later news was dispatched to the world. "The bombing of the Kuwaiti oil installations" and the imperialist horn was blowing everywhere and ascribing this incident to Iran. This is due to the fact that Kuwait has a relatively better stand toward the Islamic Republic of Iran than other states in the Persian Gulf region. Incidentally, the

attack on the oil installation of Um al-'Aysh in Kuwait occurred at the time that Iran not only broke a year long siege of Abadan, but also on the domestic and foreign front has gained great victories. On one side, the defeat of counterrevolutionaries within the country and the people rejecting them, and on the other side, the successful trips of the Iranian missions to Cuba, Malaysia, North Korea, and the fruitful trip of brother Mossavi to Benghazi and his participation in the steadfastness and confrontation front conference.

The enemy which is not capable of bearing these great domestic and foreign victories of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with an attack on Kuwait, tries to direct world opinion against the so-called Iranian expansionism in the hope that it keeps a spark of hope in the heart of the counterrevolutionaries inside and outside and gives them hope in continuing their campaign against the revolution and in the meantime outshines Iran's victories in domestic affairs, foreign policy and the war.

The United States knows that if it does not instigate these plots, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, after a very short time will prove its legitimacy to all the countries and then they will stand to protect Iran. The United States by creating an anti-revolutionary atmosphere might prevent Iran's political victory in its foreign policy.

And now after the great victory of "Tariq al-Quds" and "Tolu al-Fajr," the 'Big Satan' is again implementing another plot this time in Bahrain.

Bahrain, due to the personal and irresponsible comment of one of Iran's clergymen in the beginning of the revolution was fearful of Iran. Fortunately, the extensive activities of the ministry of foreign affairs has dismissed all doubts about the revolution of Iran. Suddenly, the secret hands of the U.S. wind another tune and by staging another mock play, making the Iran-Kuwait relation critical and once again making it look as if Iran had evil intentions towards Bahrain (what impudence). Possibly in this manner, the searching diplomacy of Iran in the world scene is hindered and once more world opinion is directed from the recent victory of Iran in the war front and towards Iran's offensive diplomacy against the notorious and reconcilable peace plans in the region. It is understood that after the decisive stand of Iran in regard to the sordid Fahd peace plan and the shameful defeat of the conference of the Arab leaders following the explicit statement of Imam Khomeyni such a "lullaby" be heard against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From the beginning of the imposed war of Saddam, the United States has exerted all its efforts to feign this war as Arab and Persian war and used all its menace to succeed in this endeavor with no avail. It now intends to create some basis, such as the recent riots in Bahrain and the attacking of the oil installations of Um al-'Aysh in Kuwait, in order to make the small states of the Persian Gulf superstitious about the revolution of Iran and on the other hand to encourage military cooperation between these states and Saudi Arabia and if necessary to persuade these countries along with Saudi Arabia, to take military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran. No wonder that in the second session of the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council which was held in Riyadh last month, the member countries of this council reached a military agreement for the security of the Persian Gulf.

Therefore, one of our principal battles with world imperialism is the battle on the political front. We have to try to divulge the U.S. plots against the Islamic

Republic of Iran and show that our revolution has never had bad intentions towards neighbor countries. The explicit assertion of this subject confirms this to the region's reactionary governments and our neighbors. We will use our expanded diplomatic efforts in every way to continue to export our revolution. This is among our principal and unchangeable plans of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Definitely, with healthy and proper relations with other countries, we as the proclaimer of Islam will not face failure.

Consideration and careful studies of the states of the Persian Gulf regions is one of the important phases of Iran's foreign policy and therefore we must not throw the small countries, with our own hands, into the lap of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

To conclude, the United States is trying to blockade and isolate the Islamic revolution of Iran in every aspect. Economically, by boycotting the purchase of Iranian oil by oil purchasing countries, politically, with plots like the incidents in Kuwait and Bahrain and also militarily, by dispatching countless arms to Iraq through France and other countries of the western block. Therefore, we must adopt a sound policy towards all countries, among them the small countries of the Persian Gulf region in order to proudly attain victory in this campaign. Definitely, the United States has other projects for the political isolation of Iran and is going to implement them. We must be cautious and by adopting a basic and sound foreign policy explain to the world the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to make them realize our position and perceive the plots. If the aims are the aims of the worlds nations, such is our way.

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CSO: 4640/98

SYRIAN ENVOY LISTS DAMASCUS STAND AT NEXT FEZ MEET

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 10 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN - Syrian Ambassador in Iran, Ibrahim Younes said that the recent visit of Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati had brought Iran and Syria closer and added that his country condemned Saddam for his attack on Iran.

Talking to the TEHRAN TIMES, Younes said that Iran and Syria shared a good many views in common and more deeply still a sameness of beliefs, ensuring broad bilateral ties between the two countries.

Elaborating the envoy said, that both countries believed in neither East nor West and were members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The two countries, he further said, took up an unprecedented and firm stand in favor of the deprived peoples of the world.

He said another common factor which brings the two countries nearer was their firm stand against Israel which is the backbone of Zionism and the US in the region. "Contrary to this, he said, during the shah's time Iran's policy was against all Arab nations and the shah moreover was working hand in glove with the interests of Israel."

Younes said that the Islamic Revolution in Iran had a great impact both in the region and throughout the world. He said that "one can quite easily perceive that Iran is firmly on the side of the Arabs without any reservation," and added that "as a representative of my nation in

Iran, I can assure the Iranian Moslems that all the leaders in Syria, the ruling party of Syria (the Baath Party) and the entire nation of Syria are with Iran and Iran's victory is Syria's victory."

Younes said that it was desirable that the present war should end and that Iraq should evacuate Iranian territory. He said, "This war was imposed on Iran by the US - it's not a real war - the US

wanted to hurt both Iraq and Iran - and so Iran was attacked by Iraq."

Younes said that if the Iran-Iraq war had not been started, Israel would never have dared to annex the Golan Heights as they had done today. He condemned the US and said that US imperialism were attempting to strengthen Israel more and more as time went by. He said these moves were highly dangerous to the Arabs and added that only a determined stand against the US and Israel could avert a crisis.

He denied that the Soviet Union had the upperhand in determining Syrian policies and said that the Russians helped Syria in all its endeavors and almost every sphere and lent support in the United Nations Organization (UNO) too.

He said, "Syria is an independent country, Non-Aligned and it is not guided by any foreign influences when it comes to framing our foreign policies." He added that Syria's stand at the forthcoming Fez

Summit will be the same.

On the Fez Summit he said it was Syria's position that all lands usurped by Israel should be freed, Qods should be liberated, Palestinians to have their own rights to self-determination in Palestine and finally the complete independence of Palestine.

He said that the Palestine issue was an issue which was the concern of all Arab nations and no single country should be allowed to tackle this question on its own.

He said that Syria appreciated very much the manner in which Iran had reacted to the annexation of the Golan Heights, "a response that gave one the impression that Iran took up the issue as a concern of its own."

The Syrian ambassador finally said that President Hafez Assad had plans to visit Iran soon.

VELAYATI: CONFRONTATION OF COMMUNISM

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN -- If Communism wants to justify the Soviet action in Afghanistan, the Islamic

Republic will adhere to its former stand and does not only disagree with but will even confront them, said Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati yesterday.

The Iranian foreign minister also said in an exclusive interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency that creation of unity and coordination between all Moslems of the world is "one of the most important strategic goals pursued by the foreign ministry."

President Hojatoleslam Seyyed Ali Khamenei will also address the ambassadors of the Islamic countries in Iran this week to shed light on the aims and objectives behind the Islamic Republic's call for observing "Unity Week" throughout the world, he added.

Dr. Velayati said the Iranian diplomatic missions and branches abroad will hold Unity Week celebrations marking the birth anniversary of Holy Prophet Mohammad (SAW) to explain the motives behind the Iranian call for unity between all Moslems of the world.

As an Islamic country, Iran shares several common grounds of interest with other Moslem countries, the minister said.

He continued: "To face the dangers now threatening Islam and Moslems, we should

rely on these joint principles and create the grounds for close relations between all Islamic countries."

Velayati emphasized that Moslems can form the strongest and widest human force on earth by properly using the possessions and resources they have in geographical, manpower, mineral and other resources.

"We should reveal to the Moslems of the world the nature of the elements striving to create discord and differences between the Islamic countries and Moslems should proceed to drive out those discordant elements and thus achieve unity among themselves," he said.

The foreign minister explained his ministry's policy on Iranian proposition for creating a united anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist Islamic front.

"We believe Islamic countries have priority for membership in this front. As to the countries which are not Islamic but share common interests with us in our fight with imperialism and Zionism, we can cooperate with them against our common enemy by highlighting these interests."

Dr. Velayati continued: "Of course, it should not be thought that we do not put a question mark before the existence of Communism."

"If Communism wants to justify the Soviet action in Afghanistan, we as in the past, not only disagree with such a line of thought but even oppose it, because we generally condemn any type of aggression."

CSO: 4600/189

MKO TERRORISM CAN BE COMPARED 'ONLY WITH MOSSAD, MAFIA, CIA'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] TEHRAN, (IRNA) - Majlis Speaker Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani speaking about the unsuccessful assassination attempt on the life of a Mashhad Deputy in the Majlis, Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khemenei on Sunday, said in the open session of Majlis this morning that the Munafeqin (MKO) have gone so mad that nowhere in history have such crimes been witnessed.

Addressing the deputies in the open session the Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani expressed his gratitude to God Almighty for having saved the life of the Mashhad Deputy added that in world history the only acts similar to those being committed by these counterrevolutionaries and Munafeqin and others who imagine they have a revolutionary background, were those acts committed by the Zionists in occupied Qods and by the Mafia, CIA and the British espionage network.

"Otherwise," he stressed, "such crimes have not been down by others." "The dreadful Israel terrorist organization committed exactly the same crimes when they were carrying out terrorist activities in Palestine and were assassinating popular personalities and the same is true of the CIA throughout the world. That is to say that wherever they find a powerful character they

remove that person through various deceptions. Fortunately or

unfortunately the counter-revolutionary Munafeqin have become so deranged that their work is aimed at removing revolutionary personalities, those who have the utmost popularity among people and who have no dark spot in their character."

In another part of his speech Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani continuing on the same subject said that the counter-revolutionary Munafeqin were filled with madness, psychological

complexes, stupidity and vengeance and that was why they were acting in such a manner.

Referring to the conduct of the Munafeqin and baseless propaganda they are spreading Rafsanjani said:

"The fugitive element in Paris announces that there was an attempted strike in the Iran National Factory and that our government arrested two thousand of them, killing seven and wounding hundreds of them. But that is how they behave, their propaganda and the media of their propaganda are the radios of Israel, the Voice of America and so on."

At the end of his speech the Majlis Speaker called on those youth who have been misled by the Munafeqin to come to their senses and to cease such counterrevolutionary activities. "Due to my religious, Islamic, political

responsibility before this country, I remind these youth and those who could more or less be found in various parts of the country and who are blindly following them (the MKO) to stop these crimes and return to Islam. The way is still open for you", he said.

The defeated Munafeqins, purged by the society, have become blind to the reality and their meanness has even surpassed that of the Mafia's, the Majlis Speaker said.

He said the MKO was even inferior to the Mafia who at least had some kind of goal whether materialistic, political or pure adventurism. "But the acts of these (Munafeqins) are empty of any motive. Their actions are really hollow and they are doomed," Rafsanjani added.

He invited the deceived members to surrender because they still have a chance to embrace the revolutionary society and join Islamic goals.

"In our movement, we in fact pursue a two-fold goal either side of which is victorious: "If we are martyred, our martyrdom strengthens the revolution and we are awarded by closeness to Allah.

"And if we do not get martyred, we continue the path we have selected and our nation gets more stronger as each day passes," he added.

RAFSANJANI: 'ATTACK ON AFGHANISTAN IS ATTACK ON IRAN'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) -- "We consider the aggression on Afghanistan an invasion of Iran and the struggle of the Afghani brothers as the struggle of the Iranian nation," said the Speaker of the Majlis (parliament) Hojatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani yesterday in the course of a meeting with foreign guests invited to Iran on the occasion of 'Unity Week.'

In this meeting at first the leader of the Afghani Islamic Movement and the Secretary General of the Liberation Fronts of the Afghanistan Islamic Revolution said that he was so pleased to be in the only Islamic parliament of the world and that all Iran's problems derive from its being an Islamic country.

He later said that in their meeting with the Imam, all foreign guests were awed at the simplicity of Imam's residence, adding that the White House and Kremlin were now trembling before this very simple Huseinieh in Jamaran.

At the conclusion of his speech on behalf of all Afghan Moslems the Secretary General of Afghani Islamic Movement thanked Iran for its stand in regard to the Afghanistan issue.

Afterwards, while thanking all the guests present for their support of the Islamic Revolution, the Majlis Speaker

said that they should consider the Islamic Assembly as their own house and that since the Majlis belonged to all Moslems, Iranian officials never considered themselves as host to a group of 'foreign guests.'

Rafsanjani said that despite obstruction by Islam's enemies, the Islamic Revolution had brought about Islam as a school of thought and a movement in a sensitive part of the world as Iran.

Rafsanjani added that though from a geographic point of view Islam has originated in Mecca, it was not meant only for Mecca and thus all faithful, committed and revolutionary elements had to cooperate for the execution of the Islamic principles.

"The presence of you Islamic revolutionary personalities here as guests during 'Unity Week,'" Rafsanjani said, "is more valuable to us than the presence of kings and presidents. A militant revolutionary personality is much dearer to us than any flamboyant Western or Eastern personality."

"We do not consider the Moslems separate from each other and support them across the world. We have repeatedly said that until Russia does not take its hands off Afghanistan, we can never be friendly to them."

The Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani concluded by saying that he and other Iranian officials considered the

aggression over Afghanistan as an invasion on Iran and that the struggle of the Afghani brothers was viewed as the struggle of the Iranian nation.

VELAYATI SCORES U. S., ISRAEL, USSR, IRAQ

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Jan 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) - The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Velayati said that the Iranian

government respects the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and that it has never contemplated exporting the Islamic Revolution to any country by infringing the said principles. He said the eventual idea behind the exportation of the Islamic Revolution is to reveal to other nations the problems caused by "usurping" world powers.

Velayati who was talking to a group of visiting foreign

diplomats at the ministry in Tehran on the eve of the anniversary of the Birthday of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) echoed an earlier statement from Imam Khomeini to the effect that the Islamic Republic of Iran considers "the rapacious America" as its main enemy and that it will continue its struggle "against aggressive and imperialistic policies of America and its illegitimate child, the usurping Israel". He said the Islamic countries should "wage a continuous and incessant war against Israel until its annihilation". The Iranian foreign minister also condemned the Soviet Union for occupying Afghanistan and said that the Moslem people of Afghanistan should be allowed to "determine their own destiny" while benefiting from the Islamic

teachings. He also referred to Iraq's undeclared war with Iran as having been masterminded by the United States as a desperate effort for crushing the Islamic Revolution, but added that much to the disappointment of the United States the Iraqi invasion against Iran had served to make the rising Iranians even more determined in treading the path of revolution.

He asserted also that in the face of invasion by the Ba'athist government of Iraq, the Iranian fighters have been left with no option but fight on "until the very last soldier of Saddam is expelled from the Iranian territory". Velayati also said that to compensate their defeat in the battlefields the Iraqi troops often bomb residential areas in Iran in a blatant violation of international laws, while despite all possibilities for a retaliation the Iranian forces have observed and will continue to preserve Islamic principles which prevent Moslems from committing "such inhuman acts."

The Iranian foreign minister declared that after having failed to crush the Islamic Revolution the United States resorted to its "last weapon" for undermining the Islamic Republic by terroristic acts inside the country which have borne no fruits "except shame and curse to the hypocrite terrorists (MKO)".

Velayati said that the Islamic Republic of Iran "seeks to expand its relations with all anti-imperialistic

nations and observe good neighborly relations with its neighbors, and especially with the Islamic and non-Aligned countries.

CSO: 4600/190

PLO OFFICIAL CRITICAL OF SITUATION; 'TIMES' REPLY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Jan 82 p 1

[Text]

MANAMA, Bahrain (AP) - A leading Palestine Liberation Organization official Tuesday denounced the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, contending the Tehran government "is now going through a strange state of chaos."

Khaled Al-Hassan, member of the Central Committee of the guerilla group Fatah, told the Bahrain weekly Sada-Al-Osbou that there is virtually no possibility that relations between the PLO and world countries on the one hand and the present Iranian government on the other could be stabilized.

"This is due to the fact that each Ayatollah in the Iranian regime has become a state within a state," he said.

Al-Hasan criticized the alleged-Iranian backed plot to topple the Bahrain regime of Sheik Isa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, aborted last month with the arrest of 60 conspirators.

"This irresponsible act was aimed not only at Bahrain but at other Persian Gulf countries....and the Arab World should adopt a serious stand toward dangers menacing the Persian Gulf," he said.

TEHRAN TIMES: The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced its decisive stands in regards to Israel, and reactionary countries and

leaders in the region. The Bahraini plot against Iran and the political games of the compromising PLO leaders are now clear to all and these old tales have many a times been heard from the foreign radios.

Instead of backing up what the reactionary forces in the region seek, it will be to their benefit if the PLO leaders also take the same stand as the Palestinian people and announce their people's views in regard to the Iran's Islamic Revolution rather than repeating what the reactionary elements say!

KHAMENEI: 'NO TERMS FOR U.S. TIES ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] Tehran--"We will not accept any terms for rappro-

chement with the US and have no intention whatever of cooperating with America in any event," said the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hojjatolislam Khamenei in a pre-televized interview held here with foreign and domestic reporters on Thursday, in which he clarified many internal and foreign issues

In regard to the Unity Week, President Khamenei said that the Islamic Republic had called for unity just when it had proved its consistency against the invaders in the battlefields of Truth against Falsehood.

"Today more than ever before, we once again ask all Moslem countries, especially those in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, not to block

the way to the unity of Moslems under induced pretexts. Bringing up issues such as Arabism and Persian or Shiite and Sunni differences will undoubtedly endanger the solidarity of Moslem states, and these have their roots in the plots of global exploiters.

"While our principal demand is our call for the unity of Moslem people and governments, we firmly declare that such support for unity from our side does not imply acceptance of any form of transgression or of transgressors."

Khamenei later said that the Islamic Republic had based

its foreign policy upon three principles namely sincere and boundless cooperation with friends, sound and normal relations with impartial governments and a bold, decisive stand against all enemies and transgressors. "It was according to these political positions," Khamenei continued, "that Iran could never accept compromise with Israel whose very existence is based upon aggression."

He said that by their silence and indifference on the Golan Heights annexation to the usurped land of the Zionists, the Arab governments were in fact encouraging them in their action which was a

flagrant violation of international rules.

Khamenei stated later that if it became necessary for the Arab countries to use military force to make the usurping regime and its supporting Superpower regret what they did that the Iranian nation and government were quite prepared to back up such a move

"Once again, in the name of the Iranian nation and as the president of the biggest and most powerful country in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, I declare that it is necessary for the governments and nations in the region to thwart all great global enemies through unity, brotherhood and

consolidation and I hereby announce our own willingness to bear our share of the cost in such an immense gain in unity," Khamenei said.

On the efforts at regional level to revive the anti-Islamic and treacherous plot of Fahd, the Iranian president said that it was very improbable from his point of view that the 8-point plot would be revived after its total failure in the Fez summit, and predicted that such efforts all would be futile

About the issues which had been brought up during the recent Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Syria, the president stressed that the issue of peace was not brought up either by the Iranians or by the Syrians. It should be recalled that imperialist and Zionist media had largely carried false reports, before and during the Iranian foreign minister's visit to Syria, that the two sides were due to negotiate a peace settlement between Iran and Iraq.

"We did and still feel," he said further, "that the Syrian brothers had to be helped against Israeli aggressions and we proceeded on such a trip to prove the fact that we were beside Syria in their struggle, and no peace feelers were intended."

Asked on the future of the war and the total frustration of Saddam, Khamenei

said the Iranian forces appeared more than ever stronger at the battle-fields and that the Iraqi Army despite all their military equipment and ammunition were low in morale. It was, therefore, only too true that the Baghdad leaders are dejected, he added.

He went on to say that frustration and disappointment had overwhelmed the Baathists following desertions, surrenders and defeats among their numbers.

In connection with the Bahrain issue and that of the "security pacts" signed between the region's reactionary governments, President Khamenei said, "efforts to churn up and exaggerate the Bahrain affair was a trick of the propaganda machinery to cover up the issue of Israeli aggression of the Golan Heights. The Israeli aggression of the Golan must take precedence over all other issues in the region. There are hands at work to distract the people's attention from issues concerning usurpers by bringing up fabricated and forged issues of secondary importance," he said.

When asked whether the economic and technical aid of Eastern Europe was adequate for the expansion of the Iranian economy and under what conditions Iran would accept having relations with the West and the U.S. for expansion of industry and technology in Iran, said: "We believe that only the creativity of our youth will give us technical and industrial self-sufficiency and we have made some progress in this regard since the victory of the Revolution." He added that no nation could live without having any relations with the outside world but the president stated firmly that presently Iran wouldn't accept having any relations with the U.S. and imperialism and had no intention of cooperating with the U.S.

The president when asked concerning conditions for a peace said: "We have many times declared our three conditions as follows:

- 1- The aggressor must end its aggression and leave our territory.

- 2- A commission must be set up to identify and punish the aggressor.

- 3- The aggressor must pay war damages."

Then Khamenei commenting on the Iran-Japan petrochemical project said Iran was ready to start its work and was waiting for the Japanese partner to declare its readiness to begin.

The president, concerning the departure of Iranian oil delegation to Libya to study the technical needs of Libya's oil industry said, "there is no need to say that the Arab countries are our friends and that cultural relations join us together. Rather those who oppose us are neither the Arab nations nor any Arab governments but in fact only some aligned governments, especially the dependent regime in Iraq." He went on to say that the people of Iraq were even standing beside Iran and added: "We respect the Arabic culture and language since it is the language of the Quran. Even studying this language has been recommended in our constitutional law."

UNITY WEEK EXPECTED TO 'MOBILIZE' MOSLEMS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Jan 82 p 2

[Article: "Unity Week Further Mobilizes Moslems"]

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) -- 'Unity Week' is an opportunity not only for thwarting discordant conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, but also for paving the way to achieve unity among Moslems and create a united front against the enemies, said Bijan Zangeneh Wednesday.

Zangeneh, undersecretary at the Islamic Guidance Ministry in Charge of Researches and Tablighat (Information), added that such a move would further mobilize Moslems.

Commenting on marking the Unity Week abroad, he said that with the initiation of Iranian representative offices and members of Islamic Associations in other countries, programs would be held in that connection. To take part in the ceremonies to be held in India, Ayatollah Janati would tour that country, said Zangeneh.

Foreign guests invited to Iran to attend the ceremonies would also meet with leading ulema, including Ayatollah Montazeri, in Qom as well as with President Khamenei, Majlis Speaker and a number of other officials, added he.

They would also pay visits to Tehran Behesht-e Zahra cemetery and to other places, Zangeneh noted. In addition, he added, the diplomatic corps of Islamic countries to Tehran, Majlis deputies, Revolutionary Guards, crippled of the Revolution and members of a number of other revolutionary institutions had been invited to attend the ceremonies.

Meanwhile, a group of Sunni Moslems of Kurdistan Province in western Iran urged the unity of Moslems in a meeting with the Interior Minister

Hojjatolislam Ali Akbar Nateq-e-Nuri on Thursday.

The Sunni Moslems have arrived in Tehran together with their leaders of congregational prayers to attend the Unity Week ceremonies.

Also, some fifty Sunni and Shi'a religious leaders of Sistan and Baluchistan province in eastern Iran have come to Tehran to meet with Imam Khomeini, the Leader of Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the occasion of the Unity Week.

Prior to their departure the Imam's representative and Friday prayers leader of the provincial capital of Zahedan, in a gathering said that this trip would disappoint Superpowers and those who intended to disturb peace in Baluchistan.

'I WISH I WERE PASDAR,' SAYS KHOMEINI

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text]

TEHRAN -- The Commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps accompanied by all Guards commanders in the southern part of the country met and conferred with Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini yesterday morning.

Imam Khomeini made a speech to the audience the full text of which follows:

"In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful"

"You should thank God that these Islamic operations are implemented by you. Not everyone has the honor to undertake this action.

"After a meeting with some of the Revolutionary Guards yesterday (Friday) morning, I went into deep thought, thinking how I wish I would have been a Revolutionary Guard too, and reflecting what are they doing and what am I doing?

"They are going forward and fighting the enemy of Islam and I am here and cannot. You should understand your own value. God has showered His Grace upon you and has made you available to protect the Glorious Qoran and dear Islam and the Islamic country.

"Providence has decreed that you be selected for serving Islam and this is registered with God and Allah and His Angels support you.

"Be strong in heart. Each step you take for Islam is a step which is Godly and bestowed upon

you. Act based on experience and thought. Do not be afraid to kill or to be killed anymore. The main thing is that your intention should be pure which, thank God, it is.

"The strong spirit of these 20-year old youths is one of the things that makes a human being wonder.

"Our present destination is to have this plague-ridden, western-ridden, and monarchy-ridden country returned to Islam and we do not have any motive other than this.

"One of the issues I wanted to outline was to tell you to totally abide by discipline. Bravery is different from rashness.

"Bravery in war is a heroic move based on planning, discipline and calculation whereas a boundless and undisciplined rashness is simply a superficial attack on the enemy.

"Tasks should be undertaken based on discipline and regulation. I repeat: When a task is based on discipline and regulation and for God, no fear exists any longer as to who is killed and who was the one who killed. God willing, may you be part of the Army of God (Jondollah) and advance forward.

"Last night, when I heard that the Iraqis had buried a number of women I told myself: To whatever extent or however loudly we raise shouts trying to tell the world of what they are doing, it is of no use because we are oppressed but will not submit to pressure.

"We should face these pressures as well but since we work for God, we should not be concerned about whatever it is that they want to publicise against us and however viciously they want to depict us.

"Amir-ul-Momeneen Ali (AS) has said: "I don't care even if the whole world turns its back towards me." So, when we work for God, then there is no ground for fear anymore.

"Whoever works more for God is given more recognition. Even though you, the Revolutionary Guards, have been subjected to insults more than all others, God will make you triumph ultimately.

RUMORS OF ARMS BUYS CONTRADICT EACH OTHER

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 16 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] Tehran (IRNA)--To mark the birth anniversary of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) a ceremony was held at the Foreign ministry attended by President Khamenei, Foreign Minister Velavati, and the ambassadors and charge d'affaires of the Islamic countries on Wednesday

"Our world belongs to unified forces," said Dr. Velavati adding that the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran showed only a small part of the immortal powers of Islam. He urged all Moslems to unite and to direct all their arms against imperialism and Zionism.

Then the Algerian ambassador to Iran Abdolkarim Gharaib delivered a speech on the characters of the Prophet. He also said that all Moslems were aware that the great revolution of Iran was based on Islam and heralded the victory of the oppressed over the oppressors in the world, and the elimination of the domination of the East and West.

Thereafter, speaking on the rumors of Iran's arms purchases from the US and Israel and the country's fall into the arms of the Soviet Union President Khamenei stated that the rumors counter each other while both of them were mere baseless lies.

He added that the immense propagations of the global enemy of Iran facilitated by influential and massive propaganda networks, could never weaken Iran and that they would only serve to reveal the real face of the enemy to the world by the very nature of their contradictory and blatant lies.

CSO: 4600/203

MINISTRY REPORTS PROGRESS IN GRAIN CULTIVATION

Tehran BURS in Persian 4 Jan 82 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Hoseyn Tabataba'i, deputy minister of agriculture]

[Text] According to an IRNA report, Hoseyn Tabataba'i, deputy minister of agriculture and rural development for farming affairs, and several officials of the operations branch of his office took part in a press and radio-TV conference, each giving information separately about the activities carried out in their purviews. First, the deputy for farming affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development explained the overall policy of this ministry regarding self-sufficiency and said: "Basically the general goal of the government after the glorious Islamic Revolution of our country was to increase the extent of land under cultivation in the interest of self-sufficiency and in pursuing this goal, committees of seven men to divide land have, during the last three years, gained for agriculture 250,000 hectares of idle land and 750,000 hectares of land contested from landlords have been made available to farmers for cultivating all kinds of agricultural crops." He added: "As a result of this goal and with the distribution of about 500,000 tons of Amol-2 and Amol-3 type seed rice which suits Iranian taste and has a yield of twenty to twenty-five times more than regular seed, it is hoped that all the country's arable land will be put under cultivation."

The then official in charge of promoting agriculture for farming affairs in the field of cultivation of this ministry explained its activities and said: "For the purposes of self-sufficiency in agricultural products, we have given number-one priority planting strategic crops. And for this purpose so far this year, about 125,000 of improved wheat seed have been distributed to the country's farmers. Also, about 14.5 hectares have been devoted to experimental planting of corn, and for the first time about 4,500 tons of seed barley have been distributed to farmers; and we hope that this practice will lead to self-sufficiency in the future and that we will absolutely have no need to import these products."

Regarding operations conducted, the head of the Organization to Protect Vegetation said about his field: "Every year about 30% of all grain and other crops suffer from blights. Therefore, to prevent them this year, farmers of the country have taken the training needed to combat all kinds of blights, and an area of more than 120 hectares has been devoted to combat field locusts, 120 hectares to combat June beetles, 295 hectares to combat field rats, and 195 hectares to combat all other kinds of rats."

In conclusion he said: "During this year, about 3,500,000 palm trees have been sprayed free of charge."

CSO: 4640/133

GHARAZI CLAIMS IRAN HAS BEST OIL REFINING SPECIALISTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 10 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) -- Speaking to IRNA after the cabinet meeting yesterday morning, Oil Minister Mohammad Gharazi said that from the point of view of human resources and specialized and committed personnel the Oil Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has vast resources and could keep the economic and technical management of the Libyan oil industry active by sending the skilled personnel to Libya.

Speaking about the technical efficiency of the Oil Ministry he said that it had the best specialists in the field of refining and while in the past only one million barrels a day were refined, presently several million barrels could be refined at the lowest expense. The technical staff of the Oil Ministry is now able to supply equipment that an American middleman used to sell at high prices, at far lower prices, he said.

Gharazi further added that the Oil Ministry had quite a number of retired specialized staff which could be sent to friendly countries. Those oil specialists who went to Libya, the oil minister added, said that by going there Iranian experts unlike American experts who were being paid but were not giving any sort of technical training to the Libyans. They

were willing to provide the Libyans with all the know-how and expertise that they have

earned during the past 90 years, within one or two years so that Libya would acquire technical self-sufficiency.

Gharazi praised the moral of these committed Iranian oil experts and hoped that they would accomplish their task successfully.

IRANIAN PLAN TO SEND OIL EXPERTS TO LIBYA READY

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, Jan. 18 (IRNA) — The Islamic Republic of Iran will dispatch many of its oil experts to Libya, in two stages soon; said Mr. Parsi, the head of the Iranian oil delegation which visited Libya's oilfields and held meetings with Libyan oil experts recently.

In the short-run stage, said Parsi, some 200 oil experts will go to Libya and in the long term stage some 2,000 Iranian oil experts will be dispatched to Libya by the end of the current Iranian year (March 20th, 1982).

Mr. Parsi, who was speaking in a press conference in Tehran upon his return from Libya today, further added that during meetings with Libyan oil experts it had also been decided to set up a joint Iranian-Libyan company in the field of oil engineering.

The Iranian oil expert added that the Libyan government was quite eager to start and to continue technical cooperation with Iran.

Following Reagan's decision to recall U.S. oil experts from Libya, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran declared that it

was ready and able to fill any vacancy with Iranian experts in Libya.

After a meeting between the Libyan Ambassador to Iran, Saad Mojber, with Iranian oil officials, a nine-man Iranian oil delegation left for Libya on Jan. 1st in an attempt to investigate closely the existing shortages and to provide for them speedily.

About the exit of American oil experts from Libya, Mr. Gharazi said that the Islamic Republics of Libya, Algeria, and to an extent Nigeria were trying to rescue themselves from the technological and political pressure of the U.S.. When asked about technical cooperation with Libya and Nigeria, he said that the Islamic Republic was prepared to share freely its experience in the field of oil to these countries without political considerations.

On the present condition of oil production and exports he said that they were sufficient to provide for the necessary needs of the country and to keep foreign exchange accounts of the Islamic Republic in good shape.

He also said that the oil production had gone from six to three million barrels after the Islamic Revolution and presently the government was making efforts to gain a share of the world market to ensure a good marketing position, adding that all technical barriers had been eliminated by the active personnel of the ministry.

Concerning the possibility of renewed natural gas exports to the Soviet Union after the Islamic Revolution, Oil Minister Gharazi said that the gas pipelines had been built at great expenses and added that there had been differences between the two countries after the revolution.

He said that if an equitable agreement was made between the two countries in line with other policies, then gas exports would resume to that country.

At the end of his comments he said that the refineries in the country were now working at 15 percent higher than their estimated capacity and the future of a number of refineries were under study.

CONSTRUCTION TO START ON SOLAR POWER PLANT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Nov 81 p 9

[Article by Avraham Peleg: "Five Megawatt Solar Power Plant To Be Constructed Soon"]

[Text] Within a year construction will start on a solar power plant--which will be the largest in the world--at Kalya to the south of the Dead Sea. The electricity, with a capacity of 5 megawatts, will be drawn from a solar pool extending over an area of 250 dunam.

This was reported by Dr Zvi Tabor, chairman of the directors council and director of the Fund for Scientific Studies at a news conference that took place yesterday at Sokolov House in Tel Aviv. Dr Tabor added that by the end of the century there will be constructed on the southern portion of the Dead Sea, solar pools that will extend over an area of 400 square kilometers and that will produce up to 2,000 megawatts of electricity, the electrical output of Israel at the present time by conventional means.

Dr Tabor spoke on the occasion of receiving the energy prize for 1981 of the Alfred Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, described as the German Nobel Prize. This prize was awarded this year to five scientists worldwide who had been working in the area of utilization of the energy of the sun. Dr Tabor received the prize of about 650,000 shekel at a ceremony Friday in Essen, Germany. He is the first Israeli scientist to receive this award.

The solar pools project is based upon a concept of Dr Rudy Bloch and the development by Dr Tabor. The first pool of this type now producing 150 kilowatts, is operating at Eyn Bokek and was constructed by the Solemet Ma'arakhot Company which is a participant in the fund and in the Ormat Turbines Company. At the 5 megawatt solar station, the government will invest \$16 million, and Solemet will invest \$4 million.

Dr Tabor reported that the Fund for Scientific Studies has also dealt with additional developments. One of these is a chimney type heater installed in a solar collector. The installation makes it possible to heat only a portion of the water in the collector, thereby effecting a great saving in the expended energy. Introduction of the heater for consumer use will bring about a saving of about \$10 million annually for the State of Israel. A commercial company has recently begun manufacture of the device and its marketing.

One of the important developments of the fund is a transmission system for an electric vehicle of very high capacity based upon the storage of energy by means of a flywheel. The transmission is adaptable to privately owned vehicles. An automobile manufacturer outside this country has acquired manufacturing rights. Dr Tabor and the director of the fund, Eddie Cohen, who also was present at the news conference, did not specify the manufacturer, but it is known to the MA'ARIV correspondent to be General Motors.

The fund continues to develop far-reaching improvements in electric vehicle relays, to convert them to general use in the near future. In this connection, negotiations are being conducted with two international manufacturers.

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CSO: 4423/66

JEWS IN ARAB WORLD

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Nov 81 p 8

[Article by Yosef Priel: "Jews in Arab Countries"]

[Text] Of some 1 million Jews who in 1945 lived in Muslim countries, there are today less than one-tenth that number--as indicated in a study conducted by the Jewish researcher Louise Gottesman--a study published in New York.

According to a summary of the data, before the establishment of the Jewish state about 1,003,000 lived in the Muslim countries whereas last year 86,000 Jews only lived in those same countries. These data present the following picture:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Prior to 1948</u>	<u>1980</u>
Iran	90,000	35,000
Afghanistan	5,000	70
Algeria	130,000	600
Bahrain	400	10
Egypt	75,000	300
Iraq	125,000	350
Lebanon .	5,000	300
Libya	38,000	15
Morocco	256,000	18,000
Sudan	400	40
Syria	30,000	5,000
Tunisia	105,000	6,000
Turkey	80,000	20,000
Yemen	55,000	1,000
Totals	1,003,00 [sic]	86,000 [sic]

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CSO: 4423/66

BRIEFS

LABOR SHORTAGE--For the first time since the Six-Day War of June 1967, there has recently been noted a shortage of workers who are residents of Judea and Samaria. At present there are some 65,000 workers from Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. About 48,000 of these workers reach their place of employment within the confines of the Green Line by means of the Employment Service. All others reach their work places in a nonorganized manner, particularly in the agricultural branches and in construction. I was informed by the Employment Service that as a result of the accelerated development taking place of late in the cities of Judea and Samaria, many of the residents of the region who previously used to work in Israel have now found themselves places of employment near their homes. As a result, there has been a dropoff in the number of residents of Judea and Samaria who sally forth each morning to work in Israel. The shortage of workers from The Territories is felt particularly in the service branches and in the textile branch in which wages offered workers are relatively low. An investigation by the Employment Service which was recently conducted, indicates that while the number of unemployed in Israel reaches about 5.8 percent of the work force in the economy, beyond the Green Line the number of unemployed hovers around a mere single percentage point of the work force. [By Avraham Dishon] [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 17 Nov 81 p 19] 8080

NEW COTTON IRRIGATION METHOD--Two investigators from the Irrigation Department in the Agricultural Research Division of Beyt Dagan, Dr Avner Carmi and Dr Zvi Plaut, have developed a modern method for irrigating cotton by droplets. It shortens the growing period, conserves water and increases yield. Their method makes possible more efficient utilization of land area, through winter planting of wheat and following the harvest of the seeds the area is utilized for growing of cotton. Until now these two crops were not able to be planted in the same area one after the other during the same year. The new method will bring a change to the entire system of field crops in Israel and will augment income of farmers. The cotton branch is the most important and the largest among the field crops in Israel. Until fairly recently this was a very profitable branch, but as a result of an increase in costs of production and a drop in the world market price of cotton, income has fallen. This situation drove the farmers and the investigators to seek means of improving the work and of increasing the profitability of the branch. One of the accomplishments of the method is a reduction of the growing period of the plants by from 1 to 2 months, as compared to the conventional cultivation method. In field experiments which the investigators conducted last summer at Kibbutz Neyr-'Am using their new technique, maximum yields were attained of some 700 kilograms of cotton per dunam in tracts which had been planted at the end of May, a yield greater than that which had been attained in the conventional tracts of the kibbutz which were grown by the accepted method. [By Aharon Priel] [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Nov 81 p 11] 8090

HUSAYN'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN U.S. WEAPONS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 248, 21 Nov 81 p 17

/Article by Hani Khayr: "For These Reasons, King Husayn's Visit to Washington Was Unsuccessful"/

/Text/ It is clear, according to sources I met with in the Jordanian capital, that King Husayn's official visit to Washington did not achieve the success expected of it. Based on the same sources, it can be said that the friendship that has existed between Washington and Amman during the past 20 years is no longer as strong as it once was.

It is also clear that the extension of the Jordanian monarch's visit to the United States did not mean that relations are still sound and good. Rather, the private visit that followed the official visit was, in the first place, planned in advance and, secondly, it was impossible to curtail the visit to prevent people from saying that Amman had adopted a new position with respect to Washington.

The Jordanian-American dispute (if this term may be used) can be summed up as follows:

1. Amman wants the United States, as the main source of Jordanian arms, to supply it with an air defense system so that Jordanian airspace will not remain undefended against Israeli aircraft engaged in either a possible attack against Jordan itself or an attack against other Arab states. Husayn has tried repeatedly--especially since the 1973 war and with greater determination following Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem (19 November 1977)--to convince the Americans of the necessity of supplying Jordan with such an air defense system. However, the Americans have always found sufficient excuses to refuse such a deal. Their pretext is always: "Washington cannot be responsible for disturbing the balance of forces in the Middle East." (As is generally known, the Institute for Strategic Studies in London rates the Jordanian Army as one of the most advanced on the ground--i.e. in traditional warfare--but its main weaknesses are in air power and air defense).

King Husayn dispatched his former army chief of staff Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Majali (now Jordan's ambassador to the United States) to Washington on more than one occasion in the past 2 years to ask the United States to sell Jordan an air defense system, threatening to turn to the Soviets if the Americans refused. However, the Carter Administration used the same excuse: "the balance of forces."

When Reagan came to power, the Jordanians tried through diplomatic means to obtain the same deal from the Reagan Administration, but the Reagan Administration made excuses in turn. King Husayn then sent a military mission to Moscow to request an air defense system from the Soviets. The Soviets promised that they would study the matter well. After studying it, they agreed to the deal in principle. King Husayn then paid an official visit to Moscow during which the details were agreed on. A portion of the deal had even reached Amman shortly before King Husayn's recent visit to Washington.

In Washington, King Husayn met with President Reagan and visited the State and Defense Departments reiterating his request. He stated that what has reached him from the Soviets to that point did not amount to much and said: "If the Americans agree to supply us with the system we want, we will return to Washington."

However, Washington informed the Jordanian king of its displeasure at the Jordanian-Soviet deal and threatened that this deal could affect the supply of weapons to Jordan in the future when this matter is brought before Senate consideration.

Last week, while King Husayn was still in the United States, Jordanian Prime Minister Mudir Badran announced that a Jordanian military mission had gone to Moscow to work out the final details of the arms deal which Jordan concluded with the Soviet Union shortly after King Husayn's recent visit to Moscow. Mr Badran described the deal as a good one and said that Jordan needed it urgently.

Badran said King Husayn had informed the Americans that when his country had asked for advanced weapons from the United States, it had found all doors closed. He said that Jordan had submitted a request to the Soviet Union to supply it with weapons in view of its inability to obtain these weapons from the United States.

The Jordanian prime minister touched on the necessity of supplying Jordan with weapons from any area in which they are available.

2. The second and most important reason for the Jordanian-American disagreement is the fact that while Washington had wanted Amman to support the Sadat initiative and join Camp David, Amman refused to do this and condemned the initiative just as the other Arabs had done. Consequently, Washington decided to "punish" Amman in the way we are now seeing: "No weapons and no air defense system for Jordan until further notice."

8591

CSO: 4404/159

MAGAZINE COMMENTS ON HUSAYN'S TALKS WITH REAGAN

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 91, 7-13 Nov 81 pp 4-5

/Article: "King Husayn in America: AL-MAJALLAH Reveals Details of Political and Military Talks With Reagan and Top Officials"/

/Text/ The news item published exclusively in AL-MAJALLAH some 2 months ago was the main topic of talks which King Husayn held with President Reagan and top American officials in Washington this week.

In issue No 83 of 12 September, AL-MAJALLAH published a report based on information from well informed American sources which revealed the following: "Advisors to President Reagan are carefully studying a report dealing with relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union submitted to the White House by the American Department of Defense. The sources indicated that the most important item in this report was the disclosure that Amman is negotiating with Moscow to purchase a large air defense system which would cover the entire airspace of Jordan. The item said that the negotiations pertaining to the conclusion of this deal had made 'tremendous progress' and had reached their 'final stages.' The American report said that this system--which will be the first of its kind acquired by Jordan if the deal is concluded--will consist specifically of SAM-6 and SAM-2 missiles and will protect Jordanian airspace from any Israeli air raids. These missiles are capable of shooting down raiding aircraft at both low and high altitudes. According to the sources, the White House views these Jordanian-Soviet negotiations with 'complete seriousness' but does not expect the deal to be concluded before King Husayn's visit to Washington and his talks with President Reagan next November. Informed observers say that Reagan will try to convince the Jordanian monarch to abandon the idea of concluding this deal."

After about a month, the American magazine NEWSWEEK published a confirmation of AL-MAJALLAH's report based on American Department of Defense sources. NEWSWEEK stated that the American missile defense system currently in place in Jordan was designed--at the insistence of the U.S. Congress--in such a way that the Jordanian cannot operate it in the direction of the Israeli border.

The matter of the negotiations to buy a Soviet missile defense system was one of the main topics raised by Reagan and American officials with the Jordanian monarch, who began a more than 10-day visit to the United States with Queen Nur last Sunday. Informed American sources confirmed to AL-MAJALLAH that officials

in the Reagan Administration feel that the conclusion of this Soviet arms deal would represent a "serious shift" in Jordan's policy and its relations with the United States. According to the sources, the officials will do everything within their power to prevent the conclusion of this deal and they consider this issue a "critical test" of relations between the two countries.

Informed American and Arab sources acknowledge that King Husayn turned to the Soviet Union to obtain modern war weapons and equipment only because the United States showed hesitation in both the Carter and Reagan Administration to supply Jordan with advanced weapons as it does for Israel. In talks with the Americans, Jordanian officials showed their uneasiness over the United States' willingness to supply Israel with all the advanced weapons it needs while it hesitates or refuses to supply friendly Arab states with equivalent weapons.

Informed American sources told AL-MAJALLAH that during the past months, intensive negotiations have taken place between the Americans and the Jordanians concerning the issue of "ensuring Jordan's defense needs." The sources indicated that the Jordanians asked to receive F-16 fighters as Israel had done but the Americans have not yet approved this request. Instead, they offered to supply Jordan with F-5 aircraft, which are less advanced and less effective than the F-16. In addition, these negotiations included the possibility of Jordan's acquiring additional modern heavy tanks. As for a missile system, American sources told AL-MAJALLAH that the Reagan Administration offered to supply Jordan with the American Hawk surface-to-air missile system as an alternative to the Russian system and prepared a special demonstration for the Jordanian monarch so that he could see how the missile system works.

However, the final decision on all these matters awaits the outcome of King Husayn's talks with Reagan and top American officials headed by Secretary of State Haig and Defense Secretary Weinberger.

From Tension to Appeasements

The fact is that King Husayn's current visit to the United States has been carefully planned and there have been numerous communications between Amman and Washington concerning the trip. The visit is important--especially with regard to Jordanian-American relations--because it follows a phase of crisis and tension unprecedented in the history of the two countries. Informed Arab diplomatic sources told AL-MAJALLAH that there are three main reasons for this tension:

--Jordan's uneasiness at the fact that throughout the Reagan Administration--and especially prior to the Sadat assassination--the United States has consistently ignored the Arab position rejecting the Camp David agreement and has sided with Israel.

--Concern in Amman over "pressure" that Washington will probably apply to Jordan to bring it into the autonomy talks.

--Jordanian fears about the existence of an agreement or secret understanding between American and Israel to make Jordan the "substitute homeland" for the Palestinians and thus solve the Palestinian problem at Jordan's expense.

However, before the Jordanian monarch began this visit and held his first visit with Reagan, the American Administration had eliminated many of these fears and causes of tension.

A few weeks ago, the American Administration sent an official note to the Jordanian Government in which it confirms the United States' commitment to Jordan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Prior to the first session of talks with King Husayn, Reagan was led to make this announcement before journalists at the White House: "Jordan's security and the unity of its territory and the unique qualities that characterize it are all matters that are very important to us." King Husayn responded to this by saying: "We must not permit attempts at slander on the part of others to be an obstacle and barrier to the mutual understanding that has characterized our relations which have continued for 25 years."

No Pressure From Reagan

A number of events occurred which created a better political and psychological climate between the two countries. First, there was the approval of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia and Reagan's firm stance in the face of Zionist pressures to halt this deal. This was followed by Reagan's praise of the initiative of Prince Fahd and his recognition of this initiative as a "basis" for negotiations. In addition, there was Reagan's remark on the necessity of involving the PLO in the peace process and his asserting that this process should be broadened and a just solution to the Palestinian problem should be achieved.

According to informed American sources, Reagan did not want to apply any pressures on King Husayn during the talks aimed at making him join the Palestinian autonomy talks called for in the Camp David agreement. These sources said that while Reagan did raise this subject with the Jordanian monarch, he was committed to saying that all parties must wait for Egypt and Israel to reach an agreement on Palestinian autonomy before inviting the "other sides" to participate in these talks. These sources indicated that despite the Reagan Administration's support of these talks, it does not exhibit real "optimism" about the possibility that they will achieve any progress. Therefore, it has "left the door open" to the acceptance of other ideas, notably Prince Fahd's initiative.

The Saudi Initiative

The Saudi initiative occupied a considerable portion of King Husayn's talks with American officials. The Jordanian monarch affirmed his absolute rejection of the Camp David agreement and encouraged Reagan to abandon this agreement--at least after Israel's evacuation of Sinai in April 1982. According to information disclosed to AL-MAJALLAH by informed Arab sources, King Husayn said that the United States should support Prince Fahd's initiative because it is the main pillar of a just and total settlement of the conflict. King Husayn spoke highly of Reagan's position on the AWACS issue and said he hoped this position would be the beginning of a truly balanced American policy in the Middle East.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that the Jordanian monarch's talks with Reagan and American officials also dealt with the following important matters:

--The king put forward the idea of holding an international conference to solve the Middle East crisis. This conference would include the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe and the concerned sides in the area. However, the Americans did not appear enthusiastic about this idea--at least not at the present time.

--The king put forward "solid ideas" concerning how to go about solving the conflict, but the substance of these ideas was not revealed.

--The issue of the participation of the PLO in the peace process from the standpoint of both the substance and the timing of this process was raised during the talks.

--The Jordanian monarch warned that Israel's continued pursuit of its expansionist policy threatens to detonate the situation in the area and weaken the "influence of the moderates."

--The talks dealt with the situation in Egypt following Sadat's assassination as well as the Lebanese situation and the Iraqi-Iranian war.

--The Jordanian monarch expressed his hope that the approval of the AWACS deal will constitute the beginning of a new American policy in which the United States will not hesitate to supply friendly Arab states with advanced weapons.

Informed observers speculate on what King Husayn meant when he said upon his arrival at the White House: "I hope that I can bring good news" to the upcoming Arab summit conference to be held in Fez at the end of this month. AL-MAJALLAH has learned that the king hopes to be able to inform the Arabs that America is willing to abandon the Camp David agreement and is not determined to stick with it. The results of the talks--i.e., whether or not the Jordanian monarch has really obtained such a pledge or at least a tacit commitment to it--have not yet been made clear.

However, one result of this visit that has been made clear is that the Reagan Administration feels that Jordan does indeed have a primary role in the peace process and it is committed to maintaining the "friendship" of this country.

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LEBANON

SOLUTION TO LEBANESE CRISIS OFFERED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1307, 20 Nov 81 p 19

[Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "Lebanon, on the Verge of an Arab-International Solution Abolishing the Border Strip; a Capable President, a Strong Army and a Reasonable Agreement with Syria and the Resistance"]

[Text] In the presence of a limited number of politicians and a prominent officer in the army, one of the more important candidates for president of Lebanon took out a file from his briefcase and said, "I want to reveal a secret that has to do with the future of Lebanon and the destiny of the Lebanese crisis."

The presidential candidate did not begin his statement at this point in particular. He rather approached this secret in the middle of a round of political discussions which dealt with the Lebanese crisis from the onset of the crisis until today.

That candidate said, "I got this information, whose general outlines I will refer to now, after a long series of visits I made during the last 2 years and this year to several European countries and to the United States. I got this information after my unofficial meetings during these visits with senior European officials, with senior U.S. congressmen and with a senior official in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is in addition to the contacts I made with some Arab officials in Arab capitals, which may be said to have a direct or an indirect effect on the course of the struggle in Lebanon."

Then the presidential candidate said as he went right into the substance of his information, "I believe that we must take into account the importance of the communications that are taking place behind the scenes between major world leaders. We must not ignore the importance and the influence of these communications on the course of the Middle East crisis and accordingly, the crisis of Lebanon. At the same time we must not forget the importance of the roles that responsible leaders such as Chancellor Kreisky, the King of Belgium, Pope Paul II and others play [in this matter]. For if a decision is expected from the superpowers or from the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, such a decision would go

through numerous channels. Each country, within the limits of its capabilities, would take part in outlining the features of this decision before it is finally announced. In view of this fact, Lebanon may not ignore the positions of other countries regardless of their size, nor may it ignore the influence exercised by their policies, even as it shows its attentiveness to the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union."

The Lebanese politician who has this information then said that if everything takes its normal course, international and Arab steps will be taken in 1982, and these steps are supposed to carry Lebanon and its crisis into a new situation represented [by the following]:

First, conditions will be created that would allow Lebanon's internal crisis to be separated as much as possible from the crisis of the Middle East.

Second, after this objective is achieved, there will be a trend to form an official task force which would be headed by the next president. This task force would function throughout the 6 years of the president's administration to get Lebanon out of its predicament in accordance with a comprehensive plan for a solution that consists of a set of points which are beginning to take shape by means of the communications that are taking place on the Arab and international scenes.

This solution is based on the following points:

First, the next president and the task force he will choose will tackle the Lebanese crisis and all its ramifications in a limited framework within which the details of a solution will be forcefully worked out. The 6-year term will be considered the final, decisive experiment in which the will of the ruler must be firm, his decision resolute and his determination to carry things out not subject to any discussion or neglect.

Second, official, serious and unequivocal talks are to be conducted during this period with the leadership of the Palestinian Resistance to achieve a formula for cooperation in the next stage. The substance of these talks would be the status of Lebanon, the status of the area and the notion which states that unless the Palestinian people get their independent state on their land and unless their problem is solved on just principles, not Lebanon nor anybody else can from any viewpoint ask the Palestinian Resistance to extinguish the flame of its struggle to regain the usurped right. Instead of looking into unattainable, impossible solutions, it is possible to coordinate the cooperation between Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance according to a formula that would preserve the role of the Palestinian military and their effectiveness. At the same time it would prevent this equation from being put into effect at the expense of Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and the effectiveness of its legal government.

Third, the legal government is to get back all its powers from all the armed organizations, and this government is to rebuild its institutions, chief among which is the balanced and strong Lebanese army which is capable of imposing the sovereignty of law on all groups [of people] and in all areas.

Fourth, the comedy of the border strip is to come to an end, and this land is to be restored to the sovereignty of Lebanese law by means of pressure applied by all the international powers who stand behind this plan. Everyone knows that these international powers can force Israel to yield to this logic and stop its interventions and its practices on Lebanese territory.

Fifth, the president and the task force he will form are to begin reasonable and special talks with Syrian officials on the highest levels to seek an opportunity for cooperation between the two countries in carrying out all the stages of this solution. The stages during which the army and the internal security forces will be replacing the Arab deterrent forces are to be scheduled one year after the other in light of the capability of the legal forces in Lebanon to assume their functions with the approval of the Lebanese people, provided that no stages are overstepped by this measure and the Syrian initiative in Lebanon is not disparaged because it was that initiative that actually contributed to stopping the civil war that broke out in Lebanon in 1975.

This paragraph is linked to an official study about establishing special political, security and economic relations on firm foundations. These relations would not be subject to change as conditions in the two countries or in the region change.

Sixth, Arab and foreign countries that are financially capable are to take part in financing an integrated project to rebuild Lebanon. Sufficient assistance is to be contributed into a special fund to be established for that purpose to enable the Lebanese government to carry out the task of reconstruction without fail. This can be achieved if the Arabs and the world feel that the next Lebanese government is a government that means business in all its actions.

One of those present asked the man who had this information about the guarantees that would protect the aforementioned draft solution from those who would stand to lose in any solution. He asked whether these guarantees covered the understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The man replied, "The importance of the levels and degrees of international detente is known only to those who are familiar with its secrets. There are matters about which an international agreement is achieved without a meeting between the U.S. president and the Soviet leader. The evidence for that lies in what happened regarding the missiles crisis and other international crises. The Soviet Union, for example, did not delay Security Council resolutions that had to do with sending UN forces to south Lebanon, and it did not yet even launch a verbal campaign against the mission of the Arab Follow-Up Committee. All the statements made by the Soviet ambassador in Beirut, especially those that were made after his official meetings with President Ilyas Sarkis, with Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and with Minister Fu'ad Butrus, affirmed his country's commitment to support every solution that would preserve the unity and independence of Lebanon and strengthen its legitimate authority and its cooperation [with others] in its environment. The proposed draft solution does not depart from the framework of these principles."

The speaker was asked, "Can it be said that this has been approved and will be implemented?"

The speaker said, "The plan is now on the back burner, but I cannot assert with certainty now in advance that it will be put into effect because, as I said, the matter is tied to the climates and the outcome of the presidential election. As of today I am saying that if a capable and firm president comes to power, this solution will be on its way to implementation, and the country will have chosen the way of deliverance. But if the next president is an ordinary, hesitant man who prefers to endure the crisis rather than solve it, this would mean that the components of this solution would not be available, that Lebanon has lost the last chance and that it would continue its decline into the abyss of dissolution in the real sense of the word."

8592

CSO: 4404/171

LEBANON

CABINET CHANGES EXPECTED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1307, 20 Nov 81 p 22

[Article: "Candidates Show up at the Palace; Process To Begin with Recall of Ministers; Secret Decision To Overthrow the Government before Beginning of New Year"]

[Text] In total secrecy and silence, far from the limelight and from the sources of the media a political decision was made in the last few days to overthrow the government before the beginning of the coming year at the latest.

The aforementioned decision was made by political leaders who are active on the Lebanese scene. It was made with their assurance that it was no longer possible to devote a considerable portion of effort, time and political capabilities to help the government of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan survive amidst the growing wave of political and popular opposition to it. [They argued that] despite all the obstacles around it, it had become almost impossible for the government to endure for a long period beyond next September when the term of President Sarkis is due to expire and the term of a future president is to begin.

When they made the decision to work to get the government of al-Wazzan to resign before the beginning of the following year, those leaders said that the appropriate time would come to discuss the set of reasons that were behind the decision to try to change the government. But these reasons were enough to affirm as of now that the cabinet had to resign and that the cabinet change had to take place.

A plan of action was attached to the aforementioned political decision. Its implementation in Lebanon began so that the climate can be prepared for the ministerial change which would take place with the least possible amount of tumult, challenge and division in a context of parliamentary democracy and with political, non-sectarian support. This is because the required objective of the plan is not to score the victory of one group over another by imposing the inevitability of a government change; but it is rather an attempt to proceed from this change and to turn a new political leaf that may contribute to the achievement of an openness that could help establish an acceptable agreement before the presidential elections.

The political plan to change the government before the beginning of next year stems from the attempt to affirm the notion that the crucial events which the Middle East area is going through require the establishment of relative stability on the Lebanese scene. That stability cannot actually be established with the growing opposition to al-Wazzan's government.

This effort also stems from the assertion that stopping the campaign against the government for any reason would be difficult and that the political forces whose opposition to the government has gone as far as the mainstream of Lebanon's citizens insist on holding Prime Minister al-Wazzan responsible for various matters, among which, according to these forces, is the fact that al-Wazzan has assumed positions which, they think, place him automatically in the camp of the official group which is sympathetic with a certain group of Lebanese people and not with other groups.

Regarding the determination of the means whereby the decision to overthrow the government would be put into effect, the forces that made the initial decision to remove the government agreed on the means of this removal.

There was a lengthy investigation of the parliamentary idea which calls for sending the government a written questionnaire, waiting the legal period and then convening a session of parliament to discuss [this matter] with the government. A confidence vote would be taken, and the government would fall. [Another way] was to sign a parliamentary petition that would call for convening a session for general discussion which would culminate in a confidence vote. A parliamentary majority would be ensured at that session to bring about the downfall of the government and to force the president conventionally and morally [to accept] the inevitability of change. An effort would be made to collect the signatures of a parliamentary majority on a written text to withdraw confidence from the government if it becomes evident that this would be the only means left for the opposition.

Amidst the ranks of those who made the decision to overthrow the government there was opposition to the method of going through parliament to bring about the downfall of the government.

Those who opposed the parliamentary method said in their discussions that confronting the government in the Chamber of Deputies would mean that sensitive subjects that had to do with the government's policy would have to be dealt with in the discussions. Thorny issues would be raised, and these would automatically arouse sensitivities, deepen division and build a new wall that would further the distance between the political forces that oppose the government and those that support it. It would turn the Chamber into two opposing blocs: the first would be led by the opposition, and the second would be led by the Lebanese Front. This would not guarantee the removal of the government from office, but it would most certainly guarantee that the abyss and the distance between the Lebanese people would be widened.

The opinion that called for the removal of the government from office by

means and measures that do not go as far as the Chamber of Deputies prevailed. A preliminary decision was made that a group of ministers would be asked to resign to force the government to yield to the principle of change with the beginning of the coming year or at the latest, before the month of February.

The decision to recall the ministers included the representatives of Mr Walid Junblatt, the ministers Marawan Hamadah and Khalid Junblatt. In addition, the decision included ministers who are members of the independent parliamentary bloc and a few other independent ministers.

It seemed evident that the decision to remove the government from office, which was made secretly at a previous time, was the result of deep-rooted deliberations that were conducted with local and Arab forces that have influence on the Lebanese scene. After a reconnaissance visit to one of the Arab countries a prominent minister said that he raised a specific question in that country about the possibility of the government continuing in office till the end of [the president's] term. He came back with the impression that a cabinet change had become inescapable and that the question now was a matter of [choosing] the appropriate time to recall the ministers by having them resign.

This minister was asked: "Will the resignation of some ministers lead to the resignation of the whole government? What will happen if President Ilyas Sarkis insists on holding on to the government that had resigned under the pretext of charging it to take care of business until the end of his term?"

The minister replied, "When Walid Junblatt resigns from the government through the two ministers, Hamadah and Junblatt, Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan will automatically submit his resignation. President Ilyas Sarkis's position will be dealt with in advance. We will consult with him, persuade him and [talk with him] objectively so he would consider the question of the cabinet change a principal ingredient in the political developments that are expected. It is in the interests of the government not to permit the struggle around it to lead to alienation."

Who is qualified to replace Prime Minister al-Wazzan in government if the attempt to remove the government from office succeeds?

With the continued elimination of the names of traditional candidates for this position, such as [former] prime ministers Sa'ib Salam, Rashid Karami, Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh and Salim al-Huss, [other] names emerge. It is being said that these names are quietly being singled out for this assignment--names like those of Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, chairman of the Construction Council, Rashid al-Sulh and Malik Salam, who is still popular despite some difficulties. Indications of communications between Malik Salam and the state are increasing, and it is being said that he visited President Ilyas Sarkis 2 weeks ago at B'abda Palace and that a general discussion took place during that visit about some aspects of the situation.

With the recent emergence of the decision to remove the cabinet from office, there seems to be an urgent need to conduct a lengthy dialogue with the leaders of the Lebanese Front to persuade them to go along with the cabinet change and to give up holding on to the government. The leaders of the Lebanese Front are holding on to the government because they believe that the decision to remove it is a leftist decision supported by an outside position. They believe that the decision was made for reasons that have to do with the conditions of the battle for the presidency.

The opposition of the Lebanese Front to the change in government is an important ingredient that may not be overlooked. It may ultimately ensure the survival of al-Wazzan's government beyond next September, even as a caretaker government.

8592

CSO: 4404/171

NEW UNIVERSITY OPENS AT MARSА BURAYQAH

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 18

[Text]

LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY leader Muammer Qadhafi has formally opened the Jamahiriya's third university. Located at Marsa Brega, the university will specialise in technical subjects relating to oil and engineering and will have an eventual student population of 1,700.

In addition to a range of well equipped laboratories, there are seven lecture theatres in the integrated complex, which has about 1,000 rooms. The main university building, which took three years to construct, covers 62,000 square metres of a total campus area measuring four kilometres by 2.5 kilometres. The building cost about LD 30 million. A further LD 2 million will be spent on utilities such as power and air conditioning, and another LD 1 million on furniture and laboratory equipment. A student village will also be constructed.

The university, formally opened on 25th November, was built by a joint venture of Switzerland's two leading construction companies, Preiswerk of Basle and Frutigen of Thun.

The Marsa Brega University is destined to become the focus of technical education in the Jamahiriya, and will incorporate a number of existing institutions. The Mining and Petroleum Faculty of Tripoli's Al Fateh University, and the Brack Higher Institute of Technology are amongst those that will be transferred to Marsa Brega.

One of the Jamahiriya's major petrochemicals complexes is under development near the university, and students will have ample opportunity to visit the types of project in which they will work after graduating.

Switzerland has also been successful in other Libyan higher education projects. On 9th October it was reported that the Geilinger company had been awarded a \$50 million contract to build an agriculture faculty for Benghazi's Gar Younis University. The faculty will be located at the town of Beida, about 200 kilometres north east of Benghazi. The two-storey building will cover an area of more than 28,000 square metres, and will cater for 1,500 students and 150 staff. Completion is scheduled for the end of 1983.

CSO: 4500/96

CONTRACTS FOR PEOPLE'S MARKETS AWARDED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19

[Text]

THE JAMAHIRIYA'S Economy Secretariat has awarded a \$22 million contract to the Yugoslavian firm Gosa to build and furnish three people's supermarkets.

As part of the Al Fateh Revolution's moves to eliminate exploitation, the private retailing sector in the Jamahiriya is being phased out. In the place of the privately-owned stores a country-wide network of people's markets is being set up, where Libyans can buy a wide range of commodities virtually at cost price. By March this year the General Markets Company had established 225 markets, and it was announced that 60 more were shortly to open. The latest people's market was opened on 24th September in Jado Yefran municipality.

To ensure that the people's markets are adequately supplied, a parallel network of warehouses is being established in the Jamahiriya's towns. In October it was announced that the Economy

Secretariat has awarded three Italian firms contracts to build a total of 27 new warehouses. The Codelfa company has an \$81 million contract for seven warehouses, to be built in Benghazi, Al Marj, Tobruk, Derna, Kufra, Agedabiveh and Beida. Completion is scheduled for January 1983. A further seven will be built by the Sices company. The other thirteen will be built by the Silfep company under a \$42 million contract. Silfep is currently completing a contract for five 32,000 square metre people's supermarkets.

Athens-based Doxiades Associates has been appointed construction supervisor for the new warehouses. The Greek firm has also been appointed construction manager for a scheme to build 185 further people's markets. Construction contractor is the Jamahiriya's National Construction Company, which is expected to award subcontracts for the work. The scheme is scheduled for completion in 1984.

CSO: 4500/96

JAMAHIRIYAH SAID TESTING CREDIT MARKET

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19

[Text]

THE LIBYAN Arab Foreign Investment Company, set up this year to handle all the Jamahiriya's non-banking foreign investments, has raised a \$200 million, seven year loan on the European financial market. Carrying interest of almost 16 per cent, the loan is the first Libyan venture into the Euromarket for many years. The loan is guaranteed by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, and the main organiser is the Arab Banking Corporation, in which the Jamahiriya has a one-third stake.

Contrary to reports that the loan signifies Libyan cash flow problems arising from reduced oil sales, Western financial experts see the move as an exercise designed to test the country's credit rating. On 7th November the *Economist* said that the Jamahiriya's foreign exchange holdings at the end of last May stood at more than \$13 billion in foreign bank deposits country 'probably has a large share of the \$44.7 billion in foreign bank deposits that this Friday's figures from the Bank for International Settlement show were held by Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Oman and Libya at the end of June'.

Writing in the *Guardian* on 25th October, David Simpson said: 'The loan is seen as a deliberate attempt by Libya to gauge reaction as there are no obvious reasons why the credit should be sought at this moment.' The *Economist* explained further, 'There is more to borrowing on the Euromarkets than being short of cash. Putting a toe in the water now makes it easier to slip into the market at short notice in the future. Bankers then have more savvy about the borrower's economic health and, particularly, about whether he has clean repayment habits.'

CSO: 4500/96

IMPORTED CONSUMER GOODS RESTRICTED

Tripoli AL-JAMAHIRIYAH in Arabic 27 Nov 81 p 11

[Text] In an unusual move, AL-JAMAHIRIYAH is publishing this first list of goods which may not be imported, by decision of the Popular Committee for the Economy. This publication is intended to confirm a number of principles.

This resolution comes in response to the resolutions of the People's Congresses to create a productive society and direct the national resources toward production to achieve the saying of the Green Book: "Need conceals freedom." The path to apply this is filled with work, sweat and sacrifice for the sake of stimulating the productive structure of society, whether it is that of the socialist sector or productive activity carried on by individuals without the use of paid labor.

This resolution puts an end to bourgeois consumption patterns, bourgeois operations to sabotage our society, and the dispersal of oil income into luxury consumer goods which are incompatible with the desire of the masses to create a first-rate society which consumes what it produces and does not rely on sources beyond the sea. This will free it from economic pressures applied to our society by imperialism and multinational monopolistic companies.

This resolution calls on the productive forces in society and their popular and revolutionary tools to rise to the challenges of the next stage to work to increase production and increase productive ability to create domestic substitutes for everything we can do without. We must move the wheel of production, increase production averages, reduce material loss, operate production units to the utmost, and convert our homes into productive homes, as the leader always exhorts.

The list includes many commodities which may not be imported. AL-JAMAHIRIYAH wanted to publish it to put an end to the rumors started by the bourgeoisie in an attempt to discredit the revolution and its goals. The list is intended to ban some luxuries and items which can be produced locally, and that is the important thing.

We asked the general secretary of the secretariat: "Why is liquor, which is only used by swine, on the list of banned goods, as if it were being banned for the first time?" He said: "We wanted the resolution to include previously banned items so that it would be complete."

There is one observation on the wording. The resolution does not refer to the resolutions of the People's Congresses on this subject, so that even if it were an executive resolution it would possess legality. Also, this resolution does not mention the recommendations and observations of the leader of the revolution to the Popular Committees. These are limitations which can be corrected in order for the resolution to win its popular, revolutionary and legal legitimacy.

We publish this resolution and we welcome it, because it is one of the precious goals which AL-JAMAHIRIYAH has fought for and is still fighting to achieve.

Let there be more revolutionary resolutions which protect our society from circular bedrooms, rich silk and cotton fabrics, and private swing sets for privileged children.

However, some reservations and observations remain, and we will deal with these in the next edition.

The battle still goes on with the adherents of bourgeois society and its culture!!

General Popular Committee Resolution No 1315 for 1981 Concerning Restricting Import of Some Goods and Commodities

After examining Law No 64 for 1971 concerning imports, Law No 67 for 1972 concerning customs regulations, Law No 2 for 1979 concerning economic crimes, the resolutions of the General Popular Committee concerning decisions to restrict imports, the recommendations of the General Popular Committee for the Economy, and the resolution of the General Popular Committee authorizing the commodity budget for 1982, the General Popular Committee resolved:

Article I. Import of the following goods and commodities is to be restricted:

1. Carbonated and mineral water and beverages of all kinds.
2. Canned artificial or natural juices for human consumption, with the exception of concentrates for industry.
3. Tea and coffee packed in containers.
4. Fresh, frozen, dried and pickled vegetables.
5. Slaughtered poultry.
6. Preserved meat and food prepared from it.
7. Eggs for human consumption and powdered eggs.
8. Natural and artificial honey.
9. Fresh pasteurized milk.
10. Live poultry for human consumption.
11. Harisah [dish of meat and bulgur] and peppers.
12. Canned legumes and vegetables.
13. Carbon dioxide gas.
14. Peanuts and canned salted almonds.
15. Artificial fruit powders.
16. Nutritional products from husked grain and flakes of grain unless they are for children or diabetics.
17. Preserved almonds and nuts of all kinds.
18. Chocolate and its derivatives not produced from natural cacao.

19. Deluxe baked goods (breads, zwieback and biscuits), with the exception of those for diabetics and children.
20. Flour and slices of potatoes and fruits.
21. Incompletely prepared salted, smoked or dried fish.
22. Dates of all kinds.
23. Seasoned salad dressings.
24. Animal fats, with the exception of natural butter, unless they are for industrial purposes.
25. Vegetable juices of all types.
26. Candy and sweets.
27. Macaroni of all types.
28. Fresh lemons and oranges.
29. Dried figs.
30. Potatoes for fodder.
31. Fresh or dried sugar beets.
32. Vegetables or fruits preserved with vinegar.
33. Molasses.
34. Glucose sweetener, candies and beverages.
35. Sugar candies without chocolate added.
36. Scented or colored sugar, unless it is for manufacturing use.
37. Blends or concentrates of tea.
38. Handmade carpets.
39. Oriental mats.
40. Unglazed pottery.
41. Darabik [a variety of drum].
42. Peat.
43. Lime and gypsum.
44. Barrels and bottles made of plastic.
45. Paper bags for packaging.
46. Organic fertilizer and urea.
47. Secondhand broadcasting equipment.
48. Heavy-duty detergents.
49. Wallpaper and plaster for decorating work.
50. Crystal chandeliers.
51. Wall clocks.
52. Toy pistols and rifles.
53. Luxury sports cars.
54. Yachts for personal use or pleasure trips.
55. Tools or sets of tools made of gold or silver.
56. Eyeglasses inlaid with gold or precious metals.
57. Cigarette lighters made of gold and precious metals.
58. Handmade statues inlaid with ivory and precious metals.
59. Animals, birds and fish for ornamental purposes, and their requirements.
60. Sets of perfume containers of precious metals of gold and silver.
61. Watches set with gems or made of gold.
62. Natural furs and products made from them.
63. Cooking pots.
64. Articles of domestic clothing.
65. Immoral clothing.
66. Secondhand clothing.
67. Waste baskets.
68. Brooms.

69. Fire extinguishers.
70. PVC plastic pipes.
71. Plastic bags of all kinds and for all purposes, with the exception of medical purposes.
72. Arab-style furnishings.
73. Mattresses and pillows of all kinds.
74. Desks and blackboards.
75. Candles.
76. (al-yurakina) potash.
77. Cardboard cartons.
78. Envelopes of all kinds.
79. International antennae.
80. Plastic covers for stoves and other purposes.
81. Scouring pads.
82. Clothes racks of wood or other material.

Article II. Violation of the provisions of this resolution is punishable by the penalties specified in Law No 64 for 1981.

Article III. This resolution is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, bearing the date it was issued.

General Popular Committee; Approved 1 Nov 1981.

7587

CSO: 4504/120

RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRESS, BROADCAST MEDIA DISCUSSED

Tripoli AL-JAMAHIRIYAH in Arabic 20 Nov 81 p 21

[Article: "Official Television Obstructs Revolutionary Press!"]

[Text] Is it the right of daily programs which review the press to ignore what is published by the newspapers AL-ZAHF and AL-JAMAHIRIYAH or to shirk from or diminish the value of the subjects they publish?!

First we must ask, if they were to have this right, have the television stations become "official" and gotten rid of their membership in the revolutionary committees?!

Or don't those responsible for the "programs" know that the two newspapers are issued by the revolutionary committees?!

In order to reach a definitive answer to this question, we will discuss the programs, at least from the "technical" aspect.

These programs are well-known in all Arab and international broadcasting circles for giving preference to a number of newspapers and magazines which serve a specific cause or a subject which they desire to raise through the programs.

It is assumed that this choice in this country takes place according to the instigating position of the revolutionary media and to the nature of the programs, since it relies on published newspapers and magazines.

For example, AL-JAMAHIRIYAH is opposed to the imperialistic Fahd project, and the program writer must explore all domestic and foreign articles and commentaries which uncover this project and reveal its true goals. The commentator makes use of cartoons at the end of the program and press headlines as a technical necessity from the standpoint of form and subject.

These are methods, and there are methods of reviewing newspapers and magazines. Through this review the commentator goes over the most important headlines and topics with a progressive view and a bias toward issues of the people and freedom from their enemy. Within the limits of time permitted for the programs, there must be a balance in material so that no paper is favored over another. This depends on the efforts exerted by those who prepare the programs to summarize and read critically the content of the programs, bearing in mind the need to coordinate and complement printed and audiovisual material, take advantage of written editorial material, and expand the scope of its influence and propaganda.

It is true that the choice is a judgmental question, but it is controlled by objective considerations derived from the nature of the existing regime and its interest and the nature of information at this stage. These considerations are supposed to be adhered to because we are not living amid uncontrolled dissemination of information!!

For example, it is technically impossible for us to review other newspapers whatever their affiliation, and we do not review with the same enthusiasm the newspapers AL-JAMAHIRIYAH and AL-ZAHF, regardless of their nature as the papers of the revolutionary committees.

We must concentrate and choose one or more issues so that the viewer's mind does not wander and he can derive intellectual and mental enjoyment from the program and gain condensed information. However, the programs must not be mere repetition of the newscast or a commentary on the news, but rather an in-depth analysis which contributes something.

The period allotted for the program and the time it is broadcast allow those who prepare this program to correct all of these shortcomings. The most dangerous are personal considerations in important programs which draw the attention of thousands of viewers!

Less serious is the danger of turning to mere clippings and scattered headlines and topics without any effort to differentiate between what is reactionary or progressive. If so, we lead the masses astray!

7587

CSO: 4504/120

RETURN TO CHAD ANTICIPATED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 93, 21-27 Nov 81 p 30

[Article: "Libyans Expect To Return to Chad"]

[Text] Chad is currently experiencing a contest between war and peace. As the vanguard of the African Peace Force (250 soldiers from Zaire) was arriving in Ndjamena, the eastern provinces of Chad were witnessing violent clashes between the forces of former Chadian Defense Minister Husayn Hibri and the forces of current Foreign Minister Ahmad Asil, the "Libyans' man." What are the facts of the situation? How may matters develop in the near future?

Ever since Chadian President Goukouni Weddeye announced his government's decision to withdraw the Libyan forces, many observers have expected disturbances to break out anew in this African state. This is because the rapid withdrawal of the Libyans from the capital and the eastern areas left behind a security vacuum which, because of the delayed arrival of the African Peace Force (5,000 men), was exploited by sides betting that peace in Chad will leave along with the Libyans. Colonel Qadhdhafi had hoped that by sending 10,000 of his soldiers to Chad he could achieve some sort of union between Libya and Chad that would help him realize his African dreams. To this end, the Libyans attempted during their 11-month stay in Chad to win over a large segment of the population and the tribal leaders. They also gave the Chadian Government some \$18 million in aid to help pay the salaries of government workers. This situation led to the development of strong relationships between Libyan intelligence and a large number of government employees and officials in the provinces. The secret trips to Tripoli taken by these individuals became a source of concern to the Weddeye government. Some sources say that based on orders from Colonel Qadhdhafi, travel between Ndjamena and Tripoli was free to Chadians on board Libyan aircraft.

When Weddeye began to feel that the Libyan forces were trying to consolidate their positions in Chadian territory, he hastened to call for their withdrawal by the end of 1981. However, Colonel Qadhdhafi ordered his troops to leave Chad immediately, which led to a renewal of the fighting in the northern provinces. Although Weddeye charged that Sudanese forces were participating in the fighting alongside Hibri's forces, some news reports say that Ahmad Asil's forces started the fighting and Hibri's forces were forced to respond. At any rate, the renewal of fighting in Chadian territory has alarmed African officials as well as Western capitals. In Lagos, the capital of Nigeria, the foreign ministers of Benin, Togo,

Zaire, Guinea, Senegal, Gabon, and Nigeria called a meeting in which they studied the matter of forming and financing the "African Force." However, the ministers disagreed over the nature of the force which will take charge of security in the eastern provinces where the fighting is taking place. In Paris, a meeting was called among the European states and the United States to discuss the provisions of economic aid to Chad. American officials announced that the United States would offer medical and food aid and would help transfer the African troops to Ndjamena. The American position settled the indecision of some of the African states with regard to participation in the force that will be sent to Chad. Nigeria requested U.S. assistance in transporting 2,000 of its troops to Ndjamena. Washington agreed to the request but wished that it had come from the OAU. As for the French Government, it promised to offer economic and financial aid to Chad and placed a number of military transport aircraft at the disposal of the OAU to transport the "peace force" to Ndjamena.

While awaiting the formation of the African force, Chad is once again undergoing a state of near-civil war. While some Western capitals have been betting on the success of this experiment, Libyan officials are expecting the African force to fail and do not think it unlikely that the Libyan forces will be called back to restore security in Chad.

8591

CSO: 4504/114

ARAB RECRUITS FOR LIBYAN MILITARY ACADEMIES SOUGHT

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 235, 2-8 Nov 81 p 10

[Text]

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH
ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF COMMAND:

Announcement of Admission of Arab Male and Female Applicants
to Military Academies and Secondary Schools

In compliance with the decisions made by the People's Congresses during their emergency session held in the year 1389 after the death of the Prophet, corresponding to 1980, and which decided that the [Libyan] Jamahiriya is the nation of all Arabs and that Arab nationality is the nationality of its citizens, and having as a premise the principle of total mass mobilization of all forces consisting of men and women who are prepared to fight, the Armed Forces General Staff Command hereby announces the admission of [qualified] Arab males and females to [Libya's] military academies (ground forces, air force, naval, and air defense academies), for holders of general secondary school diplomas or the equivalent, and military secondary schools, for holders of preparatory school diplomas or the equivalent.

Admission Requirements

- A. The applicant must be of Arab nationality.
- B. The applicant must be at least 18 and no more than 25 years of age.
- C. The applicant must have obtained a general secondary school diploma if he/she is applying for admission to a military academy, and a preparatory school diploma if he/she is applying for admission to a military secondary school.
- D. The applicant must satisfactorily pass a medical examination.
- E. The applicant must have never been found guilty of committing a dishonorable misdemeanor or felony.
- F. The applicant for admission must submit a written application, accompanied by the following:

1. A secondary school diploma, or the equivalent, or proof that he/she received the diploma.
2. A photocopy of his/her family [identity] booklet or personal identity card (passport).
3. A document proving his/her lack of any history of criminal convictions.
4. A total of 4 photographs, the size of which must be 4 x 6 centimeters.
5. His/her full address and the address of his/her legal guardian.

General Information

1. Monthly financial stipends are given to students during their period of study.
2. Students are given the rank of second lieutenant upon graduation from one of the military academies.
3. Students are subject to all regulations and laws followed in the armed forces.
4. Applicants abroad must submit their applications, accompanied by the required documents, to the nearest Brotherhood Bureau or People's Bureau.
5. The Arab Brotherhood Bureau/Beirut will pay the expenses of the [applicant's] round-trip ticket [to Libya].
6. The General Staff Command will take care of matters concerning [the applicant's] residence in Libya until he/she completes his/her medical examination, and will also pay the expenses of the return trip of applicants who, after completing the medical examinations, are not accepted.
7. This shall occur within 10 days of the date of the applicant's arrival in Libya.
8. Applications must be submitted, accompanied by the required documents, to the Arab Brotherhood Bureau/Beirut-Bi'r Hasan.

9468

CSO: 4504/93

BRIEFS

DARNAH PORT SCHEME REVIEWED--South Korea's Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company has been awarded the \$101 million contract for the second stage of the Derna port project, some 300 kilometres north east of Benghazi. Hyundai will dredge 600,000 cubic metres to lower the quay-side depth about 10 metres, with the dredged material being used to reclaim 300,000 square metres of land. Two new quays will be constructed. A 280 metre quay will have two general cargo berths, one for use by container vessels. A 500 metre quay will provide a grain berth, a loading berth, a police berth and berthage for a floating dry dock. Hyundai will also build five hectares of roads and pavements, administration, fire and first aid buildings, a transit shed and workshop. The second stage of the port scheme is scheduled for completion in mid-1984. Client is the Derna municipality, and consultant is Britain's Rendel Palmer & Tritton. The first stage of the Derna scheme was completed in 1979 by Egypt's Canal Harbour Works, and entailed building a breakwater and general cargo quay, and dredging to improve the port approaches. The port will be the major outlet for the Jebel Akhdar region, which is the site of a number of agricultural development projects. Port expansion is a key objective of the Jamahiriya's current 1981-85 development plan. The aim is to expand capacity from 7 million tonnes during the plan period. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 18]

POWER STATION EXTENSION PLANNED--Belgium's Electrobél Engineering International has won the \$8.3 million consultancy contract for the third extension to the Benghazi North power and desalination plant. The five year contract covers the full range of services from preliminary studies to start-up and final acceptance by the client. The power station was designed by Electrobél in 1971 with a capacity of 30 MW and 24,000 cubic metres per day of desalinated water. In 1974 the Belgian firm was appointed consultant for a scheme to double the plant's capacity, and in 1977 two 40 MW turbines were added. The third extension, for which Electrobél has already started preliminary studies, entails supplying three turbines of 120 MW--150 MW each and a 100,000 cubic metres per day multi-flash desalination plant. Work will also include buildings and workshops, seawater reservoirs and pumping stations, freshwater reservoirs and pumping stations for Benghazi and a surrounding area with a radius of 45 kilometres. Other elements include fuel storage tanks, a computerised control centre, and a 220 kV substation and interconnection with the existing electricity grid. One of the key projects in the \$62.5 billion 1981-85 development plan is the establishment of a country-wide electricity grid. A landmark in progress towards this aim came in November with the completion of 220 kV power transmission lines linking

the Gharyan power station, about 70 kilometres south of Tripoli, with the Jebel Gharbi region. Announcing the completion of the project on 13th November, the Jamahiriya News Agency JANA added that a 75 MW power station had become operational in Kufra, in south east Libya, with most of its output going to the region's agricultural schemes. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 18]

EASING PORT CONGESTION--Libya still suffers from a restricted port capacity which has the effect both of delaying ships in berthing, and in delaying the unloading and processing of their cargoes. The first problem is being dealt with by an ambitious programme of port expansion (see Hyundai wins \$100 million port contract). The second is being tackled by the creation of a new public company which will handle the distribution of goods from the ports. On 2nd November the Jamahiriya News Agency JANA reported that the company, which will end the monopoly of the private sector in this crucial area, has just started operations in Tripoli port. Already the firm has signed contracts for 500 vehicles, of which 100 have been delivered. The company will establish a network of depots and service stations for its fleet, and will shortly open branches in all the Jamahiriya's ports and municipalities. All privately-owned vehicles with a carrying capacity exceeding three tonnes and engaged in maritime transport will be incorporated into the new company's fleet, although their ownership will be unchanged. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 pp 18-19]

JAPANESE CREWS FOR FREIGHTERS--Japan is to supply crew members for the two latest additions to the Jamahiriya's merchant fleet. On 23 October MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST reported that 28 Japanese sailors have been recruited to man the 9,000 dwt "Ibn Hawkal," which is nearing completion at Rostock in the German Democratic Republic. The new vessel's maiden voyage is scheduled for late December. A further 28 Japanese are to crew the 9,420 dwt "Sirte," also built at Rostock, and delivered to the Jamahiriya's General Organisation for Maritime Transport in late September. A third general cargo vessel is nearing completion at the East German yard, and is due for delivery next February. The arrival of the two ships still at Rostock will bring the Jamahiriya's merchant fleet to 27 vessels, and this figure is set to rise to 60 by the middle of the decade, at the end of Libya's 1981-85 development plan. By then, 60 per cent of all the country's imports will be carried on Libyan-owned ships. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19]

MAJOR ROADS OPEN--The opening of three major new roads in the Libyan Jamahiriya in recent weeks is an important step towards the achievement of the 1981-85 development plan's target of 1,500 kilometres of roads to be built by the middle of the decade. 2nd October saw the official inauguration of two roads linking the coastal town of Homs with Misrata and Mislata. On 25th September the 1,223 kilometres Nalut-Jadu highway was opened. This is a key route in the network planned to link all the municipalities in the area between Gharyan and Nalut. Meanwhile, a state-owned Indian firm has won a 600 million rupees contract to build roads in the Ghat region in the south west of the Jamahiriya, New Delhi radio reported on 9th September. The contract has brought the total value of the company's Libyan work to 2.5 billion rupees. The Jamahiriya's rapid economic development has been accompanied by a large increase in the number of vehicles on Libyan roads. Japanese cars and trucks have proved particularly popular, and

this year about 60 per cent of vehicle imports were Japanese. Following orders placed with the Mitsubishi Motors Corporation this year totalling 22,120 vehicles, valued at \$83.3 million, the Japanese firm is now setting up an after sales car service network. Four service technicians have been sent to Tripoli, and another two to Benghazi to help establish the service depots. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19]

CONSTRUCTION BOOM--Recently awarded building contracts show that there will be no let up in the Libyan Jamahiriya's construction boom. On 6th November MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST quoted Lee Kyung-Hoon, president of South Korea's Daewoo Corporation as saying the firm had in the previous month won turnkey contracts in Libya totalling \$1.8 billion. The awards more than double the value of Daewoo's work in the Jamahiriya. The new contracts include building 5,000 apartments in Benghazi and 2,000 in Tripoli, all to be in six storey blocks. Also in Tripoli, Daewoo will build 2,500 classrooms and a new hospital, with accommodation for 1,000 staff. Daewoo expects to increase its Korean workforce in Libya to 15,000-16,000 from the current level of about 7,000. Another major hospital project was won by the Indian firm Turnkey Engineering Corporation last August. The Health Secretariat awarded the firm a \$15 million contract to build twelve mini-hospitals in the Tripoli region, and the company said it has been offered a further contract for two hospitals and nine clinics. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19]

CONTRACTS TO ITALIAN FIRMS--Italy's Vetraria Rocco Bormioli (VRB) and its affiliate Industria Vetraria San Cristoforo have supplied the Jamahiriya with 50 million items of glassware during 1981. By November about 15 million pieces valued at \$1.2 million had been shipped. The Italian firms are hoping for a repeat order for 1982. As well as supplying glassware, the Italian firms are also providing technical assistance to their client, the General Glass & Ceramic Company (GGCC), in operating GGCC's Tripoli and Derna factories. It was also announced in November that Italy's Pompe Aturi has an \$11.5 million order for 3,100 submersible, electrically driven centrifugal pumps, to be used to supply water from deep irrigation wells in the Jebel Akhdar region in north east Libya. Earlier, in August, it was disclosed that Italy's Omnia Orobica had won a contract to supply 250,000 tonnes of steel bars for use in construction. 21st September was set as delivery date for the \$56 million order. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 19, Dec 81 p 19]

USP: 4500/96

RENEWED STABILITY NOTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 50, 19 Dec 81 p 23

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text] WHILE the danger of the Western Sahara conflict spilling over into Mauritanian territory is ever-present, the current attitude of senior government officials in Nouakchott is nevertheless one of muted confidence.

Indeed, after years of constant political instability and even an armed attempt to topple the regime of President Mohammed Khouna Ould Haydalla, a certain calm is at last evident in the Islamic republic of Mauritania. Since the coup attempt by Moroccan-backed Mauritanian dissidents was foiled last March, and pro-Libyan and pro-Franco dissident movements neutralised in the summer, the Military Committee of National Salvation (CMSN) has again grasped the reins of power. President Haydalla, backed by Prime Minister Maassoum Ould Loue, has sought to keep the nation calm and united.

On the diplomatic front, changes in the government of neighbouring Senegal as well as Franco-Mauritanian negotiations in Nouakchott. Former Senegalese President Léopold Senghor was a fervent supporter of Morocco, and threatened to request self-determination for the black population living in southern Mauritania if the Polisario were granted the same right. In addition, Mauritania's internal cohesion has been strengthened by racial unity in the country.

With the accession of President Abdou Diouf, relations between Mauritania and Senegal have substantially improved. The new Senegalese president has adopted a more realistic approach to the Saharan

question, and expelled Mauritanian dissidents belonging to the Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique (AMD) from Dakar.

President Haydalla attended the Franco-African summit in Paris at the beginning of November, the first time a Mauritanian head of state has done so since 1978. Talks between Haydalla and Mitterrand paved the way for a thaw in relations.

Mauritania's attempts to paper over the cracks with Morocco have, however, not succeeded. Mauritanian officials told 8 DAYS that relations will be frozen as long as King Hassan refuses to enact the second article in the eight-point agreement signed last summer in Taif under Saudi auspices. This forbids both countries to harbour each other's opposition groups. Mauritania is convinced that AMD leaders are based in Rabat, while recent Moroccan claims that Polisario forces use the northern part of Mauritanian territory to launch attacks against the royal armed forces are viewed as further evidence that King Hassan is not actively seeking improved relations.

Western diplomats in the Mauritanian capital told 8 DAYS that their visits to the frontier area between Mauritania and the Western Sahara convinced them that Polisario forces neither maintain major bases in the area nor freely roam over this stretch of Saharan wasteland. Moroccan credibility is on the line: if they want to be believed they will have to substantiate their claims of Mauritanian complicity with the Polisario, and this will not be easy, commented a western diplomat.

The Haydalla regime has done all in its power to control Mauritanian territory

Motorised army units constantly patrol border areas near the port of Nouadhibou, and inland around Atar, Zouerate and Bir Moghreim. What is more, the military governors recently appointed to the northern zone are not particularly known for their pro-Polisario sympathy.

'The Moroccans are attempting by all means to drag us back into the Saharan war,' Diop Moustapha, Mauritanian minister of information, told *8 Days*. He was also extremely critical of the American decision to provide additional arms for Morocco: 'Since we are convinced that King Hassan intends to destabilise our regime, we see American efforts to reinforce Rabat as partly directed against us.'

Moustapha is also concerned that greater US backing of Morocco will tend to internationalise this regional conflict. 'We have seen that when one of the superpowers steps into a conflict in the Third World, then the other does not usually sit with its arms folded,' he stressed.

Mauritanian officials are also worried that the OAU-sponsored peace plan, initiated at the OAU summit in Nairobi last year, is running out of steam. Moustapha says that his government is sceptical about King Hassan's intention to proceed.

Relations with Algeria, Mauritania's other northern neighbour in the Maghreb, have markedly improved since diplomatic links were restored in 1979. Not only is President Chadli Benjedid's government providing financial aid — Premier Taya returned in November from a visit to Algiers with \$10m in budgetary aid — but the Algerians also sent in emergency supplies of arms following the March coup bid.

MOROCCO-CANADA COOPERATION NOTED

London 8 DAYS in English 19 Dec 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Peter Ward]

[Text] AT THE Canadian International Development Agency in Ottawa the experimental new approach to aid being launched in partnership with Morocco is viewed with a great deal of optimism. It has long been a dream of Canadian foreign aid experts to step up the involvement of private business in helping foreign development. This approach now appears to be working so well in Morocco that a major expansion of this type of aid seems likely.

The aim, according to one Canadian aid official, is to make Morocco a showcase project, illustrating how well Canadian businessmen can work with their counterparts in Third World countries, boost technological capabilities in the developing world, and at the same time make a profit.

In contrast, there are no major new aid projects on the Canadian schedule in Tunisia. It's not that Canadian relations with Tunisia have soured; they haven't. But Tunisia is already on the verge of an economic take-off, thanks largely to some hefty aid projects sponsored by Canada and other western nations. Three years ago the then Tunisian foreign minister, Habib Chatty, described relations between his country and Canada as 'the best which can possibly exist between a developed and a developing country,' and added that his country would be able to stand on its own economically by 1981. Canada's contribution to that economic boost for Tunisia has been \$150m in aid, no-interest loans, grants and food.

The Sidi Saad dam above Kairouan illustrates the more traditional Canadian approach to aid. In September 1969, the Kairouan plain was hit by a massive wall of

water, which did \$30m worth of damage, left 50,000 homeless, and deposited a layer of sandy silt several feet thick over 20,000 hectares of prime farmland. Disastrous floods like this have traditionally occurred once or twice each decade.

Canada's contribution to building the huge flood control dam 70 kilometres west of Kairouan was a \$55m no-interest loan, plus the expertise to design the dam. It was built by Canadian and Tunisian engineers working side by side, and within a year those flood waters, now under control, will be irrigating some of the nation's best agricultural land.

Much of the equipment for constructing that dam came from Canada, and however worthwhile the project, it highlighted one aspect of foreign aid which bothers many developing nations: they get angry at donor countries which sell them equipment and expertise, but buy only raw materials in exchange.

So why did Canada pick Morocco to experiment with her new theories on foreign aid? Firstly, because Morocco is a francophone country, and Canada wants to expand its dealings with French-speaking Third World countries to emphasize internationally its own dual French-English nature. And secondly, because Morocco's economy meshes so well with Canada's free enterprise system.

The new approach calls for exchanges between private companies of both countries, to the benefit of both partners. Canadian companies are investing both capital funds and technical know-how in Moroccan enterprises, and the approach is working.

Take the case of the Canadian furniture maker, for instance, who was finding wood suppliers increasingly difficult to find in Canada, and so formed a partnership with a Moroccan company which had plenty of wood. Joint investment is providing machinery for the partial finishing of furniture components in Morocco, and in time the extent of Moroccan finishing will be increased. So Morocco will be able to export not only to Canada, but also to other developed nations, and both the Canadian and the Moroccan partner will profit.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has formulated a four-point programme to promote joint commercial enterprises between Canadian and Moroccan businessmen: there is an active, government-sponsored search to find Canadian business interested in joint ventures with Moroccan enterprises; there is an initial Canadian grant of \$10,000 to fit

Canadian and Moroccan partners together, with CIDA acting virtually as an economic marriage broker: once two partner organisations have expressed mutual interest, CIDA will put up another \$100,000 for a feasibility study, which is likely to include

visits by both partners to each other's establishments; and finally, when a project is approved by CIDA another grant of up to \$250,000 is available to get the joint venture off the ground.

A project must meet two simple criteria to be approved: it must be of benefit to Canada, and it must be of benefit to Morocco. It should also involve a transfer of Canadian technology into Moroccan hands, technology which can then be used by other Moroccan enterprises to improve the country's industrial base. Canada is coming around to the view that aid works only if it provides a long-term benefit, and involves commercial success. The Moroccan programme is also creating a new respect in Canada's business community for the entrepreneurs of the Third World, who can often teach the Canadians a few things.

The new approach clearly indicates that Canada is somewhat disillusioned with the concept of dispersing foreign aid primarily through multilateral agencies, and intends to expand its bilateral aid programme while holding multilateral aid down.

Unofficially, aid officials in Ottawa will tell you that the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is displeased that Canada gets poor returns in the form of equipment orders on her multilateral aid. Estimates show, for example, that only 2.25 per cent of Canada's contributions to the African Development Bank (ADB) find their way back to Canada through orders from the recipient countries, while the Japanese manage to achieve a return of 150 per cent in orders for every dollar donated to the ADB. The French, too, get back more than they donate.

It may appear a retrograde step to move from massive flood control and irrigation dams to helping to make bicycle seats and biscuits (two more new-style Moroccan/Canadian joint ventures), but the judgement of Canadian aid officials is that both Canada and the developing country receiving aid will in the long run benefit far more from smaller joint venture programmes.

BOUCETTA VIEWS SAHARA, MIDEAST ISSUES

PM201259 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 15 Jan 82 pp 1, 4, 5

[MAP report on press conference given by Moroccan Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta in Paris on 13 January: "The Referendum on the Sahara Could Be Held Before Next OAU Summit"]

[Excerpts] Paris, 14 Jan--Mr M'hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs, was the guest at a press lunch held in Paris on Wednesday by the Eurafrican Press Association which was attended by around 60 journalists representing all the French media (radio, television, dailies and periodicals) and many foreign correspondents accredited to the French capital.

Question (JEUNE AFRIQUE): What is the position on Moroccan-Algerian contacts?

Answer: There have been official, public contacts characterized by a degree of solemnity. I must say that those contacts were not motivated by the Sahara affair or by bilateral relations. I was asked by his majesty the king to visit Algiers in person to hand President Chadli Bendjedid an invitation confirming the invitation to attend the Arab summit. I must add that I was given an excellent welcome in Algiers and that I spent almost 90 minutes with the president. I must say that we not only discussed [no qualifying adjective] affairs and the Arab summit but we also discussed affairs concerning the region, future cooperation between Morocco and Algeria, the building of the Maghreb and the tension which exists in the region. Those same subjects were also discussed between the Algerian foreign minister [sentence as published]. While he was in Pes--where I think he was given an appropriate welcome--and he had fairly fruitful talks with his majesty the king on those questions [sentence as published].

I think that--this sums up those talks--since the Algerians said that they were defending a certain principle of self-determination for peoples--a principle which they were defending several thousand kilometers from their borders--they were, therefore, bound to defend it on their own borders. Fine. Since that principle had been accepted by Morocco and since the problem was in the OAU's hands, it was inevitable that there would no longer be any reason for keeping that tension at the existing level. Consequently we thought that, since the OAU had to do its work, relations should be resumed normally. That is the position on the question with Algeria.

The Date of the Referendum

Question (LE FIGARO): Minister, in the present situation, can you tell us whether the referendum on the Sahara or in the Sahara will take place before or after the OAU summit.

Answer: We hope that it will take place before. Moreover we earnestly hope so.

Morocco and Libya

Question (EURAFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION): Minister, has it already been decided whether the Moroccan king will or will not attend the next OAU summit which will be held in Libya...

Question (AFP): And what is the state of relations between Morocco and Libya?

Answer: First, a meeting is due to take place shortly--which I mentioned a moment ago--in Nairobi and which his majesty will certainly attend (at the end of January). As regards Tripoli, I do not yet know what decision will be taken because there is still activity throughout Africa to try to establish whether that summit will or will not take place. As far as we are concerned, we have not yet changed our position. We have said that that summit would take place in Tripoli and we will therefore take part. But I feel that there are already hesitations and reservations. As regards the holding of the summit in Tripoli, it was decided in Nairobi that a "probationary period" should first be granted to establish how the Libyan regime behaves toward the other African countries. As regards the Ghana problem, I am still wondering how Africa will react.

Question (FRANCE-EUROPE-OVERSEAS): [reference unknown] Why do you mention Ghana in connection with Libya?

Answer: Because everybody knows that a Libyan delegation has just arrived in Ghana and that everybody learned from agency dispatches that there had been contacts by Libya to prepare what has just happened in Ghana. I am not telling you anything. It was you that informed me.

Question (AFP): What does Morocco regard as the determining factor with regard to Libya?

Answer: Libya has taken an initiative with regard to Morocco: Resuming relations with a view to facilitating the solution of certain African and Arab problems. We saw that that initiative could have positive results for Morocco as a [no qualifying adjective] country and as an African country. We also saw that it could help reconcile some viewpoints in the Arab world. I cannot forecast how Libya will behave on specific problems which concern us but so far we continue to have relations and to see how Libya will behave.

Question (AFP): But, turning to more practical matters, has Libya stopped helping the Polisario Front?

Answer: Yes, officially. That is what we are told. But unofficially I must say that we are still seizing Libyan arms in the field. We will have to see whether they were given before or after Moroccan-Libyan relations were reopened.

Question (AFP): So Morocco's participation in the Tripoli summit will depend on Libya's behavior toward the Polisario Front.

Answer: And also on other African issues—but on the Polisario Front mainly of course.

American Aid

Question (AFP): You have had discussions on increased American military aid. Has that aid been implemented?

Answer: Yes. We have bought arms from the Americans which we have purchased to defend the territory—defensive weapons—moreover they were bought with the promise that those arms from the United States or elsewhere will never be used to attack anybody else.

Question (AFP): What about U.S. military advisers...

Answer: No. We have no troops, no advisers, nothing.

France's Attitude

Question (EUROPE 1): Minister, do you agree with the analysis which LE MONDE made in passing in an editorial yesterday or the day before, when discussing the evolution of French policy in the direction of Algeria and—I quote—"to Morocco's detriment."

Answer: I think it is difficult to say "to Morocco's detriment" because there is an understanding, a deeper examination of the problems, of reciprocal interests which neither French nor Moroccan officials should disregard. Officially France clearly states—and we observe that this is a fact—that it wants to maintain a degree of neutrality in this Sahara question. That is true. We take note of it.

France wants to play a role with regard to North Africa—a role which is entirely legitimate and natural given the relations which have always existed between France and North Africa—and it wants to do so at a time when relations among the North African partners themselves are not entirely normal and good. But we hope that France will still be able to play that role, initially a pacifying role and later... We think that the Maghreb's relations with France will always be much more useful and important than each country's relations with France.

His Majesty the King's Visit to the United States

Question (MAP): Minister, do you have any information on the forthcoming official visit which his majesty is to make to the United States?

Answer: Yes. In principle it is to take place in the coming weeks. It is to be scheduled for April or March. But there is no very accurate information at present.

Implementation of the Nairobi Resolutions

Question (AFP): The second question which I would like to ask concerns the Sahara conflict. A resolution was adopted at the OAU summit in Nairobi. Now, 6 months later, people feel that nothing has happened. It exists on paper but the committee meeting which was scheduled has not taken place. What practical progress has been made on implementing the resolution?

Answer: The committee met after the summit and adopted some provisions and gave its chairman the job of establishing contact with the United Nations to find out what assistance the OAU could be given in carrying out the referendum. As you know the United Nations has recently been concentrating on the election of the secretary general. Once the secretary general had been elected they began work. A meeting is scheduled for the end of January, probably some time in the next 2 weeks in Nairobi.

Question (EUROPE-FRANCE-OVERSEAS): With regard to the interpretation of the OAU resolutions on the referendum, I would like to know what interpretation is given on the role of the Moroccan army and administration?

Moreover the king attended the Saharan affairs council meeting in August. Has that council already had a meeting? Is there a move toward autonomy for those populations in the Moroccan framework?

Answer: As regards the first point, I think things were made fairly clear, not only by the fact that nothing was said on some points but by the fact that they were raised, discussed and solutions found.

Three problems were raised in Nairobi both at the summit and during the seven-man commission meeting. The question of whether the Moroccan army remained on the territory is not a problem which was forgotten or disregarded. It was decided that the troops should remain.

Second, there is the question of the Moroccan administration. That problem was not forgotten or disregarded either. It was tackled. It was decided that that administration should remain. To be exact, that decision was taken on 29 August 1981 in Nairobi during the commission meeting which was held.

Third, should there be direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario? These are three fundamental problems which were discussed and on which Africa took a decision.

Consequently, since that just leaves the methods, Morocco is fully prepared to give its assistance and to help by all the means at its disposal to ensure that that referendum is held as soon as possible. That is our position.

No "Direct" Negotiations

Question (AFP): What decision did Africa take on direct negotiations?

Answer: The Polisario has never been regarded as a liberation movement (it is not even recognized on the list of African liberation movements). The Saharan Democratic Arab Republic has not been recognized. Therefore the only possible interlocutors were the states of the region talking with each other. If there are any negotiations they will be between Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania and so forth, with the OAU acting as intermediary.

In a special way, and even for its integration into Morocco, the Saharan region needs to be known. And it needs to be known more thoroughly. The council [reference to Moroccan Council for Saharan Affairs] will have to study those special characteristics—moreover, in his introductory speech, the king made that clear by saying that there were some traditions and customs which had to be brought into line or harmonized with other Moroccan legal provisions or customs.

Consequently that is why that council was formed. I must add that that council will have an important role to play in new expression of the population's will. This also means that certain economic and social structures may be established in that region, as is the case in some other regions of Morocco. That has no effect on Morocco's sovereignty or the fact that those territories come under that sovereignty.

Question: Why have you not taken advantage of this visit [to Paris] to meet with [French External Relations Minister] Cheysson?

Answer: I could well have done. I will certainly telephone him to convey my good wishes to him. I sometimes come to Paris for other reasons than to see Mr Cheysson but we have good contacts by telephone or whenever the opportunity arises.

The French Government's Position

Question (REUTER): You spoke just now of preferential relations with France. Do you think that those relations are still preferential with regard to the Sahara. What does Morocco think of the fact that the French external relations minister authorized the opening of a Polisario office in Paris?

Answer: We felt a great deal of apprehension when the change of government came about in France, in view of the attitude adopted by the Socialist Party [PS], as a member of the Socialist International which had hurriedly adopted positions without going into them in any depth—positions far removed from the truth and from the principled positions it ought to have taken. When the PS took power in France there were two important elements: The first is perhaps a more responsible consideration of the question as a government rather than as a party.

That produced some positions which are much more acceptable than they were when the PS was expressing its opinion within the International. Second, there was Morocco's agreement, thanks to his majesty's initiative, to holding a referendum in the Sahara, and that also corresponded to what the socialists claimed to defend; the principle of the referendum, the principle of populations expressing their will. These two elements made the present position an entirely appropriate one, in other words a degree of neutrality first and then support for this initiative to allow Africa to deal with the question.

France reiterates that on African problems like this one, it would adopt the decision taken by the OAU. And I think that that is the present French Government's position.

The Fes Summit

Question (Radio Luxembourg): Since the failure of the Fes Summit there seems to have been an undeniable desire by the Arab countries to "pick up the pieces." Can a summit be expected very soon or after 25 April--the date of the withdrawal from Sinai and possibly of the burial of Camp David, as some diplomats have already said.

Answer: I must tell you that the Fes Summit did not end in failure. In the context of the Arab world the best solution to the Fes Summit was the one which was taken. Therefore, as far as the Arab world is concerned it is not a failure but a success. Why? Instead of the Arab world presenting itself to international opinion as a divided world, it is on the one hand taking time to think and on the other hand is deciding to adopt resolutions on fundamental problems. Consequently we think, and this has, moreover, recently been recognized by some Arab officials whom the world regarded as bearing most responsibility for the setback--I am talking of my friend, Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam and the statements he made to the newspaper ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, that the summit will definitely be resumed on the date originally planned.

It is necessary to have bilateral contacts between two or several Arab countries. That action has already begun and 4 or 5 days ago I found myself in Riyadh, representing the Moroccan king, at the same time as the Arab League secretary general was there for talks with Saudi leaders on the consultations which are necessary in that connection. It is necessary for certain consultations to be held among other countries before this summit which will be preceded by the Foreign Minister's Council meeting which will certainly be held at the end of April or beginning of May. With regard to the additional problem you raised, which is important, namely, the problem of Egypt, we must repeat that Egypt is an essential element in the Arab world--an essential element for peace or war in the Middle East.

If the Arab world has tended to push Egypt aside, from the political viewpoint, it is because Egypt did not honor its commitments in the Arab world, namely, that the search for a solution to the Middle East should not be a partial solution concerning one country but should be a comprehensive solution. If we could have Egypt in the Arab ranks it would be bound to consolidate those ranks and

hence give the Arab world much greater strength and much more chance of solving this problem. Moreover, we will not neglect that point.

Question (AFP): Have there been or will there be any contacts to secure Egypt's participation in the next Arab ministerial meeting and will you still pose the "death" of the Camp David agreements as your precondition. Does that mean that the Camp David agreements are officially no longer valid in Egypt's view?

Answer: I said that Egypt is an extremely important element for peace or war in the Middle East. I confirm that. It is an important element because of its contribution to the Arab world, because of its population and because of its strategic and geographical position. That is obvious. It is also important because it is the country of confrontation with Israel. Nonetheless there are no official contacts owing to the decision which was taken in Baghdad to break off all relations with Egypt unless it denounces the Camp David agreements.

That does not mean that there would not be a resumption of relations with Egypt if it took a clear stance on that question and on the problems facing it.

As far as Morocco is concerned I will simply recall two events. When Israel took the decision in the Knesset to regard Jerusalem as its "indivisible and eternal" capital—and this falls into the Islamic framework—his majesty the king of Morocco took an initiative, in his capacity as chairman of the Jerusalem committee and, at the time, in his capacity as chairman of the whole Islamic conference, to appeal to Egypt to adopt a clear position toward Israel regarding this Jerusalem problem.

Another initiative was taken, this time at Arab level, during the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear power station at Tammuz, also calling on Egypt to rejoin Arab ranks and hence to condemn its agreements with Israel. Therefore any opportunity to approach Egypt will be sought.

Question (AFP): Are there any unofficial contacts. You spoke of official contacts...

Answer: Unofficial contacts are not disclosed to the press since they are unofficial.

France and the Near East

Question (FRANCO-ARAB SOLIDARITY ASSOCIATION): Minister, what is your feeling on French President Mitterrand's possible visit to Israel and do you think it might serve peace in the Near East?

Answer: I think that, in view of the positions at present being adopted by Israel, this arrogance and this persistence in adopting such inflexible positions, and not only positions on a formal and political level but the continuation of aggressions and violations of international law, that [visit] is bound to be viewed very severely by the Arabs because it is an encouragement to Israel.

The Golan affair is another demonstration of the fact that all diplomatic actions, all approaches to Israel in the search for peace merely encourage it to continue to violate international law. And questions are now being asked in the Arab world. You know that the Security Council met on the Golan affair but that that poses very painful problems for our relations with the rest of the world.

Question: I would like to know how you feel about the French stance on the Near East because the French are trying to sit on the fence. They say things which please the Israelis when they visit their country. When they visit Arab countries they talk about the Palestinians and the PLO. Do you not think that this is an ambiguous and vague position which will produce nothing?

Answer: We sometimes ask certain questions. France must have a clear position on these great problems. When we get to the root of the matter in discussions with French officials, moreover I have had the opportunity for lengthy discussions with Mr Cheysson. [sentence as published] In most cases we found completely divergent positions in particular as regards recognition of the PLO as a necessity for any future negotiation.

CSO: 4519/98

OBJECTIVES OF DEFENSE BUDGET VIEWED

PM131005 Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 6 Jan 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Six Years of Steadfastness"]

[Text] The 1982 budget includes a huge defense allocation of over 5,895 million dirhams to meet obligations for the defense of the nation. The sum allocated for defense expenditure has increased in past years because of the aggressive policy which Algeria and its clique have been pursuing against our country. This policy is being implemented with the help of large numbers of mercenaries and large quantities of tools of destruction imported from various parts of the world, including highly sophisticated weapons that are available only to a superpower and that no African hand would employ.

Therefore, since this is the will of the whole nation, any amount needed to strengthen our defense capabilities must be allocated. The amount allocated for defense this year is 23 percent higher than last year.

This represents a heavy burden on a small state like ours concerned only with developing within the framework of cooperation and good-neighborliness, as was the case until 1956, when our bad neighbors revealed their intentions and launched a destructive war against us. But when it comes to self-defense and protecting the nation, there is no room for hesitation. This is what the Moroccan people have shown since 1975; they have offered many martyrs and devoted a large portion of their income in order to secure the needs of national defense.

The Sahara war has proved to us that there are designs against our country and that colonialism, which made great efforts to divide and contain Morocco, is still lying in wait for us. This is because colonialism realizes that Morocco, with its character and heritage, stands for a mission. It also realizes the important fact that to strike at Morocco is to strike at the Islamic message of liberation, since Islam liberates man from exploitation and teaches him to have human dignity and to reject injustice and domination.

And now colonialism, with its crusader and capitalist concept, is manipulating its agents and inciting them to strike at Morocco to weaken and encircle it. Therefore we have no choice but to meet the challenge, to preserve the heritage of our ancestors and to protect Morocco against the ambitions of the covetous. Thus the battle of the Sahara is the battle of Morocco and indeed the battle of its future.

It is not because of our love for war that we willingly make all these allocations for military expenditure but because we are a nation that respects itself and realizes the dangers threatening it and therefore has no choice but to stand fast.

The Moroccan people have stood fast for more than 6 years in the face of the aggression directed against them. The poor and middle-class people have daily paid for this steadfastness with sacrifices and by being denied the opportunity to improve their standard of living to the desired level at the desired speed. We must all now--in all our social factions--prepare ourselves to make further sacrifices, sacrifices that should be made by all the factions, each according to its abilities.

Indirect taxes, which the people pay equally on consumer and other goods, represent a major portion of the revenue (7,806 million dirham). These taxes still exceed direct taxes, which are estimated at 5,475 million dirhams. But there have been changes in the projected revenue from taxes on people with high income, which would lead to an increased contribution by the well-to-do to the general effort being made to ensure the carrying out of urgent and important tasks. These tasks are the need to meet the national defense requirements, to deal with the effects of the economic crisis. Particularly the effects of tremendous rise in the fuel bill, and to remedy the tragic effects of the drought catastrophe.

These tasks must be shouldered by all society, but it is only fair that each should contribute according to his ability so that the results of the splendid steadfastness which has continued for 6 years now are not lost and so that we can strengthen this steadfastness for years to come until we force the bad neighbors around us to reconsider their schemes and to submit to a policy of good neighborliness and honest cooperation.

CSO: 4504/168

AMERICAN SHIFT ON PALESTINIAN STATE REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Nov 81 pp 21, 22

[Article: "Washington Confronts Israel with the Saudi Plan and Accepts a Palestinian State on the Bank in Principle!"]

[Text] Although President Husni Mubarak was very reserved in all the declarations he made on Egypt's position on the Arab world, having refused to attack any Arab country through the media or official statements;

Although he stipulated clearly that he would not attend the Arab summit conference, whether Egypt was invited to it or not;

Although the conviction remains in Egypt that the Arab countries which severed relations with Egypt must themselves, and not Egypt, start to strive to renew these relations;

In spite of all that, the overwhelming feeling in Western diplomatic circles in Cairo is that Mubarak's Egypt will be playing a very important Arab role soon and that the next 3 months will witness concentrated activity which will lead to developments with a profound effect.

Proceeding from this belief, Western diplomats in the Egyptian capital set forth last week in quest of "possible dimensions" for an Egyptian role in the near future.

Signs which led the Western diplomats to have this belief concentrated on the following premises:

1. The shedding of further light on the Saudi initiative to resolve the intractable Palestinian problem.
2. Agreement by the American Senate to the AWACS airplane transaction with the Saudi kingdom, which was contrary to Israeli desire and efforts.
3. The conviction on the part of the United States of America that the Saudi kingdom's influence in the Arab and Islamic worlds is strong and could therefore be decisive, which prompts President Reagan to exert massive efforts to reduce the Zionist influence in the senate if only to a degree adequate to salvage the AWACS deal.
4. Washington anticipates that the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations concerned with Palestinian autonomy will go through a crisis that it will not be feasible to overcome

if Begin's government insists on its views, which strip autonomy from its content, while Egypt insists on its views, which are contrary to the Israeli ones.

5. The European initiative's failure so far to introduce any modification into the various positions on the Middle East issue and all parties' conviction that this initiative will be fruitful only if the United States is satisfied with it.

6. The impossibility of making any fruitful American contacts with the Palestinians except via the Saudi connection, which led to the cease fire in Lebanon last summer.

On this point, specifically, the prevalent feeling in Cairo, based on information from diplomatic circles that set out to investigate the dimensions of the future Egyptian role, is that Washington emphasized its readiness to introduce some changes in its Arab policy to Riyadh, acknowledging the need to provide a suitable format that would help in dealing with the Liberation Organization /line missing/ from its former belief that this country should be part of the Jordanian state. However, it was looking for a way to enable it to realize this idea without harming its relations with Israel.

The American government is leery of having its "good relations" with certain Arab countries lead to a deterioration in its relations with Israel, and, as the maxim says, it is trying to grab the stick in the middle. But will it be able to do so? And, if it does, for how long?

Let us go back to the Arab role Western diplomatic circles believe Egypt is destined to perform in the early part of the next year or, by the most conservative estimate, with the end of the Israel withdrawal from Sinai.

These circles say that the American thinking on the dimension that the Egyptian role could receive began when the late Egyptian president acknowledged the great Saudi achievement in getting the cease fire in Lebanon and appealed for a continuation of this achievement so that American contact could be achieved with the Palestinians.

At that time, Washington considered al-Sadat's acknowledgment tantamount to a call for a new initiative. However, the nature of the contacts that existed between al-Sadat personally and most Arab leaders condemned any efforts to venture on a new initiative to failure. The prevailing idea then was that next spring would see a further freeze in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and that the freeze would be an opportunity for an American demarche aimed primarily at expanding the scope of the Camp David agreements, once the Israelis had in practice become persuaded that their obstinacy would not succeed in torpedoing the peace efforts and that that would be only to the Soviet Union's benefit.

Therefore Washington at that time resorted to procrastinating and delaying through "reconnaissance operations" which it said were necessary before a final decision was adopted on the Middle East problem.

After al-Sadat's departure the justifications for American procrastination disappeared. The most important reason was that President Mubarak enjoys respect in the Arab world and is the sort of person who does not consider any of his country's rights open to

negotiation. In Addition, his positions on Israel have not been characterized by leniency, although he has declared a commitment to all the agreements Egypt made with Israel.

Western diplomatic circles also say that Mubarak's commitment to the agreements Egypt reached with Israel do not mean dealing lightly with or relinquishing the principles that prompted Egypt to sign the Camp David agreements and that therefore it is not possible to trifle with these principles as Egypt understands them - nor is it possible to conceal any disputes in views, since it is a feature of Mubarak's nature that he does not hide anything and that he does not consider that time will guarantee that the intractable can be resolved. He believes that proper solutions come about only if there is good will to reach them; otherwise the situation will consist of maneuvers whose goal is to achieve something other than what has been agreed to.

In exchange, the prevalent feeling in Egyptian circles is that the position President Mubarak has taken in the Arab context is a wise and practical one and that the disputes that exist among Arab countries do not permit the adoption of any other position.

At the same time, Egypt insists that:

1. The peace process is continuing and is also open to any Arab who wants to join it.
2. The Camp David agreements still hold in the Egyptian, American, European and Israeli contexts, it is these two agreements that led Israel to return to the 1967 borders on the Egyptian front, and in this field the Arab countries have lost precious time. If they had joined Egypt at the beginning, it would not have been in Begin's power now to say that he would not return to the 1967 borders, he would not have been given scope to establish new settlements on occupied Arab territories, and he would not have been able to execute the decree incorporating the city of Arab Jerusalem.
3. The basic change that has occurred since the departure of the late President Anwar al-Sadat is that while Israel always used to refuse to resume negotiations on autonomy if Egypt insisted on getting the Palestinians to take part in these negotiations, Israel now no longer raises this subject, although regarding autonomy the Camp David agreement stipulates that the Palestinians are to be allowed to take part.

Regarding the "many alternatives" that al-Sadat used to talk about, responsible circles indicated that they know nothing about these and that the only possible solution as far as they are concerned is the commitment in letter and spirit to the Camp David agreement.

Will Israel commit itself to the agreement in spirit as it commits itself to it in letter, or says it does?

Here is where Egypt's Arab role comes in, in the opinion of the Western diplomatic circles in Cairo. However, these circles are still confused as to whether this role will start with an Egyptian initiative, an Arab initiative, or an American one! This is the reason for their active exploratory activities to ascertain the dimensions of this role.

These circles observe:

1. That the Israeli reaction to the American Senate's agreement to the AWACS airplane deal was one of bitter disappointment. Menachem Begin was almost certain that the members of the senate who supported Israel would deliver a mortal blow to those opposed to Israel's will on this specific subject.
2. That Israel declared through all the media it could that it rejected the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's plan to resolve the Palestinian issue and the Zionist organizations in the United States started to prepare a violent campaign against the American administration because it welcomed the plan.
3. That Egypt and Western Europe reached agreement with Washington to consider the Saudi plan a positive one and a good basis for discussion and negotiation.
4. That American receptivity to the Saudi plan is to be considered significant, because the draft calls for the elimination of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, as they were eliminated in Sinai; the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to return and receive compensation; placing the West Bank under international trusteeship for a few months while working to establish a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem; and withdrawal from the Arab territories Israel occupied in 1967.

The same circles then wonder whether the American receptivity was an acceptance of the draft as a whole or as a basis for negotiation.

Whatever the answer to this question might be, it is certain that Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz considered that obtaining American guarantees on the Palestinian problem was a condition for his forthcoming visit to the United States of America.

Proceeding from this point, American receptivity to the Saudi plan is considered to hold great significance in terms of the change that has occurred in American policy vis-a-vis the Arab world following al-Sadat's departure.

Here it is worth pointing out that Reagan and his aides previously declared their absolute rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state and their refusal to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization, whatever the circumstances; while American policy has always proceeded from total support for Israel in all cases and under all circumstances, this support has clearly taken practical form. In addition, the American administration did not want, nor was it able, to exert any form of serious pressure on Israel, even in cases when some American officials showed reservations over Israeli conduct. This means that American policy in all cases in various forms and styles assumed a position of hostility toward Arab interests. The greatest Arab hope was that a shift might occur in the American position so that it could be (only) neutral in the struggle between the Arabs and Israel.

When Egypt signed the Camp David agreements, and the Arabs became alienated from them, it could not, in the view of Egyptian officials at the time, do more than guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces from its own occupied territories and set out the preliminary bases for Palestinian autonomy whose development the Palestinians could then take charge of.

Now, the Saudi plan is considered an integrated strategy and a clear definition of "what we want" for the sake of creating a decisive resolution to the Arab-Israeli struggle.

It remains to turn the Saudi strategic plan into an Arab strategy, considering that the other Arab countries have offered no alternative either to the plan or even to the Camp David agreements.

Is it possible to arrive at a common Arab position on this type of coming summit conference?

In the view of diplomatic observers, the next Arab summit will not provide better conclusions than the previous ones. A possible solution to the Palestinian problem must of necessity assume a new course because:

1. Matters cannot remain as they are indefinitely as many conditions in the region are deteriorating because of growing Soviet intervention in Africa and Asia.
2. In the event it is not possible to arrive at an Arab consensus, arriving at an Arab majority is better than the state of aimlessness that exists now.

Here a basic question arises: what role is expected of Egypt in the new settlement process? The premise of the question depends on the points that:

1. The United States has not abandoned the Camp David agreements but it has at the same time considered the agreement a "phase" to which other phases can be added.
2. The United States remains convinced that Egypt's Arab presence is of special importance in the context of an American strategy for coping with Soviet infiltration into the region.
3. The United States has to a large degree become convinced that eliminating the explosive elements in the Arab region is the best way to protect the oil wells in the region and that the "rapid intervention" will be feasible only if the Arab peoples feel that America will not treat Israel at the expense of Arab interest, although its goal is to guarantee Israel's security.

In 1977 the American administration indicated that it was necessary to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. President Carter then went so far as to call for a Palestinian nation (16 March 1977). However, the divergent Arab reactions to that at that time, and the escalating Israeli pressures on the government in Washington, compelled President Carter to modify his statement and declare his absolute rejection of the establishment of a "Palestinian state" because his viewpoint was that "permanent peace could not be attained if there was no independent extremist state in the heart of the Middle East" (28 December 1977).

Now the American administration has started to use the same technique.

People who said in 1977 that the Arab disputes in the area bore the marks of Israeli pressure to gain a clear success in Washington are now saying that the continuation of these disputes weakens the chances for American pressure on Israel, while Arab agreement, even if it is not all-inconclusive, will help strengthen them.

Western diplomatic circles in Cairo stress that the source of their interests in probable developments in the region may be attributed to the information at their disposal, which is that President Reagan's administration is now inclined to believe that the time has come to put a limit to the principle of partial agreements that Henry Kissinger devised and to seek a comprehensive solution in the Middle East, and that all attempts to set forth a comprehensive solution will of necessity require dealing with the Palestinian issue by getting the Palestinians to take part in the negotiations.

This thinking is not new as far as Washington goes.

In late September 1978, Harold Saunders, deputy American secretary of state for Middle East affairs, gave testimony before congress in which he emphasized that while support for Israel and protection of its security and prosperity in the Middle East would continue to represent an absolute American foreign policy priority, Israel, like any other state, would have the right to have its neighbors recognize it and to live in security through its own power and by cooperating with its neighbors. He asserted that the Camp David agreements covered great strides in this direction, because need requires at the same time that any solution arrived at through negotiations guarantee that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people be attained.

The new American administration has embraced this principle, it appears; that is, it has created, or is on the way to creating, some distinction between its Israeli policy and its Arab interests.

In the Israeli context, the United States (and this is also the Europeans' view) will continue to be concerned for Israel's security and livelihood.

At the same time, any solution to the Palestinian issue must in the view of the American administration be reached through a guarantee of the existence of Israel.

Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people comes after that automatically!

However, more important than that, if Israeli pressure on the American government is not matched by Arab solidarity constituting a pressure to reduce the burden of Israeli pressure, Arab progress in the context of a comprehensive settlement will remain limited.

In other words, Arab disputes constitute an element of force for Israel pressures, and vice versa.

Although Washington does not expect Arab consensus "because such consensus in existing international circumstances is out of the question," it does expect an Arab half-consensus which will enable it to cope with Israeli rejection and overcome the centers of Zionist pressure, as was the case in the instance of the AWACS deal.

Here the question arises: what are the dimensions of the Egyptian role in this area?

How will Washington bring about a "political turnaround" after next April, that is, after Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the garrisoning of the international "peace forces" on the borders between the two countries?

The strange thing is that the answer to these two questions is connected to the positions of the Arab countries themselves!

CAUSES OF FAILURE OF FEZ SUMMIT REVIEWED, EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 5 Dec 81 pp 42, 43

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Calm Matters down in Order To Cope with the Danger of the Failure of Fez and Arab Dissension"]

[Text] In spite of the "disparagement" and feelings of "frustration and disappointment" that dominated the Saudi capital and other capitals in the Gulf states over the results of the 12th Arab summit conference, it has been observed that official circles in Riyadh have refrained from holding any Arab party responsible for the failure of the Fez summit conference. They have contented themselves with saying that the Saudi plan for peace in the region was not the reason for the "postponement of the Arab summit." Last Friday Radio Riyadh again laid the reason for "the postponement of the Arab summit conference on the failure of some countries to provide representatives at the summit level who could adopt the appropriate decisions."

When AL-MUSTAQBAL asked a responsible Saudi source in Riyadh about the official Saudi Arabian reaction to the failure of the Fez summit, the Saudi source refrained from commenting and contented himself with saying "There is nothing being said now in the kingdom except the comment the Saudi News Agency published quoting an official responsible source who denied that the Saudi peace plan was the reason for the postponement of the Fez summit and that the kingdom did not try to bring the summit conference around to its view on the peace plan, because it did not in the past, embrace, and is not embracing at the present, any view on the Palestinian cause that differs from the Arab consensus and Palestinian will."

However, in the comments it published over the past days, the Saudi press attributed the reasons for the failure of the Fez summit to a "disturbance" in some Arabs' positions, to "the obvious evasion of the issue of the historic confrontation," and to "naive childishness in treating the issues of the nation."

What cannot be doubted is that the Saudi press statements on some Arabs' failure to attend the Fez summit reflect the feelings of official circles in Riyadh, which consider that some Arab leaders' failure to attend the Fez conference meant an evasion, which may have been intentional on the part of some and unintentional on the part of others, of confronting the responsibility of accepting or rejecting Prince Fahd's peace plan. However, official circles in the Saudi capital, as appears from their hesitancy in commenting, so far do not want to cause a blowup in the situation with "some Arabs" whom Riyadh has felt have denigrated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and cast doubts about the truth of its intentions and goals in present-

ing the Saudi peace plan in spite of the encouraging talk Riyadh was hearing shortly before the conference from those Arabs regarding the Saudi peace plan. That prompted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to insist on including its plan in the summit agenda at the outset, then to demand that it be withdrawn after the severe campaign it faced; as the Saudi crown prince said in the lone Foz summit session, that reached the point of "personal defamation."

Semi-official sources in Riyadh mentioned that "the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not want to help bring the Arab world into a policy of axes and blocs that some people are aiming toward. Therefore Riyadh currently does not want to comment on the positions of some Arab countries that have said that the results the Foz conference reached meant the failure of the Saudi peace plan."

The Saudi press (contrary to the Gulf papers), in its comments on the past days also raised a group of questions with extreme reservations on what happened during the Foz summit and the Arab foreign ministers' meetings that preceded the summit. These comments in their totality reflected questions that unofficial Saudi circles in Riyadh had raised.

These questions hold that if it had been declared that the Foz summit postponement occurred so that the Arab foreign ministers could again complete their study of the issues that had been presented at the Arab summit, then why was the Arab summit held? And, if some Arab countries "that raise analogous slogans" had had objections to the placement of issues on the summit agenda, why did these countries declare their agreement to attend the conference, and why did their leaders then fail to attend it?

The Saudi newspaper AL-RIYADH, in an article its editor in chief published last Monday, replied to that with two hypotheses:

First, "That the people who failed to attend were not convinced that it was possible to come up with solutions to these problems." The paper said "In that case, why then was the conference held, when we realize that its whole objective was to deal with these problems in order to reach agreement on solving them?"

Second, "That the failure to attend was deliberate, so that the conference would be just a response to the demands that would be made in it and an occasion for the payment of further bills." The paper said, "Perhaps what comforted the people who failed to attend was the fact that they had been counting on the acceptance of a single fact, which is that if the meeting did not take place to discuss matters that had been put on the agenda that concerned them more than others, then staying away would not jeopardize continued support for the confrontation (which it is no longer exactly known is aimed at confronting whom)." The newspaper AL-RIYADH presented another query, stating, on that subject, "Why didn't everyone fall silent and listen to the voice of the Palestine Liberation Organization? Why didn't the first word go to the Palestinians, whether in regard to the decision for peace such as the Saudi peace resolution, which they had previously accepted, or the decision for war, such as risks they considered to be dangers that threatened them in the context of peace?"

The paper added, "The Arabs, in their private councils, in the seats of their unified decisions, did not listen to the Palestinian voice that they had accredited as a legitimate representative of the people of Palestine."

These questions which were raised in the Saudi capital made many political observers in Riyadh fear that the failure of the Foz summit would have adverse effects on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's future relations with some Arab countries such as Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, especially since the newspaper AL-RIYADH said, "What has happened, in spite of the commitment to silence, carries the threat that the Arabs have actually reached a crossroad and that the time has come for others, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the other Gulf states, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan, Somalia, and North Yemen, to distance themselves so that the parties concerned may determine what they want. Do they want to decide for war, and what is the extent of their preparedness for that? Or do they want to decide for peace, and what is their vision of that?" However, a responsible Saudi source has pointed out to AL-MUSTAQBAL "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will continue to observe its Arab and international commitments toward the Palestinian cause."

The statement the Saudi source made to AL-MUSTAQBAL has been confirmed by quasi-official sources in Riyadh which state that while blame has been directed at the group of countries "that raise analogous slogans" because they stayed away from the summit, they know that the Palestine Liberation Organization, which through its head, welcomed the Saudi peace plan, actually took part in the activities of the summit and agreed to face responsibility, is experiencing objective circumstances which dictate that it take positions that are not to be envied.

Ultimately, although everything that is appearing now in the Saudi capital indicates that reticence in declaring positions is predominant, and in spite of the questions that are being raised by the Saudi man in the street, there is no doubt that Saudi diplomacy is now making a comprehensive reappraisal of its policy and its diplomatic and political activities for the upcoming stage, as a means for extricating itself from the anticipated dilemma, which is the breakdown of the Arab world into political and economic blocs and axes which will destroy all that is left of the minimum Arab solidarity that received a crowning blow at Foz.

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CSO: 4404/197

ISRAELI APPROACH TO GULF OF AL-'AQABA REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 4 Dec 81 p 30

[Article by Sulayman al-Farzali: "From Tabuk to Sanafir and Tiran: Israel classes Saudi Arabia as a Confrontation State!"]

[Text] Israel does not let an occasion or pretext go by without grasping at the opportunity to talk about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in order to make it appear as if that is a confrontation state or even a state bordering Israel. The purpose, as Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, stated before he slipped in his home and broke his leg, is the demand for direct negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

In the quarrel they picked with Saudi Arabia, the Israelis have moved gradually from "the old testament question" to the "strategic question." For a quarter century they have been carrying out a media campaign in the United States against the Saudi decree prohibiting the employment of American Jews in American companies operating in the kingdom.

Whenever American papers talk about Saudi gold mines, in connection with the rise in gold prices and the prediction that the Saudi mines would be put back in operation - having been shut down since the early fifties for economic reasons - the Israelis revive a story from the Old Testament stating that these mines are part of "Solomon's treasure," as if they were asking for them, or a portion of them!

This is above and beyond the fact that the Israeli government, from time to time, whenever an influential role or scope in the international situation is hinted at for the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicates that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia finances and subsidizes the organization.

Four years ago, specifically, the former foreign minister of Tunisia, Mohamed Masmoudi, deciding to return to Tunisia from his exile in Paris, gave a statement in the French capital in which he said that Israel was making preparations to launch an attack on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since that time, light has begun to be shed on this aspect, which many Arabs, including those who considered that it was out of the question, had belittled.

The possibilities of Saudi-Israeli friction increased recently a short time before and after the declaration of Prince Fahd's initiative. When Israeli aircraft attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Baghdad last June, it was said that it was the Israeli plan to have these airplanes fly over Saudi air space, which would be tantamount to an aggression against Saudi Arabia and Iraq both!

In light of this raid on the Iraqi reactor, some people interpreted this Israel air provocation over the Tabuk area in the northwestern portion of the kingdom as a training sortie. However, the Israelis left no room for doubt that the air sorties their planes made were aimed at Saudi Arabia specifically. These sorties stopped once their significance was exposed and the United States intervened in the matter. It reached the point where Gen Rafael Eytan, the Israeli chief of staff, spoke openly about it this week before an Israeli-American Chamber of Commerce meeting in Tel Aviv last Thursday.

At that meeting, Eytan declared that the Israeli aircraft were conducting reconnaissance over Tabuk because the Saudis were building a large airbase in that area, which was no more than 100 miles away from Israeli territory, and, since the Saudis had no enemies at that point on the border but Israel, Israel considered that that Saudi military base was directed against it and that it was "its right" to discover what was going on there!

The story on the air sorties over Saudi Arabia had hardly ended when the Israelis raised the issue of the two islands situated at the entrance to the Red Sea facing the occupied Egyptian area of Sharm al-Shaykh, the Islands of Sanafir and Tiran. Originally the two islands were Saudi, but they are totally uninhabited and have been used only by fishermen who cast their nets in this area known for the quality of its fish. However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ceded the two islands to Egypt in the time of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz, founder of the kingdom, in 1950, and they then fell under Israeli occupation in 1967 when Israel occupied Sinai during the June war that year. They are still under Israeli occupation.

There is a story behind Saudi Arabia's cession of Sanafir and Tiran to Egypt, which occurred for strategic reasons. At that time, that is, 30 years ago, Israel, in the era of Moshe Sharett's government - unnoticed by the Arab states, after the 1948 defeat - managed to advance to occupy a spot on the Red Sea, which is now the port of Eilat, on the pretext that it needed a maritime outlet to the south. Once Israel obtained that maritime outlet to the Red Sea, the Islands of Sanafir and Tiran, which lay in the middle of the southern entrance to the Gulf of al-Aqabah at approximately equal distance from Egyptian and Saudi territory, directly came to face the Israeli challenge. Saudi Arabia at that time did not possess a military force worth mentioning and decided to put the two islands under Egyptian sovereignty. The Egyptian government erected surveillance and coastal artillery centers on them, and in fact Israel could not pass its ships through this strait until after the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, when the two islands fell under the oversight of international forces. As soon as the international forces withdrew in 1967, the two islands reverted to Egyptian sovereignty and Egyptian coastal artillery was restored to them, and Israel used that as an excuse for the June war, as it had been prevented from passing through the strait once President 'Abd-al-Nasir announced the blockade of that region.

On the brink of the final stage of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai next 26 April, Israel has raised the question of the two islands by stating that they are Saudi and not Egyptian, thus raising the possibility that it might not withdraw from them as part of the plan to withdraw from Sinai in accordance with the Camp David agreements. Indeed, legal scholars in Israel have started to publish studies in international law to prove that Sanafir and Tiran should revert not to Egypt but to Saudi Arabia. Gen Rifaman Zeevi, the former advisor to the prime minister and chief of the central

military command in Israel, lodged an appeal with the government to refrain from handling the two islands over because they, as he says, "lie under Saudi sovereignty, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is still in a state of war with Israel." Gen Zeevi also said that what causes him anxiety is the fact that the multinational peace-keeping force that is supposed to come to Sinai when the time for withdrawal comes is delegated to deal with Israel and Egypt but it has no delegation to move or act if Saudi Arabia decides to occupy the two islands and turn them into military positions!

Saudi Arabia is also arming itself with international law, which, as the minister of information, Dr Muhammad 'Abduh al-Yamani, says, calls for the two islands to be returned to Egypt because Israel occupied them when they were under Egyptian sovereignty.

However, the Israeli newspaper JERUSALEM POST, which is published in English, has quoted a high source in the Israeli government as saying that Saudi occupation of the two islands was something that had not been envisioned at all when the Camp David agreements were set out!

However, Arab circles which have been amazed that this subject has been raised at this time say that Israel's objective in doing so is a dual one: on the one hand it is trying to pick a fight with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, using that as an excuse to procrastinate in withdrawing from Sinai or to fabricate a military incident - from this angle, that is considered similar to the air sorties over Tabuk - while on the other hand it wants to bring Saudi Arabia into direct negotiations with it by keeping the two islands as hostages to that end!

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ECONOMIST EVALUATES INCOME DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 2 Dec 81 p 6

[Article by Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-Dukhayl: "The Saudi Economy and the Post-Petroleum Outlook"]

[Text] In the 20 November 1981 issue of the newspaper AL-JAZIRAH, Dr Faruq Akhdar dealt with an issue that in my opinion is one of the most important modern economic questions facing this nation in particular and the oil-producing states of the Arab Gulf in general. The article is important because it discusses the future and the destiny of future generations and their chance of enjoying an economic life which will guarantee that they maintain the affluent circumstances that the current generation is blessed with.

My article here is aimed at pointing out that the course and future of the domestic economy will not be as smooth as the reader might infer from Dr Akhdar's article, in which he said:

"The idea that oil will run out must not make us afraid, since we can exploit oil revenues to develop the Saudi domestic economy in a sound, realistic manner. Perhaps the development achievements in our country over the medium term have proved to us that we can turn our country into an advanced developing nation more quickly than many of us had thought - indeed more quickly than development scholars in the advanced countries who have studied the development plans and methods in our country had anticipated."

Dr Akhdar continues his discussion on the future of the Saudi economy by saying "There is no doubt that if the Saudi economy continues to grow at the same rate it did the last 7 years (and we have nothing to indicated the opposite), the main segments of the infrastructure in the towns and villages of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be ready by the time the oil runs out, and that will put the country in the ranks of the advanced nations in terms of construction carried out, utilities, and services. The Saudi economy will be prepared to embark upon any alternative it faces in the future and it will thereby eliminate the infrastructure, utility and service obstacles that generally inhibit developing countries from advancing, growing and specializing in output."

Dr Faruq Akhdar describes for us the features of the Saudi economy following the depletion of oil, which he describes as follows:

1. The completion of the infrastructure.
2. The presence of a large number of well-trained, educated staffs.
3. Development of the tourist sector.
4. Development of other mineral resources.
5. Development of solar energy use.
6. Development of salt water uses.
7. Development of opportunities for use of the atom.
8. Any industry whose feasibility is proved.

The view Dr Faruq Akhdar presents on the future of the post-petroleum Saudi economy is characterized by a simplicity and great optimism that does not do justice to the magnitude and significance of the issue. It is true that Dr Akhdar is addressing the general public in a daily newspaper, and his style in doing so must be different from the way specialized students of economics write; however, his attempt to simplify the issue does not exempt him from hewing to the major concepts and rules of economic analysis, especially when the matter is related to predicting the course of the economy and outlining its long-term features.

What Dr Akhdar has stated concerning the features of the Saudi economy once the oil runs out does not in my view go beyond a mere blend of hopes and expectations that are not supported by economic conclusions based on realistic assumptions. For example is the tourist sector he mentioned to be an economic development based on a realistic or logical hypothesis? What are its current features and future economic conditions?

Solar energy and nuclear power are also all [mere] hopes and it is hard to say that they will constitute features of the Saudi economy once its oil is exhausted - unless we have scientific proof and economic studies that show, if only in general terms, that it is possible for us to carry out such activities and that they are economically feasible.

Is it a foregone conclusion that when the infrastructure is completed we will be able quickly to assimilate all industries? Aren't we living in an interlinked, integrated economic world where developments are based primarily on the comparative advantage our industries possess relative to regionally and internationally competing industries? Is the abundance of money and oil sufficient at the present time to achieve comparative advantages for our industry which will guarantee it a strong position in the world market among the international industries that arose decades before ours did?

In another area, can we, in spelling out the comparative advantage of our industry, economically set the value of the factor of petroleum and the factor of capital that industry require below the value set by the world market and the factors of supply and demand? It is correct that the generation of oil has cost us nothing; it was generated by natural forces and was a gift to this nation from God. However, that does not reflect its economic value. The real criterion of the value of and the

financial returns from the oil depends on the scarcity of oil and the world's need for it.

In many third world countries, even industrial ones, many industries have been established that people thought would point the way to a better future but at the end of the road became a burden on the economy which it was not easy to shake off.

My difference with my colleague Dr Akhder lies in the fact that the features that he has drawn up for our post-petroleum economy are essentially based on the fact that his prediction lacks an integrated economic vision based on the interaction of various economic factors, most important of which are production, consumption and investment.

Herewith I will review some basic points in brief which I hope will illustrate my conceptions on the subject of the Saudi economy following the exhaustion of oil.

First, A Simplified Model of the General Economy

The movement of an economy, in the view of the school that adheres to the free economic system, depends on the interaction of three main economic activities: production, consumption and savings (investment). An equation governs the relationship among these activities:

Production minus consumption equals savings.

This equation means that the total volume of general production is equal to the sum of consumption and savings.

For a domestic economy to grow, the people in it must produce more than they require for consumption, and must allocate the surplus (savings) to various investment areas, so that production will increase further and the general economy will grow. One can therefore say that the further the volume of consumption falls below production and the further the difference, which is savings, is converted into new investment, the further the volume of production will increase, and consequently consumption and investment will increase, production will increase, and so on and on. Therefore economic growth is an expression of a constant increase in investment, which leads to an increase in production, which is reflected in an increase in consumption and productive investment. When the volume of consumption increases greatly, thus diminishing the resources available for savings and the investments needed to increase productive capacity, previous economic activity will be characterized as proceeding from development to decline. The diminution of resources available for savings as a result of the increase in the volume of consumption (assuming that everything saved is directed toward productive investment) will reduce the volume of investment, and that, in turn, will more greatly affect the reduction in the volume of production. Thus, production, and along with it the economy in general, will start to retrench. Thus economic contraction can be expressed by an enduring deficit in the volume of production resulting from an enduring deficit in the volume of investment.

This simplified model of the most important components of economic activity in its basic outlines is similar to the basic skeleton of the human body. It does not reflect the complex composition of man in all his details, along with the arteries

and nerves he contains, but it does show the main parts of the body, without which human life cannot take place.

Second, the Unbalanced Economy

If we try to analyze the activity of the Saudi economy in accordance with the foregoing economic model and equation, we will find that the general volume of consumption exceeds the volume of domestic product.

This might seem odd at first, because many people have been accustomed to calling crude oil output "production" and considering it an element of domestic product.

This is contrary to the economic definition of production, which is essentially based on the close interaction of its main elements, which are land, labor and capital. Oil is a liquid which natural factors have closely combined to generate in the underground strata of the earth over the millenia, and our previous and present generations exerted no effort in generating it. The only thing that can be counted among the components of national product in the true economic sense, as far as our income from oil sales goes, is the effort exerted to produce oil from the ground, and that constitutes only a minor portion of the total value of the oil produced -- especially in the case of fields in the kingdom, where oil production does not require the great effort it does in other areas of the world.

In summary, one can say therefore that the volume of overall consumption in the Saudi economy exceeds the volume of overall production. If this conclusion, based on the formulation of the economic theory we came up with in the previous paragraph, is correct, the surplus of consumption to production will lead to a capital deficit and a contraction of production and consumption; therefore, the Saudi economy must be characterized as one of contraction and dwindling production.

However, this is the opposite of the increasing growth in consumption and material prosperity we are witnessing today: doesn't that imply a contradiction between theory and reality? The answer is, absolutely not: the reason is that the Saudi economy is able at the present time to realize a growing rate of consumption because it can produce increasing amounts of oil in order to meet consumer aspirations which are not compatible with the volume of general domestic production. That is to an extent clear from the connection between the size of the general state budget and the volume of crude oil produced each year.

The question that arises urgently here is to what extent can the Saudi economy continue to rely principally on the revenues available to it from crude oil production, in order to maintain current rates of consumption and increase them in the future?

Our crude oil reserves, of which about 10 million barrels or less are being produced each day in order to feed the consumption and production processes in our economy, are declining, because the rate of production from these reserves greatly exceeds the rate of addition of new reserves. This means that they are fated to be depleted, sooner or later.

In another area, consumption rates are increasing day by day and, along with that, the level of material welfare of the citizens is also rising.

If we assume that the oil will be exhausted in 50 years, as Dr Akhdar says, that means that if we want to maintain the citizens' economic welfare at current levels we will have to generate productive activities that can create a level of production (income) that is compatible with our volume of consumption of goods and services by the end of the 50th year.

Since our country is clearly deficient in many natural and industrial resources, we will continue to depend on foreign imports to meet a large portion of our needs for goods and services, in order to maintain the rates of consumption that are apparently constantly increasing. This will consequently require that the production activities that we must develop as we use up our oil resources will be able to bring in the foreign currency through which we can acquire our influx of imported goods and services. In other words, our productive activities will have to be oriented toward the international market and be able to compete with international industries on their own turf.

From the foregoing it is evident to us that the factor of time is important and that there is not much room for error and experimentation, because, if we do not succeed in creating productive economic capabilities which can guarantee that our rates of consumption are maintained when the oil runs out, the welfare and consumption to which the citizens have become habituated will drop forcefully and directly, causing social shock.

Therefore the creation of productive capabilities that are able to create real incomes for individuals is to be considered one of the most critical and important of priorities.

Maintaining the petroleum sector's productive capacity and building productive bases in other sectors will provide a positive economic return which in my opinion should be considered the economic basis to be adopted by development plans in countries with unbalanced economies, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. An unbalanced economy, as we define it here, is one that relies on the consumption of its capital and natural resources in order to subsidize its consumer requirements.

Third, the General Framework of Development in an Unbalanced Economy

I again state that the economic strategy of a country with an unbalanced economy must be concentrated on two main bases:

A. Preserving present petroleum resources by applying the principle of the optimum exploitation of resources over the long range as well as developing and improving other sources of petroleum and mineral wealth.

B. Forming economic production capacities in other sectors of the economy.

For this strategy to be based on good, solid ground, it is necessary that it be preceded and accompanied by the performance of two activities that occupy a high level of importance:

1. Creating scientifically and technically qualified domestic staffs in a manner compatible with the main features of the economic plans and programs. Along with the formation of this base of qualified domestic staffs it will be necessary to

carry out a comprehensive national program to eliminate illiteracy and raise the cultural, social and health level of all the citizens. This rapid comprehensive social program must be a goal on its own because of the importance of its direct and indirect positive effects on social and economic development - along with the presence of an educated manpower base suffering few social or medical handicaps facilitating the selection and training of the competent domestic technical personnel needed to push the wheel of economic growth forward.

2. Establishing what are known as infrastructure factors. By these are meant factors which support the performance of productive economic activities, such as roads, electricity, telephones, airports and so forth. There is no doubt that the solid presence of these factors will directly and effectively help increase the economic productivity and the establishment of projects. Many of us do not differentiate between productive activities and the auxiliary factors necessary for the performance of these activities: electricity, water, telephone, road and airport projects are auxiliary factors, but they are not in themselves factors of production. Therefore, the more the volume of these auxiliary factors exceeds the requirements for performing productive economic activities, the more the costs of these services increase, ultimately reducing the profitability of the productive activities and their ability to compete with corresponding industries elsewhere.

I do not believe that there is enough space here to talk at length about the two main bases to which I referred above, on which the economic strategy must be concentrated, but some general ideas and observations must be raised which I will summarize as follows:

A. The optimum use of petroleum resources.

Petroleum is one of the most important productive sectors in the Saudi economy, when its productivity is measured by the difference between costs of production and gross sales prices. The net revenue to the economy from petroleum sales is to be considered the main source for all production, consumer and investment activities in the domestic economy.

The real productivity of a resource may be attributed to two main factors -- first the natural forces which have helped create the raw material of petroleum through the processes inherent in geological formations over the millenia and second the industrial world's need for petroleum for use in the field of power and numerous other areas.

Therefore I do not believe that any preceding generation, or the present one, can claim to have had an influence in creating this productive resource except insofar as it has worked to discover and produce it. This resource belongs to all generations, and every generation must strive to exploit it in the optimum manner in a way that serves the interests of this and coming generations.

In my opinion, the optimum use of petroleum resources is spelled out by economic suppositions and conclusions which I might summarize in the following lines:

All the competing alternatives to petroleum in the realm of energy or other fields must be considered high-cost when compared with the current cost of petroleum. As long as scientific research in the realm of technology does not lead to real possi-

bilities for replacing petroleum with other sources, since the areas in which the world needs crude oil are many and numerous and will continue to be so over the long range, going by current technical circumstances, I believe that keeping the crude oil in the ground should be considered the best way to benefit from it in the future, in view of its constant increase in price, by virtue of the increasing need for it. If this assumption is correct, the conclusion which arises is that the optimum exploitation of oil resources requires that production of it be reduced until the economic and social yield from the consumption of a portion of the oil resources at the present time is at least equal to the economic and social yield that can be gotten in the future if these resources remain in the ground.

There is no doubt that the platform I have described above for the optimum exploitation of petroleum resources contains many economic assumptions and conclusions that many economists here in the kingdom or abroad might differ with me about. Differences in conclusions and recommendations do not mean differences in goals (which are to bring about the optimum exploitation of national resources) so much as differences in assumptions -- which have been the nature of the science of economics since it was established.

B. Creation of productive economic capabilities in various sectors of the domestic economy.

Just as the domestic economy needs to make optimum use of the petroleum resources it possesses, it needs to seek out other productive economic sources in all fields, industry, agriculture or various services.

Spelling out the economic activities that might constitute a productive source requires much research and analysis, if the economic feasibility of these programs and projects over the medium and long range are to be established.

Just as there is a difference in hypothesis related to the optimum exploitation of petroleum, the extent to which other economic resources are available, and contemporary and anticipated social and political circumstances, so do the programs and plans related to the outlining of a general framework for productive economic activities and their components differ. If a researcher may be permitted to present some views on the basis of his general observations and a small amount of the statistics available, while stressing that the situation requires a great deal of economic research and analysis, I consider that the economic sectors that can offer the domestic economy a high economic yield can be listed in accordance with the following priorities:

1. Petroleum, petrochemical and other basic industries needed to round out the concept of the optimum exploitation of petroleum resources.

If we accept the hypothesis that the optimum exploitation of oil is to keep it in the ground unless there are economic uses offering a better yield, that might indicate that these industries should be of intermediate size.

2. The banking sector.

This includes the establishment of financial and investment institutions that are compatible with the financial resources of the domestic economy as well as the creation of domestic staffs to run a developed banking industry.

3. Intermediate and small consumer industries and services.

For these industries and services to be of benefit to the domestic economy, they will have to be able to stand on their own two feet and government subsidies must not be the basic source of their survival over the long range.

4. The agricultural sector.

All agricultural activities and processing industries with a suitable economic yield needed to meet the requirements of self-sufficiency in food and develop the social life of the citizens in the rural areas and areas with a concentrated population.

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OIL SEEN AS SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 93, 21-27 Nov 81 p 45

[Article by al-Sar Sayyid Ahmad: "Discovery of Oil Will Solve Sudan's Economic Crisis"]

[Text] Three presidential decisions affecting Sudan's economic progress were taken this month. First of all, a \$22-million loan from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] was authorized. In addition, an oil exploration agreement was signed with Phillips Petroleum. However, the event that drew particular attention was President Ja'afar Numayri's attack on the Council of Ministers and the other administrative organizations. In the attack, he charged these organizations with ineffectiveness and neglect which had led to a decline in performance. This was followed by the announcement of a series of decisions including a 12.5-percent devaluation in the Sudanese pound, increases in government subsidies on oil, sugar, flour, and medicines, and the declaration of a public austerity program.

In the midst of the exchange of accusations between Sudan and Libya last month and the American administration's disclosure of its readiness to expedite fulfillment of Sudan's request for weapons, the WASHINGTON POST published an editorial saying that the real aid that Sudan needs is not in the military sphere but in the economic sphere.

The economic crisis in Sudan is nothing new. Its most evident symptoms were the first devaluation of the Sudanese pound in 1977 followed by institution of the austerity program and the beginning of efforts to reschedule debts. However, the roots of the crisis go back to the fluctuation of economic policies, which began with state interference through nationalizations and then shifted to a policy giving free rein to the private sector. This was followed by the initiation of an ambitious development program in all sectors at a time when the basic infrastructure was lacking. Adding to the problem were political disturbances in the interior and problems in neighboring states which forced some half a million refugees to enter Sudan, thus causing an additional burden. The problem was aggravated by the emigration of around one-half million Sudanese to work abroad. Despite the fact that these individuals send nearly \$300,000 a year back to their country, this does not make up for the negative impact caused by their absence since the great majority of them are highly trained in contemporary mental and physical skills. The lack of these skills has contributed to the decline in the standard of performance.

Published figures reveal that the oil bill for 1980-81 was \$339 million, or 67 percent of all revenues from exports. This percentage is expected to rise to 89 percent this year because of the increase in the price of oil and the decline in the volume of exports. On the other hand, food supplies have now become the number one item on the list of imports, amounting to 41 percent of the total. Food costs for last year reached \$275 million, half of which was spent on sugar imports. This fact is a direct contradiction to the hope which prevailed in the early 1970's that Sudan would become self-sufficient and the breadbasket of the Arab world in the 1980's.

Oil

It is hoped that the IMF loan will be followed by another loan for \$150 million from the Arab Monetary Fund and some \$100 million in support from Saudi Arabia. These sums will be used to fund the balance of payments and provide the necessary funds to purchase basic commodities. From this point, Sudan will continue the process of rescheduling its debts. Of the total foreign debt of \$2.3 billion, some \$425 million has been rescheduled. The British bank Morgan-Grenville is playing a primary role in current debt rescheduling operations.

However, the strongest hope for getting the Sudanese economy back on its feet is oil. The story being circulated is that the government of President Numayri brought in experts from the People's Republic of China to assist in oil exploration. After study and exploration, the Chinese announced that Sudan has oil but only the American companies would be able to extract it. In the event, an agreement was signed with Chevron, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, to begin exploration in the Red Sea area in 1974. The company did not remain in that area long, however, but moved on to the midwestern and southern areas of Sudan to explore in an area of one-half million square kilometers. This area has dwindled to 280 square kilometers at present. The company's first success occurred after 2 years of work in this area when it succeeded in extracting oil from the Abu Jabirah well in 1979.

Up to the present, Chevron has drilled 24 wells in its current concession area. Twelve of these were dry wells and 3 wells still need additional work and evaluation to establish the extent of their potential. As for the remaining wells, what with Abu Jabirah, which was discovered in July 1979 and has a productive capacity of 575 barrels a day, and al-Wahdah well number 7, which was discovered in January of this year and has a productive capacity of 2,900 barrels a day, the total production of discovered wells is around 17,910 barrels a day. The largest concentration of wells is in the al-Wahdah field. This field is believed to contain reserves of 68 to 80 million barrels, prompting Alan Martini, the manager of Chevron in Sudan, to say that there is currently enough oil to last 10 to 15 years at the lowest estimate. Sudan currently requires 25,000 barrels per day.

This optimistic situation dictated that construction begin on a second refinery which would rely on the produced petroleum. However, selection of the refinery site was an extremely delicate political decision. The al-Wahdah field that contains the oil is located in the impoverished Southern Region, which was in a state of war with the north for a period of 7 years but was granted autonomy

in 1972. Therefore, the southerners naturally felt that the refinery should be built in their region to aid in the development of the area. The central government had a different opinion since natural resources and the means of exploiting them fall within the responsibility of the central government. Therefore, the proposed site in the city of Kusti 223 kilometers south of the capital city of Khartoum is an appropriate site in view of its location in the central part of the country, a fact which will aid in the process of distribution.

Last August, the Sudanese Government signed an agreement with Chevron and the International Finance Agency for the establishment of the White Nile Petroleum Company. The first task of this company is to concentrate on the Kusti refinery. The International Finance Agency took a 20-percent share in the new company while the government and Chevron divided the remaining shares between themselves. Although this agreement is not final, there is talk about involving the Arab Petroleum Investments Company--an organization belonging to OAPEC--in the project. The refinery project includes 550 kilometers of 12-inch diameter pipeline extending from the al-Wahdah field to the city of Kusti. The initial cost of the project has been estimated at \$700 million of which \$200 million will go for the pipeline alone.

The tenders pertaining to the start of work on the refinery call for the invitation of bids at the beginning of 1982 with the work to be completed by 1984. The refinery will operate at a capacity of 25,000 barrels from the beginning.

Chevron is not the only company active in the field of exploration. However, it is unique in that it is the only company that has enjoyed success thus far and is also the first company that ventured into exploration in Sudan's interior. All previous activities had taken place on the Red Sea coast. Up to the end of last year, Chevron had spent \$210 million on its activities inside Sudan. It is expected to spend an additional \$75 million by the end of this year. The company has three drilling rigs in operation at the present time.

The Red Sea coast is still attracting other companies. For example, Texas Eastern Sudan Company is operating on an area of 26,711 square kilometers. If it renews its contract next month, this will indicate that it is optimistic and it could begin drilling some exploratory wells at the beginning of 1982. Another company is Union Texas which has an area of 3,440 square kilometers. This company hopes to drill its first well before the end of this year. The Americans are not the only ones working in the field. The French are working in two different areas. The first of these consists of 64,000 square kilometers south of Port Sudan in which the French will drill Sawakin well number 2 next January. Sawakin well number 1 was dry. The French also have a second area of 200,000 square kilometers and the idea of moving into the western border area adjoining Libya is currently under discussion.

The current picture of oil resources is not so encouraging as to suggest that Sudan will ever become, for example, a member of OAPEC. However, the situation is encouraging enough to make Sudan self-sufficient and provide the costs of the ever-growing oil bill. Until domestic production begins, the Sudanese economy will undergo a critical period.

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STUDY EXAMINES SUDANESE ECONOMY

Cairo AL-WADI in Arabic No 7, Nov 81 pp 61-63

[Article by Aminah al-Sharif: "A Dissertation Which Complains"]

[Text] The Arabs Are Howling About Lack of Food, and the Lands of the Sudan Are Howling About Neglect!

The Arab countries and the rest of the world have become increasingly aware of the food supply problem and are seriously feeling an urgent need to provide for a secure food supply. This has brought the attention of the world to the Sudan. Studies have shown that the Sudan enjoys enormous untouched resources in terms of arable land, which could be used for agriculture, and also has great animal wealth. We are talking here about between 120 and 200 million feddans of land, and several million head of sheep, camels, and cattle.

Dr 'Iraqi 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sharbini, in the introduction to his doctoral dissertation which he submitted to the Institute of African Studies and Research in the University of Cairo, tells us further that if the resources of the Sudan were utilized well they could effectively contribute toward achieving the secure food supply which is being sought. This was the beginning of a broader discussion about the Sudan as the breadbasket of the Arab world.

Broad Outlines

Dr al-Sharbini's doctoral dissertation, after being submitted, earned Dr al-Sharbini a degree with honors after the dissertation was extensively discussed by the doctoral committee, which was composed of Drs 'Abd al-Malik 'Awdah, Sa'd Mahir, and Muhammad Yusuf al-Suki.

The dissertation consists of four chapters and a final chapter. The first chapter of the dissertation deals with the background of the Sudan's economic activity and the problems of mobilizing the Sudan's resources. The second chapter concerns the role which the tax system played in the mobilization of public resources during the sixties and seventies. The third chapter discusses the problem of assessing the economic and financial performance of public projects in the Sudan. The fourth chapter deals with the problem of deficit financing as one of the important means of mobilizing resources in the Sudan. The final chapter takes up the future of development in the Sudan and presents the most

important conclusions and suggestions which Dr al-Sharbini arrived at during his residence in the Sudan.

In the introduction to his dissertation, Dr al-Sharbini says: "The Sudan, which is the largest nation in Africa (with a total area of 2.5 million square kilometers), embraces many types of terrain, climates, and vegetation. This is why people have begun to talk about the Sudan as a 'world food bank.' This is also why both international gatherings and gatherings of Arab nations have repeatedly stated that it is necessary to set up a program for the utilization of this potential and to channel all sorts of sources of investment to the Sudan for this purpose, especially the enormous Arab capital surpluses which have been earned after 1973."

The Less-Developed Countries

Dr al-Sharbini adds: "In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that the Sudan, already about two decades ago, began the process of planned development, it is still considered by the UN to be in the category of nations considered to be underdeveloped. This classification by the UN is based on phenomena such as economic and social backwardness, low individual income, the predominance of an economic and social dichotomy in all aspects of the nation's life, backwardness in production methods, and weakness of the nation's infrastructure."

Dr al-Sharbini goes on to say: "The Sudan began its process of development two decades ago, relying on the method of comprehensive national planning, according to which the public sector was supposed to play the main role in the development. However, there have always been unforeseen circumstances which have affected the development projects in these plans and have thus delayed the process of development in the country. For example, the first development plan which the country had was the 10-year economic and social development plan which started in 1961 (the 1961/62-1970/71 development plan) and was halted in the year 1964. After that there was the 1970/71-1974/75 5-year development plan which was accompanied by basic organizational changes in the national economy. The result was an expansion of the scope of the public sector and increasing dominance of the public sector in the country's economic activity."

"This plan then faltered, and there began the implementation of some temporary programs and policies until 1977--a year which saw the beginning of the implementation of a new development plan (the 1977/78-1982/83 development plan). This plan was also obstructed by a number of circumstances." Dr al-Sharbini labels these successive plans "investment programs for the restoration of the public sector."

Domestic and Foreign Economic Activity

In the first chapter Dr al-Sharbini talks about the features of the Sudan's domestic and foreign economic activity and leads the discussion to the role of the public sector in the country's economic activity. He says: "The most important thing which distinguishes the Sudan's economic and social structure is the phenomenon of economic and social dichotomy. This, in general, refers to the situation in which the national [economic] sector is divided into two sectors

which coexist side by side. One of these two sectors is a traditional economic sector, and the other one is a modern economic sector. The former is distinguished by its production which aims at self-sufficiency, whereas the latter is characterized by its market-oriented production, utilization of monetary exchange, and reliance on real fixed capital."

"The Sudan offers a perfect example of an economy which is a dual economy in all respects. First you have the huge traditional economic sector. This sector accounts for about half of the national production and occupies more than two-thirds of the country's inhabitants. The modern economic sector, though, consists of large agricultural projects and industrial projects which rely on modern technical means of production, and the larger part of the production is exported."

Dr al-Sharbini also says: "The Sudan basically depends on agriculture. The agricultural half of the economic sector, including animal, plant, and forest production, constituted 60 percent of the GDP at the beginning of the sixties. This figure went down to 40 percent by the beginning of the seventies, and then went down to 38 percent by the middle of the seventies--as the percentage of the sector of industry and services went up. The long-staple cotton crop is considered to be the most important agricultural crop in the Sudan. During the years 1962-64 long-staple cotton accounted for an average of 57 percent of the total in large commodity exports, and during the years 1975-77 it accounted for an average of about 47 percent of these exports. The production of cotton is considered to be one of the country's decisive factors in economic performance, although the government has tried to expand the planting of other types of crops such as peanuts and sesame, for export, in addition to sugar cane, sorghum, and rice."

Dr al-Sharbini mentions that although the Sudan has large areas of land available for agriculture, the country's agricultural sector suffers from a lack of available sources of investment, a small labor force, poor distribution of this labor force, poor transportation and communications services, lack of irrigation, and lack of agricultural research.

"Industry in the Sudan," according to Dr al-Sharbini, "is extremely weak. It still consists of processing industries even though the government has tried to encourage industrial investment. The barriers to a better industry in the Sudan are basically the country's lack of transportation, communications, electrical power, education, and training. Also, the various mineral deposits are not being exploited, there is a lack of skilled labor and technical personnel, and there is a lack of planning."

"The Sudan's foreign economic activity relies on exports and imports. Earnings from exports are unstable due to the fact that they depend on a single crop whose prices go up and down on the world market and the foreign demand for which is unstable because it is subject to the policies of the importing industrial nations and is affected by the fact that synthetic materials are taking the place of cotton textiles. The Sudan's imports are continually increasing, and a large part of these imports consists of machinery, equipment, and means of transportation."

The Public Sector Represents Half of the GDP

Dr al-Sharbini goes on to say: "The public sector did not demonstrate its importance as a large and effective force in the country's economic activity until the beginning of the seventies, after large-scale nationalization had taken place at the beginning of that decade. Since that time the public sector has come to dominate all of the country's nontraditional economic activities. The public sector is now involved in modern agricultural projects, sources of electrical power and water, the field of communications and transport, manufacturing industries, domestic and foreign trade, and banks. By the early seventies the public sector accounted for about half of the country's GDP."

Dr al-Sharbini adds: "Only 2 years had gone by since those enormous changes which had been brought about by measures of nationalization and confiscation when people began to think about modifying those measures when the government became aware of the failure of some of the units and installations which had been confiscated within the framework of public administration."

"Thus thought was given to formulating a new government policy concerning the private sector! The government announced that it was providing many easy terms to the private sector and it passed a number of laws to encourage both domestic and foreign private investment in the Sudan's industry and agricultural services."

"The Sudan's tax system," according to Dr al-Sharbini, "has most of the characteristics common to the tax systems in developing African countries in terms of relying on indirect taxes, especially taxes on foreign trade."

Dr al-Sharbini says: "Up till very recently (1964) the Sudan had no system of personal income taxes. [The introduction of personal income taxes] was a great event in the country's economic and financial development because it created justice in the tax system due to the tax revenues' flexibility with regard to changes in income and since it is an important tool for achieving economic stability and dealing with the pressures of inflation." Dr al-Sharbini adds: "The most important problem confronting the tax system is tax evasion on the part of the Sudan's citizens. This is attributable to old colonial political vestiges. Some people go so far as to say that taxes during the colonial period, in the eyes of the Sudanese, were a symbol of colonial domination and that evading payment of taxes was considered to be both a national duty and a heroic deed."

Dr al-Sharbini, in the final chapter of his dissertation, discusses the future of development in the Sudan. He says: "The principal source [of finances] for development in the Sudan consists of the surpluses of capital resulting from the collection of taxes. This capital is making a real contribution toward the economic development of the Arab world, particularly in the Sudan. These capital surpluses benefit not only the Sudan. They also benefit the Arab nations themselves which possess these capital surpluses, especially since these surpluses are invested in capital assets in tax banks, and this causes them to take an interest in furthering Arab development."

"However, it seems that bad relations are preventing the implementation of such cooperative projects."

At the end of his dissertation, Dr al-Sharbini offers a number of suggestions for guidance for the Sudan's development. They are a result of the scholar's residence in the Sudan and his contacts with specialized agencies there: "As far as the tax system is concerned, I recommend combating the evasion of taxes on profits and taxes on income from real estate, in order to achieve social justice and in order to correct the path taken by the tax system in the realm of controlling expenditures."

Dr al-Sharbini mentions a number of ways of doing this. They include the improvement and consolidation of the monitoring of expenditures and revision of the charter of current expenditures in light of new priorities and principles by means of providing systems of accounting, auditing, and strengthening the central auditing apparatus, the possibility of redeployment and restructuring of the military establishment so that it can contribute to social development in the realm of improvement of the efficiency of public projects by means of the creation of qualified administrative personnel, who are capable and experienced, to take over the responsibilities of administering the projects, and giving them the authority to administer the projects, use their flexibility, and take decisions.

In the realm of mobilizing resources, Dr al-Sharbini suggests that the authorities give up the policy of deficit financing as a means of public financing. Deficit financing means printing more money and consequently the necessity of resorting to policies and steps which are more difficult when it comes to mobilizing the country's own resources. Deficit financing is financing which covers excess government expenditures over and above the government's normal income. This also means that the government resorts to borrowing and withdrawing from its accumulated savings in order to finance a portion of its expenditures.

Proposed Solutions

Dr al-Sharbini touched upon the subject of Egyptian-Sudanese integration and its possibilities as a clear indication of economic relations between the two countries. He says: "This integration has resulted in some organizational and political structures in various fields, joint technical committees in different specializations and activities, and in the offering of recommendations concerning these matters to other parties concerned. It has also resulted in agreements which include the establishment of joint agencies and corporations, the exchange of preferences granted in the field of commerce, and the establishment of some projects based on economic integration. Some of these projects have been in the field of irrigation. The total amount spent on joint projects during the years 1978-82 was approximately 996 million pounds. A total of 60 percent of these funds was for irrigation projects, and 32 percent went to transportation projects. All of the other sectors taken together received less than 20 percent of the proposed investments."

Dr al-Sharbini also mentions the fact that both countries are suffering from a financing problem. He says that this is the principal obstacle to achieving success in the case of many of the projects involving integration between the two countries because they are projects which require huge amounts of funds. In his opinion, the solution to this problem is to be found in large-scale cooperation between the Arab countries.

BRIEFS

PORT EQUIPPED FOR RORO VESSELS--The Syrian port of Latakia will become the first state in the eastern Mediterranean to be equipped to receive "Roro" vessels, i.e., vessels with "roll-off, roll-on" capability. This technique is one of the fastest and most modern systems in the field of marine transport. This information was announced by Ramadan 'Atiyah, general director of the port of Latakia, in the context of his evaluation of the news that the Port Administration has contracted with a Danish engineering consulting firm to prepare a complete technical study pertaining to the construction of a special terminal for this type of ship at the end of the port of Latakia's old breakwater. The cost of the study is 475,000 Danish kroner (or \$50,000) with the provision that the study is to be ready within 6 months from the date of authorization. This sum is part of the overall cost for construction of the terminal, which is estimated at 7 million Syrian pounds (around \$1.1 million). The terminal will be ready to receive the first vessel of this type by the end of 1982, thus opening the door to Roro ship traffic bound for the Middle East and the Gulf in the form of international transit to specified ports in this area, which includes Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The key advantage of Roro vessels is the ease with which their cargo--estimated at 3,500 to 4,000 tons per ship--can be loaded and unloaded within a few hours. This feature will give the port of Latakia an excellent international reputation and will give a high productive capacity to the rail lines which extend from Latakia to Tartus, Homs, Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and al-Qamishli and then on to Mawsil, Baghdad and the Shatt al-'Arab. /Text/ /Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 247, 14 Nov 81 p 60/ 8591

CSO: 4404/159

BRIEFS

INCREASED BANK CAPITAL--The National Bank of Abu Dhabi is to increase its authorised capital tenfold from \$27.24 million to \$272.4 million and its paid up capital to \$163.44 million from \$27.24 million, the bank's board of directors announced recently. The board said 3 million shares would be offered to local citizens at \$81.72 per share. The National Bank of Abu Dhabi was established in 1968 and its main shareholder is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, which holds 65.6 per cent of the equity. UAE citizens hold 29.9 per cent of the shares and other shareholders have 4.5 per cent. At the end of last year the bank held deposits of \$4.49 billion and had 28 branches in the UAE and 15 foreign branches. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 1, 4 Jan 82 p 11]

CSO: 4400/114

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

NORTH YEMEN TO GET \$10 MILLION LOAN FROM IDB--The Islamic Development Bank has extended a \$10 million loan to North Yemen to buy Iraqi Petroleum products, the Jiddah-based bank said last week. The bank gave no other details of the conditions of the agreement, but the bank's loans are interest-free as interest is forbidden under Islamic laws observed by the bank. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 1, 4 Jan 82 p 7]

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